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Abstract	  
In this study we investigate how market structure affect the interest rate spread of banks that 
provide lending for commercial entities in Norway. We delineate the Norwegian bank market 
into local commuter belts, and define the commuter belts as either high- or low concentration 
regions depending on their level of market concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). Regions with HHI-levels above 0.20 are defined as high 
concentration regions whereas regions with HHI-levels equal to and below 0.20 are defined as 
low concentration regions. We analyze how market concentration along with other potential 
determinants affect the interest rate spread of banks in both high- and low concentration 
regions over the years 1998 – 2008 using panel data regression methods. In high 
concentration regions, we find that a 0.10 increase in market concentration increases the 
interest rate spread by 3.64 basis points. However, there is no evidence that market 
concentration affects interest rate spreads in low concentration regions. Our analysis further 
reveals that market share, based on loan levels, has a negative impact on the interest rate 
spread in both high- and low concentration regions. The study is based on unique banking 
data, which we use with permission from the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. The data 
provides an extensive overview of the Norwegian banking sector from 1998 – 2008. 
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1.	  Introduction	  
1.1	  Background	  
Currently, there is a growing body of research that discusses market structure and how this 
affects performance in the banking industry. Market structure refers to the different 
characteristics of a market, i.e. the number and distribution of banks and the specific attributes 
of the banks within the market as well as the attributes of the market itself.  Performance may 
be measured in terms of banks’ interest rate spreads1. Many studies have been conducted on 
this topic and empirical evidence show that market concentration has an effect on interest rate 
spreads. However, competing theories offer contradictory conclusions in regard to this 
relationship. For instance, proponents of the Structure Conduct Performance Hypothesis 
suggest a direct positive relationship between market concentration and interest rate spreads, 
while those in favor of the Efficiency Hypothesis consider the effect of market concentration 
on interest rate spreads to be merely spurious. In this study, we thoroughly review the 
available literature on these topics and investigate how market concentration, along with other 
possible determinants, affect interest rate spreads in the Norwegian banking sector. We define 
the Norwegian banking sector as all commercial- and savings banks that supply credit. Other 
types of financial intermediaries are and intentionally excluded. On the credit demand side 
our focus is solely on commercial customers. Private consumers are excluded from our 
analysis2.  
The data we use consist of comprehensive data sets made available to us by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance. These data sets contain key information about all deposit and loan 
accounts in Norwegian registered banks belonging to commercial organizations in Norway in 
the years 1997 – 2008. The data sets include actual year-end balances of the accounts as well 
as interests that were credited or debited from accounts during the period. Because all data are 
audited and since all banks are required to report this information to the Norwegian Tax 
Administration we believe that the data offer a highly accurate snapshot of the Norwegian 
bank market.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Various measures of performance can be found in the theoretical banking literature. Frequently applied measures include loan rates, 
deposit rates and interest rate spreads, although other performance measures such as return on assets and net interest margins can also be 
found in applications. 
2 Commercial customers typically have different banking needs than private consumers. For instance, private consumers’ banking needs are 
usually limited to loans, deposits and payment transaction systems. Consumers are to a lesser extent dependent on close geographical 
proximity to their banks than commercial customers, due to the advent of internet banking (The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, 
2008).  This impacts how we have defined the relevant bank markets as detailed in the Theory chapter.   	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1.2	  Research	  Question	  and	  Objective	  
Credit market concentration has increased in most European countries in recent years, the 
result being fewer and larger credit institutions. In Norway, the number of commercial banks 
has been relatively stable the last decade. However, this is not to say that the structure of the 
Norwegian bank market has remained unchanged. Although the number of banks is high 
compared to other countries when adjusting for the size of the population, the Norwegian 
bank market has indeed been subject to consolidation with fewer and larger banks making up 
most local markets, according to a report on competition in the Norwegian bank market from 
The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Konkurransen i bankmarkedet, 2008). Prior 
to the financial crisis in 2008 the profitability in the banking sector had been increasing. The 
good results and high returns on equity can be attributed to low losses on loans, since tighter 
competition had led to a reduction in the banks’ interest margins. It is also evident that the 
largest banks have had higher returns on their equity than smaller banks. The same report 
proposes a combination of higher costs and high levels of equity as the cause of the smaller 
banks’ lower returns. 
The changes in market size and the differences in equity return among banks of different sizes 
makes it interesting to assess how the spreads between the banks’ deposit rates and lending 
rates are affected by market structure, specifically the number and distribution of banks in a 
market. Based on an assumption that a correlation between interest rate spreads and market 
concentration exists, it is tempting to further examine which implications market structure has 
on the interest rate spread. In order to assess this, it is sensible to look at markets with 
different market structures, or more precisely; compare markets with various levels of market 
concentration. This leads us to propose the following research question for our study: 
“How does market structure affect the interest rate spread in local Norwegian bank 
markets?” 
The object of the study is to identify how structural changes in local bank markets determine 
the performance, measured by the interest rate spread, of banks offering commercial lending. 
The interest rate spread serves as a measure of performance based on the assumption that 
banks enjoy higher earnings as the difference between loan rates and the cost of funding 
increases. Since we are interested in the effects of market structure, it is helpful to distinguish 
between markets with different structural compounds. A typical distinction, commonly used 
by legislators when determining the anti-trust effects of potential merges, is to set a threshold 
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that distinguishes between highly concentrated an un-concentrated markets based on their 
levels of market concentration. We make a similar distinction between markets in the analyses 
conducted in this study. The academic purpose of this thesis is to provide a thorough analysis 
on the relationship between market structure and the dynamics of interest rate spreads in the 
Norwegian banking industry. 
1.3	  Structure	  
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the relevant theoretical 
literature, focusing on studies on the coherence between market structure and measures of 
performance in the banking industry. This chapter also contains a depiction of our research 
model derived from the theoretical literature. In Chapter 3 we provide a thorough description 
of the data that form the basis for our analysis. The methods applied in the analysis are 
described in Chapter 4. We present our findings in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 contains a detailed 
discussion of the findings and the conclusions we draw from these. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   4	  
2.	  Theory	  
2.1	  Introduction	  
In this chapter we will first describe the theoretical approach we have used to define the 
various bank markets in our study. This includes a discussion of different ways to define 
markets within an industry analysis framework, as well as an assessment of different methods 
to measure market structure. A discussion of how changes in market structure affect banks’ 
performance, and how market concentration along with other possible determinants affect 
banks’ interest rate spreads will follow3. We will proceed with a discussion of competing 
theories on how the subject, with particular emphasis on the Structure Conduct Performance 
Hypothesis, the Efficiency Hypothesis and new empirical industrial organization studies on 
banking. 
2.2	  Market	  Definition	  
When assessing the effect market structure has on competition and performance in the 
banking sector, a cogent definition of the relevant markets is necessary (Jackson, 1992). As 
Brooks (1995) points out, it has little meaning to assess conditions of competition, such as 
market concentration and market share, unless the boundaries of the markets under analysis 
have been thoroughly defined. The literature on market delineation is rather extensive and 
several approaches to make correct definitions of markets have been proposed4. However, a 
basic introduction to the topic can be found in Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer 
(2007).  When defining a market (in our case we wanted to define the local markets for 
Norwegian banks that provide credit to commercial entities), it is useful to begin with 
identifying competitors. By comparing the degree to which the products or services of two 
firms are substitutes for one another, i.e. the extent to which a price change by one firm leads 
to a demand change for another firm, it is possible to say something about the level of 
competition between the firms in question. According to Besanko et al. (2007) products that 
have the same or similar product performance characteristics, have the same or similar 
occasions for use and are sold in the same market tend to be close substitutes. A product’s 
performance characteristics describe the product’s attributes subjectively from the customer’s 
point of view. For instance, a money market deposit account (MMDA) from bank A may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The interest rate spread can be defined as the difference between the bank’s interest revenue from its loans to commercial customers and 
the interest expenses that the bank has when lending in the money market (i.e. the 3- month NIBOR): (interest paid by borrowers/interest 
earning loans to borrowers) – NIBOR. We discuss how we define the interest rate spread in our study in Chapter 4.	  
4 See for instance Elzinga and Hogarty, 1978 and Stigler and Sherwin, 1985. 
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share the following characteristics with a MMDA from bank B: larger-than-normal deposits, 
offers the competitive (real) interest rate and has restrictions on withdrawal. When, where and 
how a product is used describes the product’s occasion for use. Bank A may specialize in 
syndicating loans to finance large industry projects whereas Bank B could be a consumer 
bank providing credit to homebuyers requesting a mortgage and to small privately owned 
businesses. In such a case, the financing services offered by Bank A and Bank B would likely 
not be substitutes. This illustrates that bank specific competence matter when defining 
relevant bank markets. Products that share the same performance characteristics and 
occasions for use may not necessarily be substitutes if they are sold in different geographic 
markets. Local banks or local branches of nationwide banks that offer the same products and 
services in their distinct geographic market may be competitors, but they seldom compete for 
customers with banks in other geographic markets. Besanko et al. (2007) offer a list of three 
criteria that determine whether two products are in different geographic markets: 1) they are 
sold in different locations, 2) transportation of the goods is costly and 3) it is costly for 
consumers to travel to buy the goods. Delineating markets by location alone seems to be 
insufficient in order to determine the geographic market to which a bank belongs. Therefore a 
definition of geographic bank markets should take into account both the location of where 
banking services are offered and the cost of transportation between, and travelling to, these 
locations. As such, an intuitive approach is to define the geographic markets in our study by 
the commuter belts5 to which each bank or branch of bank belong. 
Admittedly, the approach to competitor identification and defining substitutes outlined above 
can be subjective and is based on intuition rather than empiricism. Attempting to delineate 
markets by competitor identification may sometimes be challenging due to the occurrence of 
switching costs. As Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009) explain, switching between banks may 
entail both transactional switching costs that are directly observable and informational 
switching costs associated with the capitalized value of a bank-firm relationship. They argue 
that banks can increase transactional switching costs by charging account closure fees and can 
invest in information gathering to increase informational switching costs. Sharpe (1990) 
argues that information asymmetries between firms and banks arise because banks learn more 
about their customers than their competitors do through the process of lending. This enables 
banks to give firms that they have longstanding relationships with better credit ratings than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We refer to commuter belts simply as “regions” throughout this thesis. However, in some contexts we still use the term “commuter belts” 
for better clarity. Statistics Norway (SSB) defines a commuter belt as a populated region that includes at least one municipality that workers 
commute within. There are 161 commuter belts in Norway. 
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these firms would receive elsewhere. As a result of the informational advantage a bank may 
have over its competitors, the bank can capture some of the rents generated by its best 
customers by holding up these customers, effectively preventing them from receiving 
competitive financing elsewhere. Ioannidu and Ongena (2007) show that even under an 
information-sharing regime, where information is accessible to competing banks, switching 
costs may still occur. By offering similar credit rating to its current customers, a bank can 
make it more difficult for competitors to assess the actual quality of the customers in each 
individual case. Freixas and Rochet (1997: 74) explain how switching costs alters the time 
profile of competition in bank markets using a two-period model: If switching costs are 
sufficiently high, banks can “lock in” their customers in the second period and charge higher 
prices, which again influences the competition in the first period. Hence, a price change in 
one bank’s product will not immediately affect the demand for a competing bank’s product. 
Even though it is possible to take into account the time lags incurred by switching costs when 
doing the calculations, the scope of such an exercise across the entire Norwegian banking 
sector almost certainly qualifies for a study on its own.  
The type of competition in a market can also be pertinent to identifying relevant competitors. 
Freixas and Rochet (1999) argue that the assumption of perfect competition is not necessarily 
appropriate in the banking sector, partly because of high entry barriers, and suggest that 
models of imperfect competition (oligopoly a la Cournot) better describe competition in bank 
markets. The same authors also open for the possibility of bank markets being subject to 
monopolistic competition, which will incur if there is some degree of differentiation between 
the bank services offered. This suggests that banks do not compete solely on price. Again, it 
would be possible to incorporate such variables in an assessment of competition in the bank 
market, but doing such an assessment falls on the side of our primary focus in this study and 
seems at best superfluous to our purposes. 
Simple microeconomic theory on price/quantity elasticites provides a quantitative approach to 
defining competitors and delineating specific markets. This involves measuring the degree to 
which two products substitute by calculating the cross-price elasticity of demand. The cross-
price elasticity of demand measures the percentage change in demand for one good that 
results from a 1-percent change in the price of another good (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005). 
Simply put, if an increase in the price for one good, A, leads to an increase in demand for 
another good, B, all else being equal, goods A and B are substitutes. The cross-price elasticity 
of demand for product B relative to product A can be written as: 
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€ 
ηba =
ΔQb Qb
ΔPa Pa     (2.1)                                                   
 
where 
€ 
Qb  is the quantity sold of product B and 
€ 
Pa  is the price of product A. When 
€ 
ηba is 
positive, products A and B can be considered substitutes. Although using cross-price 
elasticities to identify substitutes and thus delineate markets is accurate in its own sense 
(provided that data on quantity demanded and prices are available), it may not necessarily be 
feasible when defining markets in the Norwegian banking sector. Brooks (1995) points out 
that while there appears to be some consensus on identifying market boundaries using cross-
price elasticities of demand, the practical problems associated with applying this approach 
sometimes preclude its use, especially when attempting to define geographic market 
boundaries.  
According to Stigler and Sherwin (1985), a potential source of information that may aid in 
defining geographic markets is the physical movement of goods or buyers from one place to 
another. As they explain, markets can be divided by examining the flow of goods and services 
across geographic regions. This way of defining a market can be considered as a complement 
to defining markets by a specific metropolitan statistical area. A metropolitan statistical area 
is a geographical region with a certain population density, for instance a commuter belt, but is 
not subject to common administrative legislation such as a town or a county would be. While 
identifying competitors in a specified statistical area may be a good starting point, it merely 
outlines the ad hoc boundaries between markets and does not necessarily take account of the 
customers served by the businesses in the specified statistical area. Examining the flow of 
services for the banks in our data set involves identifying where the customers served by the 
banks are located and their travel patterns. The contiguous area from which a firm draws its 
customers from is sometimes referred to as a catchment area (Besanko et al., 2007). A natural 
catchment area for a bank would be the commuter belt that surrounds it. In this context, it is 
important to note some important implications that dividing the market into commuter belts 
have in respect to the differences between bank markets for private consumers and bank 
markets for commercial entities. The evolution of electronic banking services has effectively 
eliminated the need for private consumers to be in physical proximity to their banks in order 
to use the banks’ services. Hence, the traditional boundaries between local consumer bank 
markets no longer exist. Commercial entities, on the other hand, may differ from private 
consumers in their needs for banking services and may require a closer relationship with their 
banks. Degryse and Ongena (2005) study the effect geographical distance between firms, their 
	   8	  
lending banks and competing banks in the vicinity have on loan conditions. They find that 
loan rates decrease when the distance between the firm and its lending bank decreases, and 
increase when the distance between the firm and competing banks increases. The cause of this 
spatial price discrimination is attributed to transportation costs, rather than switching costs 
derived from informational asymmetries. Potential benefits from firm-bank relationships are 
well documented in the empirical literature on relationship banking (see for instance Boot and 
Thakor, 2000). The role of firm-bank relationships generally, and geographical distance 
specifically, makes it more difficult for commercial customers to obtain the services they 
require from banks that are not in close physical proximity. We therefore argue that even 
though using commuter belts to delineate private bank markets may not be feasible, commuter 
belts still represent relevant markets in which banks compete for commercial business 
customers. 
Examining data on customer travel patterns is called flow analysis. Besanko et al. (2007) 
point out that although flow analysis is a good place to start when attempting to delineate 
market boundaries, it does have some weaknesses. It may be that customers continue to 
remain within a certain catchment area over time, but that does not mean that they would not 
travel outside the catchment area for their required services if prices or any other demand 
effecting variables were to change. Also, customers may venture outside the predefined 
catchment area for idiosyncratic reasons, such as seeking a specialized service from a bank 
that specialize in services not provided in that particular catchment area. This does not 
automatically imply that banks that offer these specialized services should be included in the 
catchment area. However, this weakness is less prevalent when dividing markets by 
predefined commuter belts. Since the boundaries of these commuter belts by definition 
remain relatively stable over time, it reduces the risk of including banks in a specific local 
market that in reality belong to another local market. 
In his study on market definition in bank merger and acquisition analysis, Jackson (1992) 
tests whether metropolitan statistical areas are appropriate measures of economic markets for 
banking services. The study compares the similarity of price movements within given 
metropolitan statistical areas with average US nationwide price movements to test for the 
existence of geographically defined local markets. The underlying assumption of the test is 
that while similar adjustment patterns to common influences for banks in different markets 
would not necessarily prove that they belong in the same geographic region, dissimilar 
adjustment patterns suggest that they do not belong in the same geographic area. Jackson’s 
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(1992) findings suggest that for certain bank services, where the interest rate is determined 
locally; the market delineation appears not to be national.6 This study was conducted on the 
US banking sector and it is important to note that the results might not necessarily be 
transferable to the Norwegian banking sector. However, it seems likely that delineating 
markets locally by using predetermined metropolitan statistical areas is feasible when factors 
affecting competition appear to have properties that originate in local areas. The view that 
bank markets are indeed local in their nature is proponed by Hannan (1991), who argues that 
if commercial loan markets are substantially broader than metropolitan statistical areas, loan 
rates should not differ systematically between metropolitan statistical areas. This is not altered 
by the fact that loan rates obviously may vary across different loans and different banks. His 
findings suggest that there are significant variations in loan rates between metropolitan 
statistical areas, providing evidence that idiosyncratic properties of local loan markets affect 
the interest rate. This further legitimates arguments for using a local market definition. 
However, it necessitates a framework for which idiosyncratic properties within a market can 
be measured, which we discuss in the following sections. 
2.3	  Market	  Structure	  
In order to assess how interest rate spreads change across markets it is important to have a 
sound understanding of the concepts that are used to measure market structure. The structure 
of the market refers to the number and distribution of firms in a market (Besanko et al., 2007). 
To capture the structural features within a market, concentration ratios of various kinds are 
often used. Concentration ratios are useful to explain competitive performance in the banking 
industry. They also measure the changes in concentration resulting from the entry or exit of a 
bank into the market and the concentration changes caused by a merger (Bikker and Haaf, 
2002). As with delineating markets and defining its boundaries, there are several ways to 
determine the structure within a given market and calculate the concentration ratios. A highly 
applicable measure of market structure is the K-bank concentration ratio (Bikker and Haaf, 
2002). This is a measure of the combined market share of the K largest firms in a particular 
market. For example, in a given bank market, the 3-bank concentration ratio is the combined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Specifically, this is the case for Super Negotiable Order of Withdraw (SNOW) accounts and Money Market Deposit Accounts (MMDA). 
A SNOW account is a type of interest earning checking account that allows the customer to write drafts against money held on deposit. It 
typically pays higher interest rates than a regular NOW account (but lower than an MMDA), hence the prefix “Super” at the front. MMDA’s 
are high-yielding savings accounts that pays the market rate of interest, the real interest rate, and require a minimum balance of a certain size 
in exchange for the additional interest paid. A national market specification is appropriate for small (less than $100,000) six-month 
certificates of deposits (CD6), where the interest rate is determined on a broader national level. Specifically, Jackson (1992) examines the 
scope of the markets for SNOW, MMDA and CD6 deposit account across US markets for bank services. For a more detailed description of 
the variables included in the study we refer the interested reader to pp. 657-661 in “Is the Market Well Defined in Bank Merger and 
Acquisition Analysis” by Jackson (1992).	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market share of the three largest banks in that market. In a market of N equally sized banks, 
the K-bank concentration ratio (CR) is: 
€ 
CRK = si = 1/N
i=1
K
∑ =
i=1
K
∑ K /N
  (2.2)
 
Here 
€ 
Si is the market share of bank 
€ 
i , 
€ 
K  is the number of highest ranked banks included, and
€ 
N is the number of total banks in the market. While the K-bank concentration ratio is rather 
easy to use and quick to calculate, it has a large weakness in that it does not change in respect 
to internal market share changes between the K-number of firms used for reference. For 
instance, if the largest bank in market gains market shares at the expense of the second largest 
firm, the K-bank ratio will remain unaffected. Another way to measure market concentration 
ratio is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sometimes referred to as the Herfindahl Index or 
simply HHI). The HHI is calculated by summing the squared market shares of all firms in the 
market, producing a number that theoretically can be between 1/N and 1(in practice the 
number will range between close to 0 and close to 1). This index can be written as: 
€ 
HHI = (Si)2
i=1
N
∑
  (2.3)
 
where 
€ 
Si is the market share of firm 
€ 
i  and 
€ 
N  is the number of firms in the market. For 
example, if a market has two firms with a market share of 50 percent each, the HHI is 
calculated as 
€ 
.52 + .52 = .5 . Given the pre-specified number of firms in a market, the index is 
closer to zero when all the firms are of equal size and tends toward one in the case of 
monopoly. In contrast to the K-bank concentration ratio, the HHI avoids the problem of 
arbitrarily cutting off smaller firms and is not insensitive to the share distribution within the 
market (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). There is therefore little doubt that the HHI conveys more 
information than the K-bank ratio. If one assumes that the size of the largest firms relative to 
each other is an important determinant of conduct and performance, calculating the he HHI is 
more appropriate than relying on the K-bank ratio (Besanko et al., 2007). A study by Davies 
(1979) revealed that the HHI is less sensitive to changes in the number of firms within a 
market if the number of firms initially in the market is large. In the banking literature, the 
HHI is the most common concentration measure, and the index is in many cases considered a 
benchmark for other concentration ratio indices (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). Other concentration 
indices, such as the Comprehensive Industrial Concentration Index, have also been promoted 
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but have not been applied to similar extents as the K-bank concentration ratio and the HHI in 
the empirical banking literature7. Hall and Tideman (1967) offer an index that is closely 
related to the HHI. They argue that the number of banks in a market has important 
implications for entry conditions and should therefore be included when calculating market 
concentration. The index differs from the HHI in that the market share of each bank is 
weighted by its ranking order, giving the largest bank the weight 
€ 
i=1. The index is written as: 
€ 
HTI = 1
(2 isi −1)
i=1
N
∑
  (2.4)
 
The Rosenbluth index resembles the HTI, but takes a different approach to the ranking of 
banks used as weights (Bikker and Haaf, 2002). The ranking of banks starts with the smallest 
firms and, thus making the Rosenbluth index sensitive to market share changes between 
smaller banks. The index is calculated as follows: 
€ 
RI =1 (2C)  (2.5) 
where C refers to the area above the concentration curve. That is, C is the difference between 
the level of concentration in the market (which ranges between 0 and 1) and the entire market 
(which is always equal to 1) for a given concentration curve. RI is identical to HTI for 
€ 
C = isi −1 2
i=1
N
∑
  (2.6)
 
Although various concentration ratios have been shown to yield diverging values when 
applied on markets in the banking sector, Bikker and Haaf (2002) found that that the rankings 
of markets across 20 countries remained the same based on both the K-bank concentration 
ratio and the HHI. In addition to this, these two indices appear to be a good indicator for the 
relationship between market structure and market performance. Finally, Bikker and Haaf 
(2002: 20) argue that the choice of concentration index should be made on account of   
‘…the relevant impact larger and smaller firms have on competition and the relative 
impact of size distribution and number of banks.’  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For a thorough review of the applicability of various concentration indices in the banking industry, see Bikker and Haaf: Measures of 
Competition and Concentration in the Banking Industry: A review of the Literature (2002).	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The following table offers a comparison of a selection of the concentration ratios discussed in 
their study: 
Table 2.1: Application of Concentration Measures to the Dutch Mortgage Market8 
Index type Range Typical features Values 
3-bank ratio 0.82 
4-bank ratio 0.90 
5-bank ratio 
1/n < HHI < 1 Takes only large banks into account, arbitrary cut off. 
0.96 
HHI 1/n < HHI < 1 Considers all banks; sensitive to entrance of new banks. 0.24 
HTI 0 < HTI < 1 Emphasis on absolute number of banks. 0.25 
Rosenbluth 0 < RI < 1 Sensitive to changes in the size distribution of small banks. 0.04 
CCI 0 < CCI < 1 
Addresses relative dispersion and absolute magnitude; 
suitable for cartel markets. 0.56 
Source: Bikker and Haaf (2002: 19) 
Given the relatively small number of banks in each of the predefined commuter belts in our 
data set, and the applicability of the index’ use, we highlight that the HHI provides us with a 
reasonable measure of market concentration for the commuter belts in our data set. Similarly, 
the HHI can be used to determine the market concentration in the banks’ output markets since 
it is feasible to assume that the market concentration in these markets may also determine the 
aggregated interest rate spreads on the bank level. 
2.4	  Determinants	  of	  the	  Interest	  Rate	  Spread	  
The structure of a market and the intensity of competition can affect the profitability and 
conduct of its firms profoundly. At various levels of market concentration, the type of 
competition and thus the performance of the banks in a given market may alter. The empirical 
literature on the impact of market concentration on bank conduct, especially the effect on loan 
rates, is comprehensive. As Degryse et al. (2009) point out; the magnitude of the impact 
market concentration has on interest rates vary widely in the empirical literature. They 
consider markets with a HHI below .10 to be competitive and markets with a HHI above .18 
to be concentrated, and accept a change in HHI of .10 as a benchmark for marking the 
transition from a competitive to a concentrated market. A similar interpretation from the US 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, often used in merger transactions, 
consider markets with a HHI below .10 to be competitive, and those with a HHI between .10 
and .18 to be moderately concentrated. Markets in which HHI is in excess of .18 are labeled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 We have calculated the corresponding values for the Norwegian bank market. A table with these calculations can be found in Appendix B. 
	   13	  
as concentrated9. The executive body of the EU, the European Commission, has similar 
guidelines but applies a wider range to markets considered moderately concentrated. Here, 
markets with HHI levels below .10 are also labeled as competitive, markets between .10 and 
.20 are considered moderately concentrated and markets exceeding .20 are generally regarded 
as too concentrated to allow for mergers.10 Regardless of the distinction method one chooses 
to use, it is evident that the level of market concentration is correlated with performance, and 
in the case of banks, the interest rate spread. An important note, however, is that the 
distinctions outlined above are intended to be guidelines for markets in general, not just bank 
markets specifically. 
Kim, Kristiansen and Vale (2005) uses a panel data set of Norwegian banks in the period 
1993 – 1998 and find that an .10 increase in HHI results in an increase of 3 basis points11 (bp) 
in the loan rate in the relevant period. Sapienza (2002) analyzes the effects of bank mergers 
on loan contracts. Her findings indicate that an increase in HHI by .10 increases loan rates by 
59 bp in the Italian bank market. Further, she reports some interesting findings as to how bank 
consolidation affects loan rates. Mergers involving the acquisition of banks with small market 
shares tend to benefit borrowers through efficiency gains. In-market mergers (mergers 
between banks in the same local market) are found to decrease the interest rate the banks 
charge to borrowers. However, her findings suggest that when in-market mergers involve the 
acquisition of a local bank with a market share larger than 6.15 percent the gains in efficiency 
is offset by monopoly power, resulting in an increase of the loan rates charged to borrowers. 
This is also true for rival banks in the markets where the mergers take place, indicating that 
the entire market of banks benefit from higher degrees of consolidation. Finally, Sapienza’s 
(2002) findings suggest that the number of bank relationships borrowers have and the size of 
both borrowers and banks affect the loan rates. Ho and Saunders (1981) argue that the interest 
rate spread depends not only on market concentration, but also on the degree of managerial 
risk aversion, the average size of bank transactions and the variance of the interest rate on 
bonds. However, they claim that the market structure influences differences in interest rate 
spreads between large and small banks heavily. By comparing two subgroups based on their 
asset size, they find that the smaller banks in their study had an average transaction spread of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission: The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (internet). Available from: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm (Accessed 25 May 2010). 
10 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
issued by the European Commission: Official Journal C 31 of 05.02.2004 (internet). Available from: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/firms/l26107_en.htm (Accessed 25 May 2010). 
11 One basis point is the equivalent of 1/100th of one percentage point. 
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approximately 1/3 of a percent more than the larger banks. The differences in spreads are 
largely attributed to market structure factors that enabled the smaller banks to earn additional 
producer’s rent12. Ho and Saunders (1981) also highlight that even in highly competitive 
markets, an interest rate spread will always exist due to the underlying uncertainties 
surrounding bank transactions. This further suggests that the intensity of competition within 
the market has implications for banks’ interest rate spread. 
Other studies report similar findings. Berger and Hannan (1989), argue that banks in local 
markets that are concentrated pay MMDA, SNOW and short-term CD rates that are lower 
than those paid in less concentrated markets. Moreover, their findings suggest that the 
difference in deposit rates paid varies over time in concentrated and un-concentrated markets, 
and that this difference is strongly related to the aggregate level of interest rates. Hannan 
(1991) finds that banks in more concentrated markets charge higher loan rates. A possible 
explanation that he offers for the differences in the relationship between market concentration 
and loan rates over time is the greater price rigidity observed in concentrated markets. 
Arguments supporting the notion that the degree of competition in the banking industry 
affects credit availability (and hence the interest rate spread) are indeed not uncommon in 
conventional theories of industrial organization (Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). While there 
appears to be strong evidence from the empirical literature that banks in highly concentrated 
local markets enjoy higher interest rate spreads compared with banks in less concentrated 
markets, another common finding in both the banking literature and in the literature on 
industrial organization is that concentration measures have fairly weak relationships with 
performance measures when market shares are also included in the regression equation 
(Berger, Demirgüc-Kunt, Levine and Haubrich, 2004).  
This has ensued a debate among researchers as to what causes the differences in margins 
between markets with high and low concentrations13. No matter which arguments one chooses 
to favor, it is evident that several factors contribute to the variations in interest rate spreads 
between different bank markets. According to Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) bank 
characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, bank taxation, deposit insurance regulation, 
overall financial structure, as well as underlying legal and institutional indicators are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The producer’s rent is the additional profit above normal interest rates accruing the producer due to a temporary or permanent monopoly 
of the means of production. 
13 Proponents of the efficiency structure hypothesis argue that high concentration endogenously reflects the market share gains of efficient 
firms, whereas the structure conduct performance hypothesis seeks to explain the performance differences between firms in high and low 
concentration markets as a result of market power, i.e. that the degree of market concentration is inversely related to the intensity of 
competition. We will elaborate more on the differences between these two approaches in the later sections of this chapter. 
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determinants reflected by differences in interest margins and bank profitability. First, 
differences in the mix of bank activity (bank characteristics) are found to impact the 
profitability and the interest rate spread. Banks that rely on deposits as their primary source of 
funding and banks that have a relatively high amount of non-interest earning assets tend to be 
less profitable. Similarly, because banks pass on operating costs to their depositors and 
lenders, variations in the banks’ operating costs can also explain differences between banks’ 
interest margins. Second, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) suggest that macroeconomic 
factors such as inflation and real interest rates, contributes to variations in interest margins14. 
Inflation is associated with both higher costs and higher income, although the study finds 
clear implications that income increase more than costs, hence increasing the banks’ 
profitability. Third, financial structure within markets as measured by bank size and market 
concentration ratios are found to affect banks’ interest margins positively. Also worth noting 
is that tax levels, deposit insurance regime and institutional factors, such as law and order, 
corruption and indices of credit rights were found to have some effects on banks’ interest 
margins (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999), although these effects help mostly explain 
variations between markets in different countries. These factors seem to be less relevant for 
our study since we are examining variations between markets within one country, implying 
that all markets are subject to the same tax regimes, insurance regulations and legal 
jurisdictions. There are evidence that suggest that firm specific factors on the customer side 
that are related to competitive forces within a market, specifically the relationships that 
customers have with their banks, contribute to determine the interest rate spread. In a study 
conducted with the same data set on Norwegian banks as our own, Hetland and Mjøs (2010) 
find that domestic mergers reduce loan availability and increase interest rate margins for 
nontransparent small and medium sized borrowers. More transparent firms, which have 
access to alternative sources of financing, do not appear to suffer from the same effects. They 
argue that a likely reason for this is that mergers terminate valuable banking relationships. 
These findings indicate that the way structural changes in bank markets affect the banks’ 
interest rate spreads also depend on what kind of relationship the banks affected by changes 
have to their customers. In a study by Petersen and Rajan (1995) on the effect of competition 
in credit markets on lending relationships, results indicate that credit constrained firms are 
more likely to be granted credit in concentrated credit markets than in competitive credit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It should be noted that the study by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) was conducted on banks from several countries and that these 
factors may not be as prevalent in local markets within a country. For instance, high real interest rates are for the most part associated with 
high interest margins in developing countries. 
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markets because lending institutions in more concentrated markets can internalize the benefits 
of assisting these firms more easily. In essence, the findings of both Hetland and Mjøs (2010) 
and Peterson and Rajan (1995) confirm that firm specific variables on the customer side will 
also affect the performance of banks. Other firm specific variables that affect performance 
may include credit risk (default risk, debt to equity ratio, profit to asset ratios) and industry 
structure on the customer side. 
A finding that is common for most of the studies reviewed thus far in this section is that 
market concentration and factors reflecting market power affect the interest rate spread of 
banks. What causes the interest rate spreads to be affected by the competitive structure within 
a market has been subject to a great deal of debate among researchers, which we discuss 
below.  
2.5	  Competition	  between	  Banks	  and	  Market	  Power	  
Currently, there is a large body of research papers that describe bank competition and the 
resulting impact on deposit rates, interest margins, and the banks’ market power. The majority 
of these studies have tested the validity of two different hypotheses that have emerged as the 
most common underlying explanations for the link between performance and market 
concentration in the banking industry. The first hypothesis is the “structure conduct 
performance hypothesis” (SCP), which argues that higher market concentration causes less 
competition between banks and leads to higher bank profitability due to increased market 
power (Degryse et al., 2009). The second hypothesis is the “efficiency hypothesis”, which 
states that the merged banks in more concentrated markets able to realize efficiency gains, 
and can pass these gains on to customers in the form of better deposits rates (Craig & Dinger, 
2008). In recent years however, several papers on new empirical industrial organization 
criticize these approaches and attempt to explain firm conduct directly instead of relying on 
“indirect proxies” such as market structure or market shares (Degryse et al., 2009). In this 
section we will elaborate more closely on both the efficiency and SCP hypotheses as well as 
some of the criticism against these approaches. 
2.5.1	  The	  Structure	  Conduct	  Performance	  Hypothesis	  
Proponents of the structure conduct performance hypothesis argue that the banks in more 
concentrated markets are able to set prices on loan and deposit rates to their own advantage 
due to collusion or other forms of non-competitive market practices (Berger & Hannan, 
1989). A typical way to test the SCP hypothesis is to regress a measure of bank performance, 
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such as bank profitability, on a measure of market concentration, such as the K-bank 
concentration ratio or HHI (Degryse, 2009). Berger and Hannan (1989) conducted a study on 
the US deposit market within the SCP framework. In order to exclude the efficiency structure 
hypothesis explanation of the results their study examined the price-concentration 
relationship. The study analyzed bank deposits rates from 470 banks using quarterly data over 
a period of 2-1/2 year from the 1983 - 1985, focusing on the link between deposit rates and 
concentration. The authors use both a 3-bank ratio (CR3) and the HHI as measures of market 
concentration and estimate the following regression equation: 
€ 
rijt = α0 +α1CRjt + γ kXk,ijt +ε ijt
k
∑   (2.7) 
where 
€ 
rijt  is the deposit rate paid by bank 
€ 
i  in period 
€ 
t , 
€ 
CRjt  is measure of market 
concentration in market 
€ 
i  at time 
€ 
t  and 
€ 
Xk,ijt  represent k-vector control variables that may 
affect the deposit rate. The results of their estimation indicate that market concentration has a 
negative impact on deposit rates. They conclude that their findings confirm the SCP-
hypothesis. Berger and Hannan (1998) follow up this work in an analysis on bank mergers 
and the impact on prices. The authors examine mergers in the period of 1991-1994 and the 
deposit rates offered by the participating banks. The deposits rates are compared in order to 
find changes in geographical markets that experience substantial horizontal bank mergers 
versus markets that do not experience this. The authors find that the deposit interest rates 
decrease significantly in the markets that have experienced mergers (and thus become more 
concentrated), and conclude that this is the result of increased market power of the merged 
banks. An important note about the two studies discussed above is that the performance 
measure they use, deposit rate, is distinctively different in its implications from loan rate as a 
performance measure. A bank is unlikely to have the same degree of market power on 
deposits as it may have on loans because opening a deposit account is based on the customer’s 
assessment of banks, whereas the decision to grant credit is based on the bank’s assessment of 
the customer. 
2.5.2	  The	  Efficiency	  Hypothesis	  
The efficiency hypothesis is derived from the assumption that the most efficient banks are the 
ones that will gain market share (Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977). In this framework, market 
concentration is driven endogenously by bank efficiency. As Berger (1995) explains, there are 
two types of bank efficiency; X-efficiency measures efficiency of managerial prowess, 
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whereas scale efficiency measures the extent to which some banks produce at more efficient 
scales than others. Degryse et al. (2009) offer the following generalization of a regression 
equation that pertains the efficiency hypothesis: 
€ 
π ijt = α0 +α1CRjt +α2MSijt γ kXk,ijt +ε ijt
k
∑   (2.8) 
where 
€ 
π ijt  is an arbitrary measure of bank 
€ 
i ’s profitability and 
€ 
MSijt  is the market share of 
bank 
€ 
i  at time 
€ 
t . The remaining variables remain the same as in (2.7). This regression is an 
attempt to disentangle the SCP and efficiency hypotheses. Where the SCP implies tha 
€ 
α1 > 0, 
the efficiency hypothesis implies that 
€ 
α2 > 0 (Degryse et al., 2009). In other words, both X-
efficiency and scale efficiency hypotheses imply that market share has a positive impact on 
profitability. In a study by Berger (1995), that includes measures of both X-efficiency and 
scale efficiency, results show that X-efficiency has a positive effect on banks’ profits, 
whereas scale efficiency does not appear to be equally important. His findings suggest that 
market share, as a representative measure of larger banks ‘market power, has a very small yet 
still significant impact on return on assets. Peristani (1997) attempts to assess whether 
consolidation, in the from of bank mergers, result in better efficiency, and analyzes bank 
mergers in the US from 1980 to 1990 by examining the effect of mergers on managerial 
efficiency (X-efficiency) and scale efficiency. He argues that the merger participants  
‘…realized a small, but significant decline in pro forma X-efficiency two to four years 
after the merger.’ Peristiani (1997:336),  
while the banks achieved moderate gains in terms of scale economies. The study concludes 
that mergers yield no significant improvements in terms of X-efficiency. Another study, 
conducted by Huizinga, Nelissen and Vennet (2001) attempts to confirm the efficiency 
hypothesis by examining the links between mergers, efficiency and profitability. They 
analyze 52 horizontal bank mergers in Europe, in the period of 1994-1998. The authors argue 
that both substantial unexploited scale economies and large X-inefficiencies are evident in 
European banking. They conclude that mergers have a positive impact on cost efficiencies, 
while profit efficiency improves marginally, hence stating that consolidation appears to be 
socially beneficial. 
	   19	  
2.7	  Fundamental	  Criticism	  against	  the	  SCP	  and	  Efficiency	  Hypotheses	  
Both the SCP hypothesis and the efficiency hypothesis have been subject to criticism and 
debate. Critics argue that these approaches assume an unreasonable precondition because they 
assume a one-way causality from market structure to performance (Degryse et al. 2009). In a 
study on the relative competitive position of European bank markets Carbo, Humphrey, 
Maudos and Molyneux (2009) find that the use of various existing competition measures 
yield diverging results across countries, within markets and over time. They argue that 
traditional indicators of competition, such as the HHI, may not predict bank market 
competition accurately and that they fail to explain a significant proportion of variations in 
performance measures such as the interest rate spread. Attempts to avoid the ambiguity of 
these results have been made by applying new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) 
models to assess competition levels in bank markets. Pannzar and Rosse (1987) propose a 
model that investigates the relationship between changes in input prices and equilibrium 
industry revenues. To measure the aggregated elasticities of total interest revenue with respect 
to input prices they calculate a H-statistic that can be computed as:  
€ 
H = βf
f
∑   (2.9) 
where 
€ 
f  denotes the factor input. A H-statistic = 1 indicates perfect competition and H-
statistic between 0 and 1 indicates monopolistic competition. A H-statistic <   0 indicates a 
monopoly situation. Claessens and Laeven (2004) study the extent to which input prices are 
reflected in bank revenues under the Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology. Their findings 
suggest that most bank markets are characterized by monopolistic competition. They also 
argue that fewer entry and activity restrictions lead to higher H-statistics and more 
competitive banking systems. Finally, they argue that the lack of importance of market 
structure in their findings may indicate that competition policy in the banking sector is more 
complicated than previously thought. 
2.8	  Implications	  from	  Theory	  
Our literature review suggests that banks operate in local markets and that clear definitions of 
the markets under analyses are imperative. Delineating bank markets can be achieved by 
dividing the national Norwegian bank market into locally defined regions, such as commuter 
belts. Concentration indices are commonly used to measure the structure within bank markets 
and help determine the level of competition in each market. While several concentration 
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indices have been proposed to measure the structure of bank markets, the most commonly 
applied indices are various versions of k-bank concentration ratios and the HHI. The 
empirical literature on banking discusses several determinants of loan and deposit interest 
rates. The review of a selection of studies on this topic reveals that in addition to market 
concentration and other market specific variables, both bank specific variables, firm specific 
variables and factors describing the bank-firm relationship also have an impact on interest 
rates. However, there seems to be ambiguous assessments concerning the cause of these 
effects. While some researchers argue that higher bank market consolidation cause banks to 
become more efficient, enabling them to reduce costs and hence increase their margins, others 
explain increased margins with changes in the market structure. The latter theory suggests that 
banks in more consolidated markets are able to use their market power to their benefit. It is 
worth noting that both these hypotheses have been subject to criticism from newer empirical 
industrial organization models. This criticism is largely aimed at the one-way causality 
implicit in these frameworks. 
As a final note, we would like to point out that most of the studies on the relationship between 
bank profitability and its determinants reviewed in this chapter, use loan rate as a profitability 
measure, meaning that they look only at the price charged by the banks for their loans. This 
measure does not reflect the funding costs the banks have themselves, e.g. the interbank rate 
(Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate, NIBOR, in Norway) or, if the banks rely heavily on 
deposits for funding, the deposit rate. Hence, the loan rate alone serves as a good comparative 
measure of banks’ profitability (how good the banks perform compared to each other), but 
does not necessarily tell anything about the absolute profitability since the costs are not 
included in the measure. We therefore believe that it can be reasonable to extract the banks’ 
funding costs to arrive at an accurate performance measure, even though the determinants of 
the loan rate the banks charge and the determinants of the NIBOR or the deposit rate may not 
be the same. In our opinion the NIBOR, which is the same for all banks in Norway, is a better 
assessment of the banks’ funding costs than the deposit rate because deposits made by firms 
make up a fairly small proportion of the banks’ funding sources in the markets for 
commercial customers. 
 
 
 
	   21	  
2.9	  Research	  Model	  
Our research model is based on the assumption that increased market concentration and other 
structural factors play an important role in determining the interest rate spreads of banks in 
local markets. Market structure may impact the interest rate spread level in three ways. As our 
literature review suggest, in the case where interest rate changes to the advantage of the 
banks, the SCP-hypothesis argues that this is due to the fact that banks in more concentrated 
markets may enjoy higher market power. On the other hand, the efficiency-hypothesis 
suggests that the level of bank efficiency drives market concentration endogenously. This 
implies that increases in both structure and performance are results of efficiency gains. The 
third scenario is that the level of concentration does not affect banks’ interest rate spreads at 
all. Based on our review of the literature above, we propose the following graphic research 
model for our study15: 
 
Since we are investigating whether there are any differences in the interest rate spread when 
market concentration varies in low concentration markets and high concentration markets, the 
independent variables of the model are market concentration, measured by HHI, and market 
shares, measured by the proportion of loans the individual banks have in the local loan 
markets. We make a distinction between markets with low and high concentration because it 
appears reasonable that the fundamental assumptions about the relationship between 
competition, market power and market structure have different implications for markets that 
differ from one another in respect to their levels of market concentration. We define low 
concentration markets as regions with HHI below 0.2. High concentration markets are defined 
as regions with HHI above 0.2. From this model we arrive at the following main hypothesis: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 We introduce an econometric expression of the model that more fully details the coherence between the variables in chapter 4. 
Interest	  Rate	  Spread	  
HHI	  
Market	  Share	   Controls	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€ 
H0 : Market structure affect banks’ interest rate spreads similarly in high- and low 
concentration bank markets 
€ 
HA : Market structure affect banks’ interest rate spreads differently in high- and low 
concentration bank markets 
Because the initial assumption is based on a positive correlation between market 
concentration and the banks’ interest rate spreads, the hypotheses reflect a belief that in high 
concentration markets, as market concentration increases, the higher the interest rate spread 
will be. However, in low concentration markets, the interest rate spread may not be affected in 
the same way, since the markets may be subject to competitive forces that inhibit market 
power benefits to increase interest rate spreads. Hence, other factors may describe variations 
in the interest rate spreads in low concentration markets better. Firm specific variables on the 
customer side are not included directly in the model, however we do acknowledge that they 
can affect the interest rate spread. The implications this has for our model will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
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3.	  Data	  
3.1	  Introduction	  
All Norwegian registered commercial entities involved in lending, such as banks, credit 
institutions, and loan brokers among others, are required by law to provide key financial 
information to the Norwegian Tax Administration on a yearly basis for taxation purposes. 
Entities that provide lending report information about their customers such as registered bank 
accounts, year end balances of these accounts, the total interest charged on loans, and total 
interest paid for deposits as well as several other types of client data that we will touch upon 
later in this thesis. The Norwegian Tax Administration gathers accurate information on all 
business entities that have loan and deposit accounts in Norwegian registered financial 
institutions through this mechanism16. 
Through a special permission granted by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, data sets with 
this information from 1997 - 2008 have been provided to Dr. Aksel Mjøs at the Institute for 
Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF) for research purposes. The 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance has in turn also granted us as the authors of this thesis access 
to the data sets. Details of the data that can be used to identify individual entities are 
confidential and therefore strictly forbidden to publish. Due to these confidentiality 
requirements, we have not included names of business entities in any charts, tables or figures. 
However, detailed discussions of our research findings are still viable, since the findings are 
nevertheless interesting without identifying the individual banks or their customers. 
3.2	  Description	  of	  Data	  
The data sets provide key information about the banks’ client accounts such as account 
balances and interest amounts that have been credited or debited the accounts. The data 
comprises the entire population of organizations in the Norwegian financial sector as well as 
all registered organizations that have one or more accounts in a Norwegian registered 
financial institution. On the credit supply side17 the data includes all registered banks in 
Norway, including foreign banks that are registered in Norway as well as mutual 
organizations such as cooperatives (handelslag), pension funds, public financial institutions 
(such as Innovation Norway), insurance companies, municipalities, and law firms.  On the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Note that all accounts have been audited as regulated by Norwegian law (Regnskapsloven). 
17 Organizations that provide lending, i.e. banks.	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credit demand side 18, all companies such as privately held organizations, non-profit 
organizations, financial institutions and even banks that have registered accounts in other 
banks, are included in the data sets. Overall, the data set represent the entire population for 
our research, with a few exceptions, which we will outline in the Limitations section in this 
chapter. 
The data is reported with an organization number belonging to the entities that own the 
accounts. This unique organization number (organisasjonsnummer)19 identifies the 
commercial entities that own the accounts. By using the organization number, the data can be 
coupled with other data sets that widely broadens the scope of the research. For instance, we 
have combined the data sets with company information data obtained from SNF, which let us 
create additional variables that allow geographical categorization of the accounts, and 
accounting data for the business entities provided by Dun and Bradstreet20. The table below is 
a summarization of the data sets. 
Table 3.1 Summarization of Data Sets* 
Year 
Number of 
observations 
(accounts) before 
Number of 
observations 
(accounts) after  
Total loans 
before 
(Billion NOK) 
Total loans 
after 
(Billion NOK) 
1997 726,793 354,993 491 202 
1998 767,113 382,952 558 246 
1999 839,345 394,975 611 244 
2000 841,961 478,751 727 358 
2001 919,761 502,913 789 387 
2002 805,888 518,414 821 388 
2003 812,203 559,995 860 452 
2004 807,723 537,741 1,144 435 
2005 858,945 559,741 1,094 514 
2006 944,988 596,886 1,292 592 
2007 1,009,289 653,773 1,549 741 
2008 1,074,176 691,576 1,891 905 
* In the table, “before” and “after” denotes data before and after we performed cleansing and sampling of the data. See section 3.5 for details 
about cleaning and sampling. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The credit demand side refers to organizations that borrow funds.	  
19 	  “Organisasjonsnummer” is a 9-digit business enterprise organization number that is provided by the Register of Business Enterprises. 
(All business entities that operate in Norway are required to be registered at the Register of Business Enterprises, including foreign owned 
entities.) For further details we refer to the website of the Register of Business Enterprises http://www.brreg.no/english/registers/business/. 
20 Dun and Bradstreet provides databases with information about organizations, gathered from various sources such as ”Enhetsregisteret –
Central Coordinating Register for Legal Entities”, the Norwegian Tax Administration and so forth. For a complete description please refer to 
the company’s website at http://www.db24.no. 	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We will present the data in summarized and graphical formats that are relevant to our study in 
the National Overview section. 
3.3	  Limitations	  in	  the	  Data	  sets	  
Perhaps the biggest limitation in the data sets is that they do not contain any contractual 
information between the banks an their customers, such as loan rates (fixed or variable), loan 
repayment terms, collateral requirements and the types of loans in general. The data sets also 
do not contain information about the banks’ credit risk assessments of their customers. 
Moreover, the data sets only provide information on annual opening and closing balances. 
This can lead to inconsistent interest rate calculations on loans and deposits. For instance, if a 
loan is issued at the beginning of December 2007, the opening balance in 2008 will show a 
relatively low interest paid for that particular loan because the interest paid for the loan has 
only accrued one month. If the loan amount is very large, it will create an extreme outlier (see 
section 4.5.2 for details on how we reduce this problem). Another possible limitation in the 
data sets is that they lack data on organizations on the credit demand side. Since the data sets 
include only Norwegian registered lenders, Norwegian registered borrowers that only have 
loans or deposits in foreign financial institutions that are not registered in Norway are 
excluded from the data sets. However, the number of firms that have these types of loans is 
limited. Most firms that fall into this category are large corporations that operate in foreign 
markets. Although we recognize this limitation in the data set, we do not perceive this as a 
potential problem, since we are concerned only with the behavior of domestic interest rate 
spreads in this study. 
3.4	  Challenges	  with	  the	  Data	  
One of the first challenges we encountered was how we should define the individual 
competing banks in order to gather an accurate count on the number of banks in the markets.  
The data sets record all banks that are separate legal entities, each with its own name and 
organization number, even though the entity may be a local branch of a bank. Failure to 
recognize the branches as subdivisions of a mother bank would have repercussions for the 
calculations of not only the number of banks in a market, but also the banks’ market shares, 
market concentration indices as well as other variables. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a 
branch does not compete with other branches that belong to the same bank. All of the 
branches and the mother entity should then be counted as one competing entity if the branches 
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appear within a region.  Note however, that if the bank has branches in different regions, these 
branches will count as separate entities.  
To continue this discussion, most banks in Norway belong to one of three major savings bank 
groups or are branches of major commercial banks, such as Nordea21.  However, 
contradictory to a branch, it is reasonable to assume that banks that belong to the same 
savings bank group will compete with each other if they are located in the same region.  This 
may be observed in practice. For instance, in Trondheim, the banks Surnadal Sparebank, 
Selbu Sparebank and Klæbu Sparebank among others all belong to the Terra Gruppen group 
of banks, but nevertheless compete against each other in the local market and should be 
counted as separate competing entities. Adding complexity to this challenge is that mergers 
and acquisitions that were undertaken within the period 1997 - 2008 would imply that a 
merged/acquired bank should be recognized as a branch of the acquiring bank. In his work 
with other studies, Dr. Aksel Mjøs has undertaken a tedious grouping of banks that operate in 
Norway, using data from Dun and Bradstreet and other sources to find the organization 
structure of the banks. We have been granted permission from Dr. Aksel Mjøs to use these 
groupings in our study. It is important to note that all reporting and all analyses in this study 
are based on the bank groups being labeled as a single competing entity, even though the 
group may consist of several banks. We normally denote the individual bank group in the 
singular form, as in ‘bank’. 
3.5	  Data	  Sample	  and	  Cleansing	  
We took careful measures to keep all instances in the data sets before we sampled the data 
into a panel for our analysis. However, we had to perform a revision of the data sets and 
exclude several instances in order to narrow down the data sets to the instances that were 
relevant to our analysis. Since the main focus of our study is the interest rate spreads and their 
determinants in the banking sector, we excluded all instances where a lending institution is 
not defined as a bank. More specifically, all loan providers that did not fall into the categories 
savings bank or commercial bank were omitted. The reason for this is that a loan provider that 
does not fall into one of these categories, such as a public institution like Innovation Norway, 
does not operate and compete on the same commercial conditions as a normal bank. A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 There are 3 savings bank groups in Norway. Terra-Gruppen has 78 member banks. Sparebank1 Alliansen has 20 member banks. The third 
group, DnB NOR, has 9 savings banks that have partnering agreements. DnB NOR is Norway’ largest bank. There are only 9 additional 
savings banks in Norway that are independent as of June 6 2009. See http://www.sparebankforeningen.no/id/1493. 
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reasonable assumption may be that these public lenders may charge interest rates that may not 
be sustainable and profitable for the institution, since part of their mission is either non-profit 
operations, or to provide favorable lending to high-risk newly founded companies with 
promising concepts.  
We also did not want to include the interbank market in our analysis. As stated above, the 
original data sets include accounts that are owned by banks, for instance when bank Y has 
deposits in bank X. Banks frequently borrow from each other, and we observed large amounts 
that were related to these transactions in the data sets. Hence, these accounts were omitted 
from the sample. On the demand side, we limited the sample to include only organizations 
that have limited liability and partnerships as organization form. All other types of 
organizations were excluded from the data set. As such, entities such as municipalities and 
government owned organizations were excluded. One reason for excluding these entities is 
that such entities may borrow money for non-commercial purposes, and can sometimes be 
granted funds on different terms and conditions than corporations and partnerships. Thus, if 
we had included government owned organizations in our study, it could have resulted in an 
unintended and undesirable effect on the calculated interest rates, which are pertinent to our 
study. 
Lastly, in preparation for selecting the appropriate sample for our analysis, we performed a 
cleansing procedure of the data set. We deleted undesired instances (accounts) such as 
obvious duplicated instances erroneously recorded by the Norwegian Tax Administration, 
instances with no loan or deposit data22, and instances with erroneously reported bank 
organization numbers. Additionally, after calculating the interest rate margins for both loans 
and deposits, we found that some banks in certain regions had margins above 100 percent. 
The likely causes of this error were either erroneous reporting of interest rates charged on 
loans or deposits, or incorrect reporting of deposit and loan amounts. This error affected only 
a few instances, and the banks in those regions were excluded. We found it important to 
exclude these instances since they would have an impact on the other key figures such as the 
number of active banks in a region, which would in turn lead to incorrect measures of market 
concentration, market shares, and so forth. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  We have only included banks that have customer accounts with outstanding loans or deposits at the closing balance. This is important in 
order to count the correct number of active banks in the market. Correct counting of the number of banks and their registered accounts have 
important implications for the calculation of regional HHI and market shares of banks, as well as other key figures in the study.	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3.6	  Key	  Figures	  
As a preliminary exercise to the analysis, we calculated key figures and produced charts in 
order to gain an overview of the data sets and understand the market structure. This section 
provides an overview of these figures and charts.	  
3.6.1	  National	  Overview	  
Number of Banks 
Figure 3.1 shows a graphic display of active banks in the Norwegian market in the time 
period 1997 – 2008. Note that we have categorized the banks into commercial banks and 
savings banks. Although we made such a distinction between the banks in the overview, it is 
assumed that commercial banks and savings banks that are active in the loan and deposit 
markets of commercial customers compete on the same terms, and we do not further 
differentiate these banks in our analysis. 
Figure 3.1 Number of Banks 
 
We can observe here that the number of banks have decreased slightly from a peak in 1997 
with 160 banks to 148 banks in 2008, most notably a fall in the number of savings banks.  
This is attributed to the increased number of mergers and acquisitions in the Norwegian 
banking sector as well as a few banks exiting the market23.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  For further details about mergers and acquisitions, see Finance Norway – FNO. Available from (online): http://www.fnh.no.	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Loans 
In order to assess the size of the entire Norwegian market, we calculated the aggregated loans. 
For each year in the time period, we aggregated the loan accounts of all customers as recorded 
from all banks. Note that the amounts are end of the year closing balances.  
Figure 3.2 Aggregated Loans 
 
While the number of banks has decreased slightly over the time period, we observe a 
significant increase in the market size in terms of total loans, from about NOK 200 billion in 
1997 to about NOK 900 billion in 2008. The commercial banks have increased their loan 
amounts compared to the savings banks, which may indicate that commercial banks have 
become an increasingly more important funding source for companies. 
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Deposits 
Similar to the rise in loans during the time period, the total loan amount has also increased 
dramatically. Roughly, the market grew more than 500 percent from 1997 to 2008, indicating 
that the banks have grown in size, rather than in numbers. This observation entices to further 
analysis to see if the bank market has become more concentrated, or if this increase can be 
attributed to other underlying causes. We calculated the HHI, and observe that the market 
indeed became more concentrated. As with the aggregated loans data, the commercial banks 
have also grown at a noticeably faster rate than the savings banks. 
Figure 3.3 Aggregated Deposits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Savings Banks 35 39 47 54 60 66 78 54 67 80 107 114 
Commercial Banks 68 80 74 121 130 125 179 234 263 333 422 421 
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Market Shares by Loans 
To further understand the market structure, we calculated the market share of the top 5 and 
top 3 banks in terms of markets shares. The top lending banks increased their market share 
from 1997 to 2008, and it is likely that this increase came at the expense of smaller banks’ 
market shares and/or from the simple fact that the number of banks has decreased.  We have 
already assessed that the number of banks did decrease slightly, however it is difficult to tell 
without further analysis whether the decrease in the number of banks or the changes in the 
market shares of the top banks versus the rest of the banks, had the greatest impact.  
Figure 3.4 National Market Shares by Loans 
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Market Shares by Deposits 
Figure 3.5 shows that the top 5 and top 3 banks that had recorded deposits, had also gained 
market shares through the period.  
Figure 3.5 National Market Shares by Deposits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Top 5 Banks 65 67 69 72 70 71 75 77 76 76 76 76 
Top 3 Banks 56 59 61 62 62 62 59 70 68 69 68 68 
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Concentration Indices 
We calculated the HHI for the regions (commuter belts) that had active lending banks, as well 
as the HHI on the national level. We also calculated the CCI for each region to see if it would 
reveal other types of changes in the market structure than the HHI shows us. Generally, the 
loan market became more concentrated during the period. This may be attributed to 
consolidation between banks. 
Figure 3.6 Market Concentration 
 
The figure above shows that the Norwegian bank market as a whole became more 
concentrated during the time period, especially for banks that provide deposits.  In 2008, the 
HHI for deposits was 0.202, which implies that the market was concentrated. The HHI for 
loans has also notably increased, from 0.114 in 1997 to 0.163 in 2008. It is interesting to 
observe the jump in HHI from 2003 to 2004. Part of this increase may be the result of the 
merger between Gjensidige NOR and DNB in 2004, which is the largest merger recorded in 
the Norwegian banking sector. The CCI has a similar trend as the HHI for the period. 
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HHI Deposits 0.161 0.165 0.190 0.150 0.148 0.147 0.145 0.207 0.205 0.212 0.196 0.202 
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Interest Rate Spreads 
We calculated two types of interest rate spreads. First, we calculated the spread between the 
interest rate charged on loans and the 3-month average Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate 
(NIBOR)24 for the given year (loan rate – NIBOR).  The second spread we calculated was the 
difference between the interest rates charged on loans and the interest rate given on deposits 
(loan rate – deposit rate). For further details on the calculations please refer to the Methods 
chapter, section 4.5.2. The graphs below show the development of the two interest rate 
spreads over the given time period. Naturally, we were most interested in observing the trend 
of the interest rate margin on loans adjusted for NIBOR and compare this with the 
corresponding HHI trend. A quick comparison of the HHI graph in Figure 3.6 and the interest 
Rate Spread (loan rate – NIBOR) graph in Figure 3.7 indicates that these two variables seem 
to correspond somewhat. This strengthened our belief that further analysis would yield telling 
results. The spread between loan and deposit rates did not seem to correspond with the HHI 
trend prior to the year 2002, but they seem to follow a similar pattern in the years after that. 
Figure 3.7 Interest Rate Spread 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The relevant NIBOR rates can be found at Norges Bank’s home page. Available from (online): http://www.norges-
bank.no/templates/article____57364.aspx  (Accessed 5 May, 2010). 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - 
NIBOR) 1.639 0.961 0.614 0.185 -0.091 0.208 1.666 1.836 1.329 0.743 0.423 0.478 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-Deposits) 2.853 2.936 2.625 3.786 3.501 3.457 2.914 2.555 2.144 1.757 1.894 2.220 
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3.6.2	  Regional	  Overview	  
So far, we have presented the data on the national level. As stated, the focus of our analysis is 
on the differences between regions. In this section we present the data on the regional level. 
However, since there are 161 commuter belts in Norway, it is difficult to visually present 
information that encompasses all the regions. We have therefore compiled tables and figures 
with a subset of the regions that may play an important role in our study. 
Choosing Representative Regions  
For simplicity reasons, we will present data for two regions with low HHI ratios, Trondheim 
and Stavanger/Sandnes, and two regions with high HHI ratios, Solund and Kongsberg. We 
also include a fifth region, Oslo, which represents a moderately concentrated market. Please 
refer to Appendix C for charts that rank the regions by HHI. In order to determine which 
regions gave reasonable representations of the regional data, we chose the regions presented 
in this section on the basis of a detailed regional chart on HHI and a cross comparison of the 
regions’ loan size. First, Trondheim is a large region and is among the least concentrated 
regions in Norway with HHI ratios of 0.1491 and 0.1489 in 1998 and 2008 respectively.  The 
region is ranked as the fourth largest region in terms of issued loans in 2008 with NOK 39.3 
billion.  Second, Stavanger/Sandnes is Norway’s second largest region in terms of issued 
loans with NOK 74.5 billion in 2008. Stavanger/Sandnes had an HHI of 0.1619 in the same 
year. The low HHI ratio for this region makes it a suitable representative for the low 
concentration regions. Third, Solund had an HHI of 0.8524 in 2008. There are regions that 
have higher HHI-ratios, however, an important argument for choosing Solund as a 
representative for high-concentration regions is that this region had the largest issued loans 
(NOK 310 million in 2008) among those regions with high HHI-ratios. Fourth, Kongsberg 
has HHI-ratios ranging from 0.2762 to 0.4006 from the year 1997 to 2008. This, combined 
with loans of NOK 7.9 billion in 2008 makes this region a good representative for regions 
with fairly high concentrations. Fifth, Oslo is the largest region with loans of NOK 361 billion 
in 2008. Interestingly, Oslo was a low concentration region in 1998 with an HHI-ratio of 
0.1509, but would be ranked as a highly concentrated market in 2008 with an HHI-ratio of 
0.2115. Thus, the extensive change in the HHI-ratio for the Oslo region suggests that the 
market structure may have changed significantly during the observed time period.  
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HHI Loans 
We calculated the HHI-ratios for each region that had banks with recorded loans. Overall, 
Figure 3.8 shows that the regions became more concentrated in the period, with Kongsberg 
peaking in the year of 2004 and Trondheim showing the same behavior with a lag of one year, 
most probably due to the DnB NOR merger. Stavanger/Sandnes contradicted with the trend, 
and became less concentrated, going from an HHI-ratio of 0.1916 in 1997 to 0.1625 in 2008. 
An interesting observation is that loans grew at a rapid pace in the Stavanger/Sandnes region 
through the same time period, which would imply that the loans were somewhat evenly 
spread among the banks that operated in that region. Observe that in 2000 and 2001, the HHI 
for Solund dropped from 0.907 to 0.489, and then rose back to an HHI of 0.876 in 2003. 
Upon further investigation, we found that a company recorded a loan of NOK 50 million in 
the years 2001 and 2002, which led to an increase of total loans in the region of more than 
100 percent.  A bank that in previous years had a market share of less than 1 percent in the 
Solund region issued the loan. Subsequently, this bank’s market share rose to over 50 percent, 
causing the HHI to drop substantially. As a side note, according to the Brønnøysund Register, 
the company in question went out of business in the year of 2006. 
Figure 3.8 Market Concentration 
 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Kongsberg 0.276 0.293 0.324 0.212 0.212 0.215 0.274 0.510 0.370 0.357 0.402 0.401 
Oslo 0.151 0.143 0.206 0.173 0.170 0.172 0.199 0.218 0.190 0.190 0.211 0.211 
Solund 0.668 0.855 0.890 0.907 0.489 0.487 0.876 0.937 0.950 0.947 0.939 0.852 
Stavanger/Sandnes 0.192 0.167 0.203 0.160 0.164 0.163 0.164 0.154 0.163 0.163 0.158 0.162 
Trondheim 0.149 0.150 0.188 0.144 0.136 0.148 0.123 0.159 0.263 0.163 0.162 0.149 
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Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate – NIBOR and Deposit Rate – NIBOR) 
An overview of the regional interest rate spreads indicates that the regional spreads follow a 
similar trend as the spread on the national level. However, two interesting observations from 
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 are worth commenting. Recall that Kongsberg and Solund were labeled 
as high concentration markets. We can see that for both regions, the volatility of the interest 
rate spreads in these two regions was higher than for the other regions in the overview. A 
possible explanation may be that the market leading banks were able to greater affect the 
interest rate than in less concentrated markets. Another explanation may be that the number of 
banks in the regions was small, and that each bank’s change in the interest rate had a high 
impact on the interest rate spread. The less concentrated regions experienced smoother 
interest rate spreads throughout the periods. This observation may pay merit to our hypothesis 
that there are indeed differences in markets with high- and low HHI-levels. Because deposits 
are much smaller than loans, Figure 3.10 show somewhat more erratic movements. 
Figure 3.9 Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate – NIBOR) 
 
 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Kongsberg 1.886 1.276 2.232 -1.193 -1.737 -0.260 1.983 2.745 1.564 0.459 -1.620 -0.144 
Oslo 1.532 0.855 0.681 0.215 0.510 0.322 1.712 1.836 1.377 0.416 0.238 0.301 
Solund 1.076 2.200 2.338 1.149 1.264 -2.184 3.115 3.061 1.994 2.054 0.243 1.861 
Stavanger/Sandnes 1.463 1.011 0.829 0.397 -0.051 0.001 0.900 1.766 1.589 0.828 0.726 0.640 
Trondheim 1.907 1.004 0.004 0.405 0.722 0.422 2.140 2.422 1.095 0.398 0.765 0.886 
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Figure 3.10 Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate – Deposit Rate) 
 
Market Shares of Top 5 Banks 
A graphical illustration of the market shares of all the individual banks in each of the regions 
in an efficient way would be nearly impossible to display. Instead, we have calculated the 
market share of the top five banks in terms of market shares in each region both for loans 
(Figure 3.11) and deposits (Figure 3.12), and then aggregated the market shares. Combined 
with the charts displaying the number of banks in the particular regions, this will give some 
indications of the market structure in these regions. Not surprisingly, in the smaller regions 
Solund and Kongsberg the top five banks share nearly 100 percent of the entire market 
between them, mainly due to the small number of active banks in those regions. In the larger 
regions, the top five banks make up roughly 75 - 85 percent of the market, and the top banks’ 
combined market shares have increased throughout the time period. 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Kongsberg 3.308 3.459 5.214 1.654 1.294 2.821 3.257 3.258 2.761 2.122 0.144 3.495 
Oslo 2.652 2.672 2.580 4.569 4.728 2.866 1.940 2.567 2.050 1.229 1.416 1.870 
Solund 2.340 5.688 5.430 2.172 5.130 1.707 5.086 4.139 3.701 4.064 3.233 3.005 
Stavanger/Sandnes 3.602 4.499 2.504 2.676 2.694 2.870 1.395 2.364 2.497 2.572 1.980 2.302 
Trondheim 2.972 2.814 1.573 2.805 4.367 1.755 2.683 3.396 1.718 1.361 2.244 2.200 
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Figure 3.11 Market Shares by Loans 
 
Figure 3.12 Market Shares by Deposits 
 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Oslo 75 74 81 80 80 80 83 85 85 84 83 86 
Kongsberg 96 98 98 94 95 96 98 99 98 98 99 98 
Stavanger/Sandnes 78 79 88 84 87 88 88 86 87 88 82 84 
Solund 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Trondheim 82 83 89 83 83 82 76 87 87 84 84 83 
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Regional Overview: Market Shares Top 5 Banks (Loans) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Oslo 80 83 84 83 81 83 83 86 88 87 86 88 
Kongsberg 97 97 97 98 95 96 94 98 98 96 96 94 
Stavanger/Sandnes 90 90 90 85 87 86 82 87 82 87 85 79 
Solund 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 99 100 100 100 98 
Trondheim 85 86 88 89 85 84 84 90 90 89 88 84 
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Regional Overview: Market Shares Top 5 Banks (Deposits)  
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Number of Customers 
The count of customers was done by counting the organization number of the customers for 
each bank in all the regions. By doing this, we could record the fact that a customer may have 
multiple customer relationships with different banks, and across regions as well. Further, the 
associated account(s) of the customer must either have a registered loan or deposit in order to 
count as an active customer. The charts below show an increase in both loan and deposit 
customers in the period. 
Figure 3.13 Number of Loan Customers 
 
Figure 3.14 Number of Deposit Customers 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Kongsberg 314 319 306 354 359 363 382 360 380 408 424 449 
Oslo 9859 10339 9413 12015 12232 12173 14415 13665 14377 15632 16887 16621 
Solund 12 12 13 16 18 15 22 18 20 20 25 29 
Stavanger/Sandnes 2832 3008 3062 3515 3623 3545 3860 3804 3978 4485 5054 5059 
Trondheim 2293 2374 1844 2811 2819 2821 3159 3090 3222 3419 3608 3655 
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Regional Overview: Number of Loan Customers 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Kongsberg 760 796 826 855 865 898 970 917 974 1117 1239 1306 
Oslo 41892 44047 41651 52341 52295 52667 59792 55300 57388 63009 71545 76364 
Solund 25 24 27 31 34 34 52 38 54 56 66 62 
Stavanger/Sandnes 6976 7387 7387 7771 8281 8469 9451 9408 9848 11892 13881 15180 
Trondheim 6063 6284 6291 6605 7240 7402 8292 8075 8522 9607 10705 11464 
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Number of Accounts 
The figures for loans and deposits simply count the number of active accounts in each region. 
The accounts must have registered loans or deposits for each respective year in order to be 
counted. By doing this, we have taken into account that a customer may have multiple 
accounts in several banks across regions. The graphs show that there are a substantially higher 
number of deposit accounts than loan accounts. When cross-referenced with the number of 
customers, we can see that the number of customers has also increased throughout the period. 
This suggests that the increased number of accounts may be a manifestation of the increased 
number of customers. 
Figure 3.15 Number of Loan Accounts 
 
Figure 3.16 Number of Deposit Accounts 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Kongsberg 559 586 563 616 609 559 581 551 611 614 681 712 
Oslo 16324 17487 14979 19163 19198 18714 21611 20516 23563 23641 25568 25874 
Solund 19 21 22 23 29 28 44 33 44 45 55 55 
Stavanger/Sandnes 4573 4910 4926 5584 5847 5649 6103 5929 6978 7007 7769 7959 
Trondheim 3882 4080 3208 4867 4895 4669 5038 4923 5336 5353 5603 5691 
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Regional Overview: Number of Loan Accounts 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Kongsberg 1341 1447 1567 1604 1611 1689 1809 1746 1891 2093 2301 2433 
Oslo 73215 77144 80302 101159 101206 102910 117740 112702 116197 124200 140260 149016 
Solund 44 42 43 57 54 54 83 63 90 95 120 120 
Stavanger/Sandnes 11878 12859 13346 14112 15288 15847 17979 18055 18849 21914 25513 28000 
Trondheim 10614 10989 11401 11863 13153 13739 15885 15533 16597 18186 20424 21716 
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Regional Overview: Number of Deposit Accounts 
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Mean Loan Size 
Mean loan size was calculated by summarizing all loans registered in the region, and then 
dividing this by the number of customers that had loans. The figures show that the mean loan 
size trended upwards, which may suggest that the individual customers have grown in size 
and managed to borrow more through the period. Notably, the mean loan size in 2008 for 
Oslo was above NOK 13 million, which initially seems like a large amount. The main reason 
for this is that the sample consists of firms whose loan sizes vary greatly.  For instance, in the 
Oslo region there were 22 borrowers that had loans in excess of NOK 1 billion in the year of 
2008, and 5 percent of the borrowers had loans in excess of NOK 64 million. Although the 
mean was around NOK 14 million, the median was NOK 777,000. 
Figure 3.17 Mean Loan Size 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Kongsberg 1,395 1,678 1,270 2,822 2,202 2,772 3,152 3,360 3,083 3,898 9,097 11,009 
Oslo 4,419 5,199 5,585 6,607 6,942 7,043 7,865 7,340 7,796 9,336 11,396 13,859 
Solund 775 1,447 1,349 1,375 3,374 3,192 1,454 1,573 1,708 1,406 2,552 5,433 
Stavanger/Sandnes 2,905 3,505 3,673 4,219 4,065 4,259 4,764 4,673 4,882 6,349 7,404 9,325 
Trondheim 2,146 2,111 2,435 3,134 3,494 4,283 4,687 4,547 4,859 5,188 5,806 6,790 
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4.	  Methods	  
4.1	  Introduction	  
The aim of this chapter is to give a detailed assessment of the various methods that we have 
used in our study and the methodology of which our research is based on. This will include 
careful descriptions of the setting that forms the basis for our thesis, the approach used to 
conduct the research, our choice of research design, methods for data collection and data 
analysis as well as a thorough discussion of the reliability and validity of the data. The term 
methods refer to the techniques and procedures used to obtain and analyze data, whereas 
methodology is the theory of how research should be undertaken (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2007). To make this chapter as comprehensible and lucid to the reader as possible, 
both a general discussion of the methods we have used as well as an assessment of the 
specific implications these methods have for our research is covered in this chapter. We will 
not describe any of our results in this part of the thesis as they will be examined and explained 
thoroughly in the Results chapter. 
4.2	  Research	  Setting	  
Because we are concerned with determinants of banks’ interest rate spreads in the Norwegian 
banking sector, the setting under which our research was conducted is the market for 
Norwegian bank loan and bank deposit services. We define this market as all Norwegian 
banks that offer these services to domestic firms (for a more thorough definition we refer to 
Chapter 3). Data from the Norwegian banking sector spanning from the fiscal years 1997 – 
2008 was used as basis for our research. We have chosen this particular setting because we 
believe that it serves as an expedient platform to answer our research question. Although 
studies on the impact of market structure on bank performance have been conducted in the 
past25, the relationship between market structure and interest rate spreads in local Norwegian 
bank markets has not been examined with data sets similar to ours. As such, our choice of 
setting may contribute to a broader understanding of the topics we cover in this study. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Many of these studies are reviewed thoroughly in Chapter 2. 
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4.2	  Approach	  
In order to test our hypothesis we identified a set of variables from a theoretical framework. 
The extent to which the theory is clear and precise at the beginning of a research project raises 
important implications for the choice of design (Saunders et al., 2007). The design of the 
study has to be consistent with the approach under which it is appropriate to conduct the 
research in question. There are essentially two different approaches that can be used. A 
deductive approach is appropriate when a theory or hypothesis is already developed and a 
strategy is designed to test this hypothesis, whereas an inductive approach involves collecting 
data first and then developing a theory as a result of the data analysis (Saunders et al., 2007). 
Our research builds upon an already well-established theoretical framework and we 
developed a hypothesis, which we tested with the use of quantitative data. As such, we have 
used a deductive approach. There are several distinguishing features associated with this 
approach (Saunders et al., 2007); first, a deductive approach is well suited when attempting to 
explain causal relationships between variables. This is what we have attempted to do when 
examining the relationship between interest-rate spreads and various sources of changes in 
market structure. Second, the deductive approach involves controls to allow for hypothesis 
testing. By including additional explanatory variables in our model other than market 
concentration and market share we were able to ensure that changes observed in the interest 
rate spreads were a function of the variables that we tested rather than unobserved variables. 
Another characteristic of the deductive approach is that the variables are operationalized in 
ways that allow them to be measured quantitatively. Since we were using historical registry 
data to construct all our variables (as opposed to variables constructed on the basis of a 
survey, for instance), the variables in our model were already given in operational terms. 
Finally, the last characteristic of the deductive approach is generalization. The extent to which 
the results of a study can be generalized to the entire population depends on how the sample 
in the study is selected. In our case, we define the population as the entire Norwegian bank 
market. Deductive research progresses through five sequential stages (Robson, 2002): 
1. Deducing a hypothesis from theory 
2. Expressing the hypothesis in operational terms 
3. Testing the operational variables in the hypothesis 
4. Examining the outcome of the test 
5. If necessary, modify the theory in light of the test results 
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The above stages represent the step-by-step progress under which our research was 
conducted. 
4.3	  Research	  Design	  
A study’s research design contains a general description of how the entire research process 
will be carried out in order to answer the research question (Gripsrud, Olson and Silkoset, 
2004). It is a plan that outlines the objectives of the research, what type of data that is needed, 
the sources of these data and how they are to be analyzed. The research design should also 
include considerations on potential constraints (Saunders et al., 2007).  There are three main 
types of research design. An exploratory design is particularly useful if the purpose of the 
research is to gain insight into an area that is not well known to the researcher at the 
beginning of the project, and if the goal is to clarify the understanding of the problem at 
question (Saunders et al., 2007). When a descriptive design is used, the object of the study is 
to describe the current situation in a certain field of study (Gripsrud et al., 2004; Saunders et 
al., 2007). Finally, when attempting to establish causal relationships between different 
variables, an explanatory design is used. In this type of design the emphasis is on explaining 
relationships between variables within a particular situation (Saunders et al., 2007). The 
reasoning behind explanatory research is that if, under a predetermined set of conditions, a 
certain situation X, correlates with another situation Y, and X comes before Y in time, there is 
a good possibility that there is a causal relationship between the two variables X and Y given 
that no other possible explanation for the correlation between X and Y exists (Gripsrud et al., 
2004). 
The purpose of our study was to test causal relationships between the interest rate spreads and 
bank and market specific factors in high and low concentration markets respectively. We were 
attempting to use a hypothesis derived from our literature review to source out relevant data 
from a set of secondary data on the Norwegian banking industry provided to us by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance26. The data set contained panel data on all deposits and loans 
in Norwegian banks from 1997 – 2008. As Wooldridge (2006) explain, panel data contains 
both a time-series and a cross-sectional dimension. This means that our study was 
longitudinal in its nature, which is to say that we studied the change and development of 
repeated observations across time (Saunders et al., 2007).  As noted above we were following 
the general structure of a deductive approach, and since we were studying casual relationships 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This type of secondary data, where a government collect obligatory data from an entire population, is called a census (Saunders, et al., 
2007). 
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our research design is explanatory. The most accurate strategy for conducting an explanatory 
study is to use an experiment. However, given the scope and nature of our research, an 
experiment strategy was not possible to conduct and would in any case not serve our purposes 
well. Instead, the data set from the Ministry of Finance provided us with more suitable 
empirical data to test our hypothesis. This data set contains interest rates on all deposits and 
loans of every bank in Norway. As displayed graphically in our research model, interest rate 
spread is the dependent variable, whereas the other variables in the model serve as 
independent variables. A strategy that involves the use of administrative records and 
documents is called an archival research strategy (Saunders et al., 2007). As Saunders et al. 
(2007) point out; an archival research strategy is suitable when doing research upon the past 
and when studying changes over time. Since our starting point was to do an empirical analysis 
of the Norwegian bank market this strategy suited our purposes well. 
4.4	  Data	  Collection	  
At the most generic level, there are two different ways to collect data for a research project. 
Data that are gathered for the specific purposes of the research project undertaken is called 
primary data, whereas data that are obtained from sources that originally used the data for 
other purposes are labeled secondary data. What ultimately determines the data collection 
strategy most appropriate for a particular research project, is the extent to which the data may 
answer your research question and meet the objectives of the study (Saunders et al., 2007). As 
noted above, we based our study on panel data collected by the Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance. Although the data we used were initially collected for other purposes, the data 
material was unmodified and raw when we received it and had to be cleansed and customized 
to a great extent before we could work with it. As such, the distinction between primary and 
secondary data is not entirely without nuances in this case and labeling the data as one or the 
other essentially comes down to a matter of where to draw the line. However, Saunders et al. 
(2007) refer to data that have been collected using a survey and that have been analyzed for 
their original purpose before being used in another setting as survey-based secondary data. In 
the case where a government collects obligatory data from an entire population, such as when 
the Norwegian Ministry of Finance obtains yearly data regularly from all Norwegian banks, 
the data is called a census. Although a census is not technically a survey, since participation is 
mandatory, it still falls under the subcategory survey-based secondary data (Saunders et al., 
2007). Census data that contain a time-series of the same individual subjects viewed over 
several moments in time is categorized as panel data (Murray, 2006). The data that provided 
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the main framework for our analysis is a combination of data sets on deposits and loans 
through the years 1997 – 2008 and fits into this label. 
4.5	  Data	  Analysis	  
In this section we will describe scales that fit the data in the data set that we used in our 
analysis and explain the various techniques that we made use of in order to do the actual 
testing. We describe the use of scales in our data set in detail so that the reader can easily 
understand the methodical assumptions that our analysis builds on. This section is meant to 
provide the reader with a walkthrough guide of how the various analyses in this thesis were 
carried out and an understanding of the assumptions about the data that these analyses build 
on. 
4.5.1	  Scales	  
As mentioned above, the data sets that we used as basis for this study were panel data with 
deposits and loans over a certain period of time, which means that the data were quantitative. 
Quantitative data are data that belong to one of two distinct groups, categorical or quantifiable 
(Saunders et al., 2007). Categorical data are data that cannot be measured numerically, but 
whose values can either be 1) placed in different categories depending on their specific 
characteristics or 2) ranked according to their specific values. The technical term for data that 
can be placed in different categories but cannot be ranked is nominal data. We divided our 
data set in different geographical regions to define the various markets. These markets were 
delineated and distinguished from each other based on relative commuter distance. Because 
the banks in these markets cannot be ranked per se (as opposed to for instance their size) they 
fall under the label nominal data, i.e. we were able to distinguish them from each other based 
on their category. Data that can be ranked, but whose numerical positions cannot be measured 
and compared with other data in the data set, are called ordinal data.  This implies that it is 
possible to decide whether or not one variable has more of a specific property than another 
variable, although it is not possible to decide how much more (Gripsrud et al., 2005). This 
would be the case of we had based our data collection on a survey. The data with which we 
based our analysis on however, was on a more precise scale level. Quantifiable data can, 
contrary to categorical data, be measured numerically. It means that quantifiable data can be 
assigned with a position on a numerical scale, and that they can be analyzed with a far wider 
range of statistics (Saunders et al., 2007). Data that are quantifiable can be subdivided into 
interval data and ratio data. Interval data is data where, in addition to be able to rank the data, 
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it is possible to state how large the difference between the values for a given variable is. 
However, the relative difference between data on the interval level cannot be measured. In 
other word this type of data cannot be multiplied and divided, only added and subtracted 
(Saunders et al., 2007). The other sub-category of quantifiable data is ratio data. Ratio data 
can, in contrast to interval data, be multiplied and divided so it is possible to calculate the 
relative difference between data values for a particular variable. In the data set from the 
Ministry of Finance that we used, the data subject to actual testing were ratio data. Hence, we 
did not have to assume the relative difference between data for a given variable, but could 
instead observe these differences directly and be confident that any observed differences 
would be accurate and precise. 
The fact that we were using a panel of time series data had implications for several underlying 
assumption for our testing. Panel data are, as opposed to cross-sectional data, not drawn 
randomly from a population. This does not mean, however, that the data is not subject to 
randomness. As Wooldridge (2006: 343) explains:  
‘…a sequence of random variables indexed by time is called a stochastic process. 
When collecting a time series data set we obtain one possible outcome, or realization, 
of the stochastic process. We can only see a single realization, because we cannot go 
back in time and start the process over again. However, if certain conditions in history 
had been different, we would generally obtain a different realization for the stochastic 
process, and this is why we think of time series data as the outcome of random 
variables.’ 
This means that our bank data represents one particular series of realizations (the series that 
actually happened) and is “drawn” from a set of all possible realizations that is analogous to a 
population.  
4.5.2	  Preliminary	  Analysis	  
In order to formulate a regression equation that would accurately measure the variables we 
wanted to test, we made use of several exploratory analysis techniques before conducting the 
actual testing. This helped us identify patterns and confirm assumptions that had to be 
established before we could do any further testing. First, we had to compare the interest rate 
spreads and the HHI for all the regions (commuter belts) over the years 1998 – 2008 to verify 
that the variables correlated over time (lest our assumption that there is some kind of 
coherence between interest rate spreads and market concentration would not hold and it 
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would be meaningless to expose our hypotheses to any further testing). Although the year 
1997 was included in the original data sets, we omitted this year from the entire analysis 
because we had no opening balance data for this year. We began with dividing all the banks in 
our data set into different sub-markets based on the region each bank belonged to. After we 
had defined the markets for all the banks, we calculated the mean interest rate spreads for 
each bank in every region as well as the regional means. We then compared the region mean 
with each region’s HHI. This allowed us to see graphically whether or not there seemed to be 
any correlation between the variables over time. The interest rate spread was calculated as 
follows: 
€ 
iratespreadi,r,t = i_ loansi,r,t∑
loans,obi,r,t − loans,cbi,r,t∑∑
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟ − NIBOR 
(4.1) 
where 
€ 
i_ loansi,r,t∑ is the sum of all interest income from loans for bank  in region 
€ 
r  in 
year , 
€ 
loans,obi,r,t∑ is the opening balance of all loans and 
€ 
loans,cbi,r,t∑ is the closing 
balance. The first part of the right hand side of the equation gives us the average loan rate for 
any given bank. In order to get a realistic measurement of the rates, we removed all loan rates 
that were greater than 1 from our data set and then winsorized the remaining loan rates by 90 
percent. The underlying assumptions of such a 90 percent winsorization is that the data below 
the 5th percentile will be set to the 5th percentile and the data above the 95th percentile will be 
set to the 95th percentile. The motivation for winsorizing the data was to exclude extreme 
values from the analysis. Without winsorizing the data, the extreme values can cause 
inconsistent interest rate spread calculations. We chose a 90 percent winsorization because 
this seemed to be the most appropriate cut-off (see Appendix A). Adding the opening and 
closing balances and dividing by 2 gave as an approximation of the average loans over a 
given year27. By deducting the NIBOR28 from the interest rate, we arrive at the actual spread. 
We used a yearly average of the 3-month NIBOR to arrive at a relevant yearly NIBOR. An 
alternative way to calculate the spread is to deduct the deposit rates from the loan rates: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Because there are no opening balances in the first year a bank enters a new market, we chose to let opening balances be equal to closing 
balances in cases of entry. The alternative would be to exclude these banks from the analysis in the year they entered. 
28 NIBOR is the Norwegian Inter Bank Offered Rate. It is often used as a reference rate for the inter bank money market rate. In other words 
the NIBOR is the rate at which banks lend to each other. If deposits only amount to a small proportion of a bank’s funding, the NIBOR may 
reflect a more accurate measure of the bank’s funding costs. 
! 
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€ 
iratespreadi,r,t = i_ loansi,r,t∑
loans,obi,r,t − loans,cbi,r,t∑∑
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(4.2)
 
The first part of the right hand side of the equation remains the same as in 4.1. The second 
part is the deposit rate and is calculated in the same way as the loan rate. 
€ 
i_ depositsi,r,t∑  is 
the sum of all interests paid on deposits,  
€ 
deposits,obi,r,t∑ and 
€ 
deposits,cbi,r,t∑  are the 
opening and closing balances on deposits, respectively. Controlling for robustness of the 
results, we performed all the tests in our analysis with this measure as well. In order to further 
examine the correlation properties between the interest rate spread (loan rate – NIBOR) and 
HHI we calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient for each region. The correlation 
coefficient is a number between – 1 and + 1 that represents the strength of the relationship 
between the variable (Saunders et al., 2007). A value of + 1 indicates perfect positive 
correlation. Conversely, value of – 1 represents a perfect negative correlation and a value of 0 
suggests that there is no correlation at all. The correlation coefficient is calculated by dividing 
the covariance of the two variables by the product of the two variables’ standard deviation: 
  (4.3)              
 
The covariance is another way to measure how strongly two variables vary together and can, 
unlike the correlation coefficient, take on any value (Murray, 2006). It is defined as: 
  (4.4)
 
The correlation between the interest rate spread (IRS) and the HHI in any of the regions was 
therefore defined as: 
  (4.5)
 
where  = total number of banks in the region and  = bank. We examined the correlations 
both at the regional level and the aggregated Norwegian bank market level. Before we could 
formulate the regression equation that would ultimately test our main hypotheses, we put our 
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data through several different t-tests to check for differences between banks in markets with a 
HHI higher than 0.20 and banks in markets with a HHI equal to or lower than 0.20. In 
addition to this, we tested for significant differences between banks in regions in the top 25 
percent regions and bottom 25 percent regions, ranked by HHI. When testing for differences 
between two independent samples, the appropriate test is the independent samples t-test 
(Gripsrud et al., 2005). The independent samples t-tests give an indication of whether or not 
there is a difference in the mean of a particular variable between two different groups. We 
assumed that the groups had equal variances. The purpose of conducting the t-tests was to see 
if high and low concentration markets tended to differ in regards to several critical variables, 
testing for each variable one at the time. We tested for differences between the groups in the 
following variables: 
- Interest rate spread (loan rate – NIBOR) 
- Interest rate spread (loan rate – deposit rate) 
- Mean loan size per region 
- Mean size of banks per region (size measured by loans) 
- Number of customers (loans) per region 
- Number of accounts (loans) per region 
- Number of banks per region 
- Market share (calculated by the sizes of the banks’ total loans) 
- Number of customers per bank per region 
- Number of accounts (loans) per bank per region 
- Loan size per bank per region  
In other words, we tested if there were significant differences between markets with HHI 
€ 
>
0.20 and markets with HHI 
€ 
≤ 0.20 in regards to these variables, and whether there were 
significant differences between the top and bottom 25 percent groups in regards to the same 
variables. We did the t-tests for all the years in our data set from 1998 – 2008. When 
conducting a t-test, two hypotheses are formulated, a null-hypothesis and an alternative 
hypothesis (Gripsrud, et al., 2005). The null-hypothesis states that there is no difference 
between the two samples, whereas the alternative-hypothesis states that there is a difference. 
For all our t-tests we used a significance level of 0.05. For any significance level < 0.05, the 
alternative hypotheses were confirmed and we could assume that differences found could not 
be attributed to random variation. Since our hypotheses tested for differences between groups, 
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and not that the particular values were either larger or smaller for one group compared to the 
other, the tests were two-sided. 
4.5.3	  Regression	  Analysis	  
With the use of a regression analysis we wanted to find out how differences in market 
structure affect the interest rate spreads in the regions in our study. In order to do so we had to 
estimate how the year-by-year changes in interest rate spreads were affected by HHI and the 
other control variables over the years 1998 – 2008. As we mentioned briefly above, this type 
of analysis required us to construct a panel data set consisting of data from all the years in our 
study. When analyzing panel data econometrically, it is not reasonable to assume that the 
observations are independently distributed across time (Wooldridge, 2006). In a panel data 
set, unobserved commonalities (factors) that affect an individual in one period, will also affect 
that individual in the next period. Consequently, all the observations on one individual bank 
share some commonality that is idiosyncratic to this bank and not shared with other banks. 
Such commonalities can also be shared by all the observations in a single time period, but not 
by any observations in other time periods (Murray, 2006). In short, unobserved 
commonalities that affect the dependent variables are either constant or vary over time 
(Wooldridge, 2006). An unobserved effects model that takes into account such unobserved 
commonalities could be formulated as follows: 
€ 
yi,t = β0 + β1x1,i,t + ...+ βk xk,i,t + ai + ui,t  
€ 
t =1,...,T  
€ 
i =1,...,n   (4.6) 
In the model, 
€ 
i  denotes the individual or entity the observation is from and 
€ 
t  indicates which 
time period the observation is from. 
€ 
ai  is an individual unobserved effect that is often referred 
to as unobserved heterogeneity in applications and is fixed over time. The unobserved 
heterogeneity captures all unobserved, time-constant commonalities that affect 
€ 
yi,t , while 
€ 
ui,t , 
often referred to as the idiosyncratic error, represent all unobserved commonalities that vary 
over time and affect 
€ 
yi,t  (Wooldridge, 2006). The presence of these unobserved 
commonalities means that the observations are not independently distributed across time and 
do not satisfy the Gauss-Markov Assumptions29. For this reason, regular ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression is not feasible when analyzing panel data, and other analysis 
methods should be used.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The Gauss-Markov Assumptions are a set of assumptions under which OLS is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) (Wooldridge, 
2006; Murray, 2006). The assumptions are that the model is linear in its parameters, there is no perfect collinearity among the independent 
variables, and that the errors have serial conditional mean, are uncorrelated, and homoskedastic. 
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Two methods that are frequently used to estimate unobserved effects panel data models are 
the fixed effect estimator (FE) and the random effects estimator (RE). The appropriateness of 
each method depends on the properties of the data set being analyzed. In both cases we 
assume that the idiosyncratic error is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables: 
€ 
Cov(x j,i,t ,ui,t ) = 0  for all 
€ 
j , 
€ 
i  and 
€ 
t  
When the individual unobserved effect is contemporaneously correlated with the explanatory 
variables we have that 
€ 
Cov(x j,i,t ,ai) ≠ 0  for at least some 
€ 
j , 
€ 
i  and 
€ 
t  
For this reason, a transformation method is needed to remove the unobserved effect along 
with any time-constant explanatory variables prior to estimation, in order to get a consistent 
estimator of the parameters (Wooldridge, 2006; Murray, 2006). This can be done with a fixed 
effects transformation. Starting out with an unobserved effects model (without a constant 
intercept, 
€ 
β0 ) we have that: 
€ 
yi,t = β1x1,i,t + ...+ βk xk,i,t + ai + ui,t  
€ 
t =1,...,T  
€ 
i =1,...,n  (4.7) 
by averaging the equation over time for each i, we get: 
€ 
y i,t = β1x1,i,t + ...+ βk x k,i,t + ai + ui,t  
€ 
t =1,...,T  
€ 
i =1,...,n  (4.8) 
Finally (4.8) is subtracted from (4.7) and we arrive at the general time-demeaned equation for 
each i: 
€ 
˙ ˙ yi,t = β1˙ ˙ x1,i,t + ...+ βk ˙ ˙ xk,i,t + ˙ ˙ ui,t  
€ 
t =1,...,T  
€ 
i =1,...,n  (4.9) 
Because the individual unobserved effect 
€ 
ai  is constant over the time periods it disappears in 
equation (4.9) and we can estimate the parameters with OLS. This is the FE. It uses the time 
variation of y and x within each cross-section and is sometimes referred to as the within group 
estimator because of this (Wooldridge, 2006). If the individual unobserved effect and the 
explanatory variables are contemporaneously uncorrelated, so that  
€ 
Cov(x j,i,t ,ai) = 0 for all 
€ 
j , 
€ 
i  and 
€ 
t  
, it is not feasible to eliminate the individual unobserved effect. In such instances, we can 
define a composite error term as 
€ 
vi,t = ai + ui,t , that are serially correlated across time. The 
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appropriate estimation method in this case is the RE30. Because FE allows for the explanatory 
variables 
€ 
x j,i,t to be correlated with the unobserved effect 
€ 
ai , while RE does not, RE is only 
suitable when 
€ 
x j,i,t  and 
€ 
ai  are uncorrelated. We argue that the explanatory variables in our 
data set are indeed correlated contemporaneously with bank specific error components. As an 
arbitrary example, consider the following; an observed explanatory variable that may affect a 
banks interest rate spread is the number of customer loan accounts a bank has. Banks with 
especially risk willing managers, for which 
€ 
ai  > than 0, may be inclined to issue loans to 
high-risk projects, effectively increasing the number of loan accounts. If this is the case, we 
will observe that those banks with above average values for 
€ 
ai  are likely to have above 
average values for the number of customer accounts and we have that 
€ 
x j,i,t  and 
€ 
aiare 
correlated. Hence, the fixed effect estimator is appropriate. Wooldridge (2006) recommends 
including dummy variables for each time period when T (time periods) is small relative to N 
(banks). By using time-dummies for each year in the panel-data it is possible to control for 
unobserved commonalities that are common for all the banks in a given year. Hence, our 
unobserved effects model included dummy variables for the years 1998 – 200831 and 
analyzed with FE. The model was formulated as: 
€ 
iratespreadi,r,t = β1hhir,t + β2loansize_ regr,t + β3banksize_ regr,t + β4cust _ regr,t + β5acc _ regr,t
€ 
+β6banks_ regr,t + β7marketsharei,t + β8cust _banki,t + β9acc _banki,t + β10loansize_banki,t +δ1d98t
€ 
+δ2d99t +δ3d00t +δ4d01t +δ5d02t +δ6d03t +δ7d04 t +δ8d05t +δ9d06t +δ10d07t +δ11d08 + ai + ui,t
€ 
t =1,...,T   
€ 
i =1,...,n      (4.10) 
In this model, the 
€ 
iratespreadi,t  is the interest rate spread as calculated in (4.1). 
€ 
i  denotes 
bank, 
€ 
r  denotes region and 
€ 
t  denotes year. Each 
€ 
i  is the equivalent of one bank in one 
region. That is to say that if a given bank has branches in several regions (which is often the 
case), each branch is labeled by its individual 
€ 
i  and thus represents a distinct entity in the 
analysis. The explanatory variables 
€ 
β1hhir,t , 
€ 
β2loansize_ regr,t ,
€ 
β3banksize_ regr,t , 
€ 
β4cust _ regr,t , 
€ 
β5acc _ regr,t , 
€ 
β6banks_ regr,t , are all region specific variables. This means that 
they have the same value for all the banks in a particular region. 
€ 
β1hhir,t  denotes regional 
HHI, 
€ 
β2loansize_ regr,t denotes the mean size of loans in a region ,
€ 
β3banksize_ regr,t  denotes 
the mean size of the all the banks in bank region 
€ 
r  at year 
€ 
t , 
€ 
β4cust _ regr,t  denotes the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For a thorough review of the specifications of the random effects model we refer to Wooldridge (2007: 493-497), Murray (2007: 691-
693) and Greene (2008: 200-210). 
31 1997 was omitted from the data set because we had no data for 1996, while 1998 served as the base year so this dummy was practically 
omitted as well. 
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number of customers in a region, 
€ 
β5acc _ regr,t  denotes the number of loan accounts in a 
region and 
€ 
β6banks_ regi,t  denote the number of banks that issue loans in a region. 
€ 
β7marketsharei,t , 
€ 
β8cust _banki,t , 
€ 
β9acc _banki,t and 
€ 
β10loansize_banki,t  are bank specific 
variables. 
€ 
β7marketsharei,t  denotes the  market share,  
€ 
β8cust _banki,t  the number of loan 
customers, 
€ 
β9acc _banki,t  the number of accounts and 
€ 
β10loansize_banki,t  the size of loans 
for bank 
€ 
i  in year 
€ 
t .  Because the banks are the units of analysis in our study rather than their 
customers, we assume that the effect of all firm specific variables on the customer side, such 
as managers’ risk willingness, customers’ credit risk and the industry in which the various 
banks’ customers operate are caught up in the constant term, the year dummies and the error 
term. Firm specific variables are as such considered to be an average measure of the quality of 
the customers for each bank in our model. 
Since we wanted to test for differences between markets with high concentrations and a low 
concentrations, we divided the banks into two distinct groups; banks in region with HHI 
higher than 0.2 was grouped in one group and those with a HHI equal to or lower than 0.2 
was grouped in another. We estimated the effect the explanatory variables in the model have 
on the interest rate spread through the years 1998-2008 in both the high-HHI and low-HHI 
regions as well as the compound effect on all banks across regions. 
4.5.4	  Robustness	  Tests	  
The robustness of an estimator is the degree to which the estimator retains it sampling process 
despite nontrivial changes to the assumptions about where the data comes from (Murray, 
2006). We tested our model for robustness by changing the underlying assumptions for the 
dependent variable, interest rate spread, in the regression model. As argued above, we 
defined the interest rate spread as the difference between the interests on loans and the 3-
month NIBOR. There were several other ways that we could have defined the interest rate 
spread. To test for robustness we used an alternative definition of the interest rate spread to 
see if it yielded similar results. We used the definition as shown in (4.2) using the deposit 
rates as an estimate of the banks’ interest costs. By applying this alternative definition of the 
interest rate spread and running the same regression as we did previously, we were able to 
find out if our findings were robust to alternative definitions of the interest rate spread. 
Finally, we also tested the robustness of the grouping criteria that we used to label the regions 
as low and high concentration. We did this by defining high and low level HHI regions as the 
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top and bottom 25 percent regions as measured by HHI. This allowed us to control for 
differences in the most extreme cases. 
4.6	  Validity	  and	  Reliability	  
It is important to be aware of the pitfalls that necessarily present themselves when conducting 
research. In this section we will briefly discuss different types of validity and reliability and to 
what extent our study is subject to pitfalls arising from such criteria. 
 Validity is the extent to which the data collection methods actually measure what they are 
intended to measure and the extent to which the research is really about what it claims to be 
about (Saunders et al., 2007). In this context, there is a distinction between internal validity 
and external validity. Internal validity measures to what degree the causality in the findings 
are actually a result of interventions rather than other stimuli that are not included in the 
model. As Gripsrud et al. (2005: 69) explain: If we claim that X affects Y, we have to be 
certain that it is indeed X that causes the variation in Y and that this variation is not caused by 
other factors that are not included in our model. In respect to our research models, this has 
implications for the degree to which the dependent variable (interest rate spread) was affected 
by the independent variables in our regression models. A lower  will reflect whatever 
variation in the interest rate spread that is not caused by any of the independent variables. 
Since we were testing empirical data from an entire population, the risk of drawing a 
conclusions that is not valid is limited because we can easily observe the  and determine 
whether or not the independent variables in our model cause significant variations in the 
dependent variable or not. There is however a certain risk of backward causation in our study, 
meaning that there is a possibility that variation in the independent variables’ values could 
potentially be caused by variations in the interest rate spreads. This would be the case if the 
performance of banks significantly impacts the market structure, more precisely if the interest 
rate spread would cause variations in HHI32. Hence, our study is not entirely precluded from 
threats to internal validity. External validity is the extent to which the findings from a study 
can be generalized (Saunders et al., 2007). The mere fact that our data set contains 
information on deposit and loan and deposit rates from all banks in Norway strengthens the 
validity of our study. While this makes the external validity of our study high in terms of 
generalizability to the population of Norwegian banks, it is apparent that the external validity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This is some of the criticism that has been raised against studies that attempt to explain a one-way causality from market structure to 
performance (see Degryse et al., 2009).  
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would be considerably weaker if we attempted to generalize our results to foreign markets. 
Still, given the level of detail in our research and the fact that the markets for loans and 
deposits tend to function in similar ways across most market economies, we believe that it 
may be possible to generalize the results of our study to other bank markets as well.  
Reliability is a measurement of the consistency of the research and refers to the extent to 
which techniques and analysis procedures used in a study will yield consistent findings 
(Saunders et al., 2007). In order for the study to be reliable, the random mistakes that often 
occur in a research setting have to be as small as possible (Gripsrud et al., 2004). The data we 
used in our study are official accounts of actual loan and deposit rates. This suggest that 
reliability is not likely to be a problem with our study, since the data we used come from a 
presumptively reliable public source (the Norwegian Ministry of Finance) and it is possible to 
do similar studies for whoever may have access to the same data. 
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5.	  Results	  
5.1	  Introduction	  
In this chapter we present the findings from our analysis. In section 5.2 we provide an 
overview of the correlations between the interest rate spread and HHI, both on the national 
level including all regions and on a selection of regions used for illustrative purposes. Section 
5.3 depicts the differences between regions with high and low HHI and gives fuel to our 
assumption that a distinction between the two groups is sensible. The most important 
findings, our main findings that conclude our study, are presented in section 5.4. In this 
section we describe the findings from our regression analyses in detail. 
Summary statistics for all of the variables that are pertinent to our analysis are displayed in 
Table 5.1 below. The variables are summarized over the period 1998  - 2008, and the 
summarization is done on the same samples as the regressions that we present later in the 
chapter. 
Table 5.1 Univariate Summary Statistics* 
Variable Obs. (bank level) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
iratespread(loan rate – nibor) 22,862 0.019 0.014 -0.0099608 0.0472835 
iratespread(loans - deposits) 17,959 0.036 0.019 -0.0439944 0.0863708 
hhi 38,432 0.321 0.156 0.122 1 
loansize_reg 38,432 3,255,346 2,902,882 161,619 4.20E+07 
banksize_reg 22,862 2.48E+08 4.17E+08 492,858 3.00E+09 
cust_reg 38,432 1,389 2,872 1 16,887 
acc_reg 38,432 2,208 4,443 2 25,873 
banks_reg 38,432 24 26 1 135 
marketshare 22,862 0.084 0.167 2.54E-11 1 
cust_bank 22,862 34 146 1 5,710 
acc_bank 22,862 55 227 0 8,479 
loansize_bank 38,432 1.48E+08 1.65E+09 0 1.29E+11 
* Complete summary statistics for all the years can be found in Appendix I. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   59	  
5.2	  Correlation	  between	  HHI	  and	  the	  Interest	  Rate	  Spread	  
As described in section 4.5.2 in the Methods chapter, we conducted correlation analyses to 
assess the correlation coefficient of the two variables HHI and Interest Rate Spread (Loans – 
NIBOR). The correlation coefficients are calculated over the time period 1998 – 2008. This is 
arguably few time periods, but we still believe the calculations yield meaningful results. We 
conducted two sets of correlation analyses. The first set was conducted on a national level 
across all regions for all of the time periods, while the second set was conducted on the 
regional level for greater detail.  Below is the result for the national level. 
Table 5.2 Correlation Coefficients on the National Level 
 HHI Interest Rate Spread 
(Loan Rate – NIBOR) 
HHI 1.000  
Interest Rate Spread (Loans – NIBOR) 0.0798* 1.0000 
P 0.0000 
*Significant at the 1% level. 
The correlation coefficient on the national level is 0.0798, which confirms that there is some 
correlation between the HHI and the interest rate spread. Recall that a coefficient of 1 means 
that the variables perfectly correlate, 0 as being uncorrelated, and  -1 as being perfectly 
negatively correlated. Albeit the correlation is somewhat weak, the result has to be interpreted 
in light of the fact that this is on the national level including all regions. 
We estimated correlations on each region33. Of all the 161 regions, 39 show significant 
correlation coefficients at the 5 % level. Despite that the majority of the regions do not show 
significant results, we still observe that important regions with large market size show high 
correlation coefficients that are significant. For instance, Oslo, the largest region in Norway in 
terms of loan size, has a significant correlation coefficient of 0.2719. Bergen, Norway’s third 
largest market in terms of loan size has a correlation coefficient of 0.1506, which is somewhat 
low. Nevertheless, there is a significant positive correlation. Recall that Bergen is a region 
with low HHI.  Among the regions with the highest correlation coefficients are Røyrvik and 
Rødøy, which has coefficients of 0.5659 and 0.4401. An observation worth mentioning is that 
these regions are small regions in terms of volume of loans, and a limited number of banks 
operate in these regions. This could possibly have affected the observed high correlation 
coefficient, but naturally, no firm conclusion can be drawn without further analysis. Table 5.3 
depicts the correlation coefficients in a selected number of regions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Please refer to Appendix H for a thorough overview of all the correlation coefficients. 
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Table 5.3 Correlation Coefficients in Selected Regions* 
Region Correlation Coefficient p HHI 1998 HHI 2008 
Solund 0.1731 0.3517 0.853 0.852 
Rødøy 0.4401** 0.0012 0.411 0.528 
Kongsberg 0.2027** 0.0102 0.296 0.381 
Røyrvik 0.5659*** 0.0002 0.411 0.297 
Oslo 0.2719*** 0.0000 0.143 0.211 
Bergen 0.1506*** 0.0006 0,178 0.204 
Stavanger/Sandnes 0.0731 0.1232 0,188 0.162 
Trondheim 0.1408*** 0.0004 0,152 0.152 
* The table is sorted on descending order by the regional HHI levels (as of 2008). For results of all regions, see Appendix H. 
** Significant at the 5 % level. *** Significant at the 1 % level. 
Overall, we see that the variables have significant correlations for both markets with low HHI 
and high HHI. 
5.3	  Differences	  between	  High-­‐	  and	  Low	  Concentration	  Regions	  
To assess whether grouping the data into markets with high HHI (above 0.20) and low HHI 
(0.20 and below) would reveal any differences in differences between the two groups in 
respect to the variables in our model, we conducted a set of t-tests on all the variables in our 
model. In addition to these tests, we conducted a second set of tests, which we tested on the 
same set of variables, but with different grouping criteria. For the second set of tests, we still 
used HHI to group the data, but now distinguished the regions by comparing the regions in 
the 75th percentile (top 25 % ranked by HHI) and regions in the 25th percentile (bottom 25 % 
ranked by HHI). All of the variables were tested across the whole time span in the data set34. 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 depict the results of the t-tests on the explanatory variables when grouping 
by high/low level HHI and top/bottom 25 percent, respectively. To save space we reproduce 
only the t-test results of the first and last time periods, 1998 and 2008. The results of the t-
tests on the two spread measures we use are depicted in tables 5.6 and 5.7. Recall that we 
interprete the results as being significant at t  0.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Appendix G for complete t-test results. 
! 
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Table 5.4 T-tests High/Low HHI 1998 and 2008 
Year Test variable 
Mean High HHI 
Regions (
€ 
>0.20) 
Mean Low HHI 
Regions (
€ 
≤0.20) 
Results 
(Pr(|T| > |t|) ) 
Mean Loan Size Regional 1,767,233 2,963,352 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank Size Region 71,200,000 385,000,000 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers by Region 303.4865 3,992.765 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Region 541.7153 6,744.103 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks by Region 12.086 46.97202 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan Banks) 0.1205906 0.0335731 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers by Banks in Region 20.03774 62.96882 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 36.15669 106.6427 0.0000 * 
1998 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 42,200,000 238,000,000 0.0000 * 
Year Test variable 
Mean High HHI 
Regions (
€ 
>0.20) 
Mean Low HHI 
Regions (
€ 
≤0.20) 
Results 
(Pr(|T| > |t|) ) 
Mean Loan Size Regional 4,901,986 5,329,828 0.0173 * 
Mean Loan Bank Size Region 414,000,000 492,000,000 0.0518 
Number of Loan Customers by Region 1,832.501 2,075.068 0.2638 
Number of Loan Accounts by Region 2,858.905 3,236.549 0.2636 
Number of Loan Banks by Region 22.80029 35.73883 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan Banks) 0.0835227 0.0367454 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers by Banks in Region  35.25682 48.99213 0.1331 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 55.5983 76.67454 0.1364 
2008 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 214,000,000 262,000,000 0.6666 
* Significant at the 5 % level. 
In 1998 there are significant differences between the high concentration and low 
concentration regions across all the variables. What we can read directly from the results is 
that the high concentration regions have significantly lower mean values than the low 
concentration regions, i.e. high concentration regions appear to be smaller. In 2008 not all of 
the results are significant however, but if we consider the whole time period (1998 – 2008), 
most of the variables differ significantly between the two groups (see Appendix G for a 
complete overview). All variables, except for market share, have higher average values in the 
low concentration regions. Considering the variables by the order displayed in the table 
above, we first observe that average size of a loan is higher in the low concentration regions. 
This implies that the customers in these regions have larger capital needs, which should not be 
surprising since the un-concentrated regions are often larger areas, and it is likely that larger 
firms populate them. We also see that the banks in these regions are larger on average, 
measured by the size of their issued loans. There are also more customers, more accounts and 
more banks in the low concentration regions compared to the highly concentrated ones. The 
market shares are higher on average in the high concentration regions, which is as expected 
since these regions have fewer banks on average. The banks in these regions have fewer 
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customers, fewer accounts and lower average loan sizes as well. The fact that the difference 
between the groups in regard to average loan size, both per region and per bank, is relatively 
smaller in 2008 compared to 1998 should not be interpreted as a comparable increase in the 
high concentration regions as opposed to the low concentration regions, because these values 
fluctuate rather rapidly between the years in the data sets. We can also observe that the 
regions and the banks operating in them have grown on average, which is indicated by the 
fact that the mean values increase from 1998 to 2008. Even though the numbers are expressed 
in nominal terms, the growth still reflects an increase. 
Table 5.5 T-tests Top/Bottom 25 Percent 1998 and 2008 
Year Test variable 
Mean Top 25 Percent 
Regions 
Mean Bottom 25 
Percent Regions 
Results 
(Pr(|T| > |t|) ) 
Mean Loan Size Regional 1,426,477 2,893,451 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank Size Region 37,300,000 372,000,000 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers by Region 103.4375 3,852.975 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Region 195.9036 6,506.977 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks by Region 12.086 46.97202 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan Banks) 0.2005208 0.0345622 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers by Banks in Region 12.55469 61.47926 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 23.52604 104.0461 0.0000 * 
1998 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 21,300,000 229,000,000 0.0001 * 
Year Test variable 
Mean Top 25 Percent 
Regions 
Mean Bottom 25 
Percent Regions 
Results 
(Pr(|T| > |t|) ) 
Mean Loan Size Regional 5,001,883 6,451,639 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank Size Region 117,000,000 1,010,000,000 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers by Region 167.0644 5,065.854 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Region 270.7706 7,892.851 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks by Region 9.132425 46.88614 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan Banks) 0.1488934 0.0316456 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers by Banks in Region 15.10463 69.96994 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 24.31187 109.318 0.0000 * 
2008 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 57,400,000 563,000,000 0.0016 * 
*Significant at the 5 % level. 
Looking at the t-test results from the alternative grouping criteria in table 5.5, we see that the 
results differ little from the previous set of tests outlined in table 5.4. The only notable 
difference from the previous tests is that the variables tend to take on more extremes values, 
making the differences even more distinct. This is the reason that the results become more 
significant, further confirming that there are differences between regions with high- and low 
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concentration regions and that these differences become more apparent the larger the 
difference in market concentration. 
Table 5.6 T-tests Interest Rate Spread High/Low HHI 
Year Test variable 
Mean High HHI 
Regions (
€ 
>0.20) 
Mean Low HHI 
Regions (
€ 
≤0.20) 
Results 
(Pr(|T| > |t|) ) 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.0211049 0.0187486 0.0010 * 1998 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0456089 0.0402202 0.0000 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) .0244112 .0241897 0.8738 1999 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate – Deposits) .0419802 .0408018 0.5761 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) .012283 .008063 0.0000 * 2000 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) .0372247 .0291588 0.0000 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) .0124759 .0107925 0.0242 * 2001 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) .0378661 .0339443 0.0043 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0128142 .0123952 0.5302 2002 
I Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) .0349557 .0328451 0.0427 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0294207 .0290928 0.6259 2003 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) .037899 .0342986 0.0003 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0288108 .0267732 0.0074 * 2004 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) .0377432 .0350486 0.0036 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .024057 .0237438 0.6234 2005 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) .0350704 .0329706 0.0097 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0182238 .0177184 0.3546 2006 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) .0320097 .0300363 0.0098 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0144222 .0141667 0.6578 2007 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) .0318694 .0311251 0.4427 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0180415 .0163215 0.0137 * 2008 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) .035121 .0334066 0.1292 
* Significant at the 5 % level. 
When we compare the regions with respect to the interest rate spreads, we see that banks in 
high concentration regions have higher spreads on average in every year, if only marginally 
so in some of the years. In the years when the differences are relatively small, the results are 
not significant, meaning that the differences in the means can be attributed to chance in these 
cases. However, when we consider the results over the time period of analysis as a whole, the 
tests indicate that banks in high concentration regions are able to take out higher spreads than 
banks in low concentration regions. This further motivates us to make a distinction between 
the two groups when analyzing the determinants of the spreads. Using the alternative 
grouping criteria with the top- and bottom 25 % regions as in table 5.7 below, we see that the 
t-tests yield similar, although not precisely the same, results as with the original grouping 
criteria. 
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Table 5.7 T-tests Interest Rate Spread Top/Bottom 25 percent 
Year Test variable 
Mean High HHI 
Regions 
Mean Low HHI 
Regions 
Results 
(Pr(|T| > |t|) ) 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.0226815 0.018577 0.0010 * 1998 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0486243 0.0403318 0.0000 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.026841 0.02364 0.0082* 1999 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0463268 0.0398485 0.0005 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.0140369 0.008063 0.0000 * 2000 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0419772 0.0291588 0.0000 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.0127854 0.0108057 0.0428* 2001 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0382512 0.0339851 0.0171 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.0128844 0.0125127 0.6826 2002 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0353992 0.0329159 0.0784 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.0294207 0.0290928 0.0327 * 2003 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0385755 0.0346514 0.0042* 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.0295192 0.0269521 0.0022 * 2004 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0396952 0.035604 0.0000* 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.0247119 0.0235683 0.1134 2005 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0370992 0.0329865 0.0000* 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.0187928 0.0177021 0.0776 2006 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0334383 0.0303299 0.0004 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.0143891 0.0143937 0.9941 2007 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0335049 0.0310871 0.0183 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate - NIBOR) 0.0184183 0.0171248 0.0819 2008 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans Rate – Deposit Rate) 0.0366843 0.0338213 0.0151 * 
*Significant at the 5 % level. 
 
To sum up the results thus far, the t-tests reveal that there are significant differences in the 
means of the variables and we can thereby confirm that there are differences between the 
groups in respect to the variables tested. The results are significant for all the variables in the 
majority of the years, except 1999, 2004, 2007 (see Appendix G) and 2008. Within these 
years, the variables Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region, Number of Loan 
Accounts by Banks in Region and Loan Size By Banks in Region, do not show significant 
results. However, looking at the years in which the results are significant, we see that the 
differences in the means are fairly large. For instance, in 2008, Number of Loan Accounts by 
Banks in Region has a mean of 106.64 in the low concentration regions, and 36.16 in the high 
concentration regions. Further, we see that under both definitions of the interest rate spread, 
the spread in the high concentration regions is significantly larger than in the low 
concentration regions. The second set of t-tests that distinguish between the top and bottom 
25 percent of the regions ranked by HHI, show results that are very similar to the first set of t-
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tests. This gives us reason to believe that the findings of the first set of t-tests are robust. 
Overall, the results of the t-tests show that there are important differences between the high- 
and low concentration regions in many ways, which in turn indicate that using this grouping 
of the data makes sense. 
5.4	  Fixed	  Effects	  Regression	  Analyses	  
This section describes our main findings. The tables below depict what determines the interest 
rate spread (defined as loan rate minus a yearly average of the 3-month NIBOR) in various 
markets conditions, and the extent to which the interest rate spread varies with these 
determinants. Recall from chapter 4 that the regression equation we used to analyze these 
effects was:
 
 
 
                             (4.10)  
Table 5.8 provides an overview of the various explanatory variables and their definitions. 
Table 5.8 Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
hhi Market concentration measured by HHI 
loansize_reg Mean loan size in a commuter region 
banksize_reg Mean size of the banks in a commuter region 
cust_reg Number of customers in a commuter region 
acc_reg Number of loan accounts in a commuter region 
banks_reg Number of banks in a region 
marketshare Market shares each bank has 
cust_bank Number of customers each bank has 
acc_bank Number of loan accounts each bank has 
loansize_bank Size of each bank’s loans 
year_dummy Dummy representing year specific events.  
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The extent to which the variables used in the regressions correlate with each other is 
displayed numerically in Table 5.9 below.  
Table 5.9 Correlation between the Variables Used in the Regressions                          
 
iratespre
ad hhi 
loansize_
reg 
banksize
_reg cust_reg acc_reg 
banks_re
g 
markets
hare 
cust_ban
k 
acc_ban
k 
loansize_
bank 
iratespre
ad 1           
hhi 0.0798* 1          
loansize_
reg -0.0708* -0.1354* 1         
banksize
_reg -0.0313* -0.2925* 0.6980* 1        
cust_reg -0.0104 -0.3295* 0.4738* 0.9046* 1       
acc_reg -0.0146* -0.3358* 0.4717* 0.9031* 0.9992* 1      
banks_re
g -0.0256* -0.4571* 0.4370* 0.8076* 0.9459* 0.9484* 1     
markets
hare -0.0286* 0.3403* -0.1322* -0.1812* -0.1831* -0.1859* -0.2473* 1    
cust_ban
k -0.0449* -0.0870* 0.0996* 0.1761* 0.1717* 0.1728* 0.1661* 0.1907* 1   
acc_ban
k -0.0458* -0.0871* 0.0976* 0.1739* 0.1684* 0.1699* 0.1631* 0.2049* 0.9948* 1  
loansize_
bank -0.0558* -0.0471* 0.1075* 0.1943* 0.1620* 0.1615* 0.1439* 0.1091* 0.8353* 0.8117* 1 
* Significant at the 5 % level. 
We see that the mean size of banks in a region, as measured in banksize_reg, has a correlation 
of 0.6980 with the mean size of loans overall in a region, loansize_reg. This is not surprising 
since the size of the banks in our analysis is measured by their total loan size. Banksize_reg 
correlates even more strongly, 0.9046, with the number of customers a region has, cust_reg, 
as well as the number of accounts in a region acc_reg at 0.9031 and banks_reg at 0.8076. 
Each of these variables also correlates rather strongly with each other. On the bank level, 
cust_bank and acc_bank have a strong correlation with each other, at 0.9948. Also, 
loansize_bank has a fairly strong correlation with both of these variables, 0.8353 and 0.8117 
respectively. The remaining variables do not seem to correlate to a large extent with each 
other, but the results are still significant. The fact that almost all the variables have significant 
results in the correlation matrix does not mean that they correlate, only that the coherence 
observed is significantly different from zero, which means that it is unlikely that what we see 
are the results of random occurrences. A graphic display of the correlations over time can be 
found in Appendix F. 
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Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show the coefficients of the explanatory variables in high- and low 
concentration regions, respectively. Table 5.12 displays the coefficients on the national level, 
including all the banks in both high- and low concentration regions. 
Table 5.10 Determinants of the Interest Rate Spread in Regions with HHI  0.20 
Dependent Variable: Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate – NIBOR) 
Method: Fixed Effects  
Number of observations: 15986 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P > t [95% Conf. Interval] 
hhi 0.0036409 0.0013033 2.79 0.005** 0.0010863 0.0061955 
loansize_reg -2.23E-10 1.01E-10 -2.21 0.027* -4.20E-10 -2.49E-11 
banksize_reg 4.09E-13 2.19E-12 0.19 0.852 -3.89E-12 4.71E-12 
cust_reg 1.46E-06 2.56E-06 0.57 0.569 -3.55E-06 6.46E-06 
acc_reg -8.12E-07 1.94E-06 -0.42 0.675 -4.61E-06 2.98E-06 
banks_reg -0.000021 0.0000546 -0.38 0.701 -0.000128 0.0000861 
marketshare -0.0102769 0.0012347 -8.32 0** -0.0126971 -0.0078568 
cust_bank -0.0000181 0.0000166 -1.09 0.277 -0.0000507 0.0000145 
acc_bank 0.0000227 0.0000109 2.1 0.036* 1.47E-06 0.000044 
loansize_bank -3.29E-13 1.30E-13 -2.53 0.011* -5.83E-13 -7.38E-14 
year_dummy1998 (omitted)       
year_dummy1999 0.0034138 0.0005452 6.26 0** 0.0023452 0.0044825 
year_dummy2000 -0.0084577 0.0005277 -16.03 0** -0.009492 -0.0074233 
year_dummy2001 -0.0079781 0.0005337 -14.95 0** -0.0090242 -0.0069319 
year_dummy2002 -0.007333 0.0005418 -13.54 0** -0.008395 -0.0062711 
year_dummy2003 0.0094229 0.0005477 17.2 0** 0.0083493 0.0104965 
year_dummy2004 0.0090148 0.0005437 16.58 0** 0.007949 0.0100806 
year_dummy2005 0.0040795 0.0005468 7.46 0** 0.0030077 0.0051513 
year_dummy2006 -0.0017916 0.0005471 -3.27 0.001** -0.002864 -0.0007192 
year_dummy2007 -0.0057648 0.0005607 -10.28 0** -0.0068639 -0.0046658 
year_dummy2008 -0.002147 0.000589 -3.65 0** -0.0033015 -0.0009925 
_cons 0.0204228 0.0011339 18.01 0** 0.0182003 0.0226453 
R-squared (within) 0.2530 
F-Statistic 207.68 
Prob > F 0.0000** 
* Significant at the 5 % level. ** Significant at the 1 % level. 
We see from table 5.10 that the R-squared (within) is 0.2530, indicating that the explanatory 
variables in our model explain 25.30 % of the variation in the interest rate spread35. The F-
statistic tells us that the coherence between the explanatory variables and the interest rate 
spread is significant. Further, the variables hhi, loansize_reg, market_share and 
loansize_bank are significant at the 5 % level. Thus, it appears that part of the variation in the 
interest rate spread in high-concentration regions can be attributed to changes in these 
variables. While hhi has a positive effect on the interest rate spread, loansize_reg, 
market_share and loansize_bank have negative impact on the interest rate spread. The latter 
finding is particularly interesting, since one would ordinarily assume that higher market 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Since we are using a fixed effects regression we are generally only concerned with the within estimator, not the between and overall 
estimators. This is because the within estimator uses the time variation in the interest rate spread and the explanatory variables within each 
cross-sectional observation. The between estimator ignores information on how the variables change over time and is biased when 
€ 
ai  is 
correlated with 
€ 
x i. In that case the random effects method would be more appropriate (Wooldridge, 2007). 
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shares would ceteris paribus lead to higher margins as predicted by the efficiency hypothesis. 
We will elaborate more on this in the Conclusion chapter. The coefficients, which are 
unstandardized, tell us by how much the interest rate changes with one unit’s change in the 
explanatory variables. As we can see, hhi has very little effect on the interest rate spread. A 
0.10 increase in HHI increases the spread only by 3.6 basis points (bp). Further, when the 
mean loan size of a region increases by NOK 1,000,000 the spread decreases by 2.23 bp. The 
spread decreases by 10.28 bp when a bank increases its market share by 10 percentage points, 
and decreases only very marginally (less than 0.001 bp) when the bank’s loan size increases. 
The fact that all year dummies are significant (even at the 1 % level) suggests that specific 
events occurring at each time period contribute to the variations in the interest rate spread. In 
plain English, the results tell us that in concentrated regions with HHI above 0.20, a bank’s 
interest rate spreads tend to increase when the markets become more concentrated and when a 
bank increases its number of loan accounts. The interest rate spread decreases when the size 
of the loans in the region becomes larger on average and when a bank gains market shares. 
Table 5.11 Determinants of the Interest Rate Spread in Regions with HHI  0.20 
Dependent Variable: Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate – NIBOR) 
Method: Fixed Effects  
Number of observations: 5109 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P > t [95% Conf. Interval] 
hhi -0.0100521 0.0172938 -0.58 0.561 -0.0439585 0.0238543 
loansize_reg -2.11E-09 6.73E-10 -3.13 0.002*** -3.42E-09 -7.86E-10 
banksize_reg 8.84E-12 4.10E-12 2.16 0.031** 8.10E-13 1.69E-11 
cust_reg 5.98E-06 1.86E-06 3.22 0.001*** 2.34E-06 9.63E-06 
acc_reg -5.17E-06 1.61E-06 -3.21 0.001*** -8.33E-06 -2.01E-06 
banks_reg 0.0000109 0.0000734 0.15 0.882 -0.000133 0.0001547 
marketshare -0.0451197 0.0093262 -4.84 0*** -0.0634048 -0.0268346 
cust_bank -0.0000229 0.0000166 -1.37 0.169 -0.0000555 9.75E-06 
acc_bank 0.0000213 0.0000111 1.93 0.054* -3.28E-07 0.000043 
loansize_bank -2.28E-13 1.75E-13 -1.3 0.193 -5.71E-13 1.16E-13 
year_dummy1998 (omitted)       
year_dummy1999 0.0024038 0.0013868 1.73 0.083* -0.0003152 0.0051229 
year_dummy2000 -0.0108704 0.001239 -8.77 0*** -0.0132995 -0.0084413 
year_dummy2001 -0.0074436 0.0012418 -5.99 0*** -0.0098783 -0.0050089 
year_dummy2002 -0.0054142 0.0012387 -4.37 0*** -0.0078428 -0.0029856 
year_dummy2003 0.0109777 0.0014009 7.84 0*** 0.008231 0.0137243 
year_dummy2004 0.0093823 0.0013221 7.1 0*** 0.0067902 0.0119744 
year_dummy2005 0.0066738 0.0013259 5.03 0*** 0.0040743 0.0092733 
year_dummy2006 0.0011954 0.0014599 0.82 0.413 -0.0016668 0.0040576 
year_dummy2007 -0.0017349 0.0015751 -1.1 0.271 -0.0048231 0.0013534 
year_dummy2008 0.0015416 0.0018867 0.82 0.414 -0.0021574 0.0052407 
_cons 0.0326073 0.0052494 6.21 0* 0.0223153 0.0428994 
R-squared (within) 0.2973 
F-Statistic 77.54 
Prob > F 0.0000*** 
* Significant at the 10 % level. ** Significant at the 5 % level. ***Significant at the 1 % level. 
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As can be seen from Table 5.11, the R-squared (within) in the regression run on the low 
concentration regions is slightly higher than in the high concentration regions, at 0.2973. We 
observe that contrary to the high concentration regions, hhi does not have a significant effect 
on the interest rate spread in the low concentration regions. Also, the dummies for years 2006, 
2007 and 2008 are not significant and the year dummy for 1999 is only significant at the 10 % 
level. The other year dummies are significant at the 1 % level. The variables that explain 
variations in the interest rate spread in low concentration regions are loansize_reg, cust_reg, 
acc_reg,  marketshare (significant at the 1 % level), banksize_reg (significant at the 5 % 
level) and acc_bank (significant at the 10 % level). An increase in the mean loan size of a 
region by NOK 1,000,000 results in a 21.19 bp decrease in the interest rate spread. While an 
increase of 100 customers results in an increase of 5.98 bp in the interest rate spread, an 
increase of 100 loan accounts yields an almost similar decrease in the spread, 5.17 bp to be 
exact. The spread decreases by 45.12 bp when a bank’s market share increases by 10 
percentage points, which is over four times more than the decrease observed in the high 
concentration regions. The number of loan accounts that a bank has yields an interest rate 
spread increase of 21.3 for every 100 additional accounts opened in that bank, but is only 
significant at the 10 % level. These findings suggest that in regions where the HHI is 0.20 or 
lower, the interest rate spread is unaffected by changes in HHI, but increases as the average 
size of the banks in the region increases and when the number of loan accounts that a bank 
has increases. The interest rate spread tend to decrease when the average size of loans and the 
number of loan accounts in a bank’s region increases and when a bank’s market share 
increases. These results differ from the results in the high concentration regions and suggest 
that there is indeed a difference between the determinants of the interest rate spread in high- 
and low concentration regions, essentially leading us to reject our null-hypothesis and accept 
our alternative hypothesis: 
€ 
HA : Market structure affect banks’ interest rate spreads differently in high- and low 
concentration bank markets 
To see why a distinction of high- and low concentration markets is relevant, we ran the FE 
regression on the entire data set without sub-dividing the markets into high- and low 
concentration regions. Table 5.12 shows the regression coefficients of the explanatory 
variables when testing for determinants of the interest rate spread (loan rate – NIBOR) on the 
national level (that is, including both high- an low concentration regions). 
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Table 5.12 Determinants of the Interest Rate Spread on the National Level 
Dependent Variable: Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate – NIBOR) 
Method: Fixed Effects  
Number of observations: 21095 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P > t [95% Conf. Interval] 
hhi 0.003846 0.0012452 3.09 0.002** 0.0014053 0.0062866 
loansize_reg -3.14E-10 8.54E-11 -3.68 0** -4.81E-10 -1.47E-10 
banksize_reg 1.83E-12 1.42E-12 1.29 0.198 -9.57E-13 4.62E-12 
cust_reg 3.27E-06 9.50E-07 3.45 0.001** 1.41E-06 5.13E-06 
acc_reg -2.29E-06 7.44E-07 -3.08 0.002** -3.75E-06 -8.33E-07 
banks_reg -0.0000301 0.0000364 -0.83 0.409 -0.0001014 0.0000413 
marketshare -0.0111378 0.0012111 -9.2 0** -0.0135116 -0.008764 
cust_bank -0.0000136 0.0000105 -1.3 0.195 -0.0000342 6.96E-06 
acc_bank 0.0000168 6.86E-06 2.45 0.014* 3.38E-06 0.0000303 
loansize_bank -3.29E-13 9.57E-14 -3.43 0.001** -5.16E-13 -1.41E-13 
year_dummy1 (omitted) 
year_dummy1999 0.0029766 0.0004771 6.24 0** 0.0020415 0.0039118 
year_dummy2000 -0.0094852 0.0004647 -20.41 0** -0.010396 -0.0085743 
year_dummy2001 -0.0081901 0.0004682 -17.49 0** -0.0091079 -0.0072723 
year_dummy2002 -0.007052 0.0004768 -14.79 0** -0.0079865 -0.0061174 
year_dummy2003 0.0094983 0.0004887 19.43 0** 0.0085403 0.0104563 
year_dummy2004 0.0087595 0.0004817 18.19 0** 0.0078154 0.0097036 
year_dummy2005 0.004116 0.0004869 8.45 0** 0.0031616 0.0050704 
year_dummy2006 -0.0018791 0.0004905 -3.83 0** -0.0028405 -0.0009177 
year_dummy2007 -0.005689 0.000505 -11.27 0** -0.0066789 -0.0046992 
year_dummy2008 -0.0023365 0.000537 -4.35 0** -0.0033891 -0.0012839 
cons 0.0214241 0.0009432 22.72 0** 0.0195754 0.0232728 
R-squared (within) 0.2642 
F-Statistic 305.53 
Prob > F 0.0000** 
* Significant at the 5 % level. ** Significant at the 1 % level. 
As is evident from the results, all of the variables explaining the interest rate spread in high 
concentration regions are significant on the national level. Except for banksize_reg, this is 
also true for the explanatory variables in the low concentration regions. Most important 
however, is that some of the variables that turn up significant when including all the regions 
in one model are not significant when we divide the markets in regions by high- and low 
concentration. hhi is not a determinant of the interest rate spread in low-concentration regions, 
even though this is a significant explanatory variable when including all regions in the 
regression. The same is the case for loansize_bank. In regions with high concentration, 
cust_reg and acc-reg are not determinants of the interest rate spread, while these variables 
turn up significant when considering all the regions. These results strengthen the assumption 
that a distinction between bank markets with high- and low concentration is feasible. Table 
5.13 summarizes our main findings and depicts the differences between determinants of the 
interest rate spread in high and low concentration markets. We have also added the results 
when considering the entire Norwegian banking sector as a whole. 
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Table 5.13 Determinants of the Interest Rate Spread (Comparison) 
Regions: HHI  0.20 HHI  0.20 All regions 
Variable Coefficient P > t Coefficient P > t Coefficient P > t 
hhi 0.0036409 0.005*** -0.0100521 0.561 0.003846 0.002*** 
loansize_reg -2.23E-10 0.027** -2.11E-09 0.002*** -3.14E-10 0*** 
banksize_reg 4.09E-13 0.852 8.84E-12 0.031** 1.83E-12 0.198 
cust_reg 1.46E-06 0.569 5.98E-06 0.001*** 3.27E-06 0.001*** 
acc_reg -8.12E-07 0.675 -5.17E-06 0.001*** -2.29E-06 0.002*** 
banks_reg -0.000021 0.701 0.0000109 0.882 -0.0000301 0.409 
marketshare -0.0102769 0*** -0.0451197 0*** -0.0111378 0*** 
cust_bank -0.0000181 0.277 -0.0000229 0.169 -0.0000136 0.195 
acc_bank 0.0000227 0.036** 0.0000213 0.054* 0.0000168 0.014** 
loansize_bank -3.29E-13 0.011** -2.28E-13 0.193 -3.29E-13 0.001*** 
year_dummy1 (omitted)  (omitted)  (omitted)  
year_dummy1999 0.0034138 0*** 0.0024038 0.083* 0.0029766 0*** 
year_dummy2000 -0.0084577 0*** -0.0108704 0*** -0.0094852 0*** 
year_dummy2001 -0.0079781 0*** -0.0074436 0*** -0.0081901 0*** 
year_dummy2002 -0.007333 0*** -0.0054142 0*** -0.007052 0*** 
year_dummy2003 0.0094229 0*** 0.0109777 0*** 0.0094983 0*** 
year_dummy2004 0.0090148 0*** 0.0093823 0*** 0.0087595 0*** 
year_dummy2005 0.0040795 0*** 0.0066738 0*** 0.004116 0*** 
year_dummy2006 -0.0017916 0.001*** 0.0011954 0.413 -0.0018791 0*** 
year_dummy2007 -0.0057648 0*** -0.0017349 0.271 -0.005689 0*** 
year_dummy2008 -0.002147 0*** 0.0015416 0.414 -0.0023365 0*** 
_cons 0.0204228 0*** 0.0326073 0*** 0.0214241 0*** 
R-squared (within) 0.2530 0.2973 0.2642 
F-Statistic 207.68 77.54 305.53 
Prob > F 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
* Significant at the 10 % level. ** Significant at the 5 % level. *** Significant at the 1 % level. 
By accepting that there are differences in the determinants of the interest rate spread in high- 
and low concentration regions, and attributing these differences to the explanatory variables 
that cause changes in the interest rate spread in high- and low concentration regions 
respectively (as outlined above), we are close to an answer to our research question: How 
does market structure affect the interest rate spread in local Norwegian bank markets? While 
the results in this chapter provide a reply to this question, we leave the discussion of the 
possible reasons behind our findings to the Conclusions chapter. 
5.5	  Robustness	  Tests	  
To test our results for robustness we ran the same FE regressions with alternative definitions 
of the interest rate spread, as explained in chapter 4.5.4. The results when running the 
regression with the interest rate spread defined as loan rate – deposit rate are shown in Table 
5.14. 
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Table 5.14 Determinants of the Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate – Deposit Rate) 
Regions: HHI  0.20 HHI  0.20 All regions 
Variable Coefficient P > t Coefficient P > t Coefficient P > t 
hhi 0.0061254 0.002*** -0.0323598 0.235 0.005733 0.002*** 
loansize_reg -3.25E-10 0.03** -3.50E-09 0.001*** -5.32E-10 0*** 
banksize_reg 2.19E-12 0.51 2.49E-11 0** 7.01E-12 0.001*** 
cust_reg 3.29E-06 0.384 4.83E-06 0.087* 3.58E-06 0.008*** 
acc_reg -2.59E-06 0.37 -6.49E-06 0.007*** -3.51E-06 0.001*** 
banks_reg -6.18E-06 0.94 0.000076 0.501 -0.0000356 0.512 
marketshare -0.015058 0*** -0.059924 0*** -0.0161437 0*** 
cust_bank 0.0000245 0.39 -7.57E-06 0.789 0.0000164 0.367 
acc_bank -4.22E-06 0.823 8.78E-06 0.647 -3.31E-06 0.785 
loansize_bank -3.68E-13 0.038** -6.33E-14 0.797 -3.32E-13 0.012** 
year_dummy1 (omitted)  (omitted)  (omitted)  
year_dummy1999 -0.0002594 0.748 -0.0011725 0.575 -0.000688 0.33 
year_dummy2000 -0.0076422 0*** -0.0105126 0*** -0.008983 0*** 
year_dummy2001 -0.0067027 0*** -0.0050255 0.008*** -0.0067441 0*** 
year_dummy2002 -0.0100545 0*** -0.006645 0*** -0.0095179 0*** 
year_dummy2003 -0.0068585 0*** -0.0043902 0.042** -0.0066781 0*** 
year_dummy2004 -0.0072273 0*** -0.0055318 0.007*** -0.0070197 0*** 
year_dummy2005 -0.010144 0*** -0.0063248 0.002*** -0.0099462 0*** 
year_dummy2006 -0.0130328 0*** -0.0087864 0*** -0.0128572 0*** 
year_dummy2007 -0.0125724 0*** -0.00825 0.001*** -0.0123474 0*** 
year_dummy2008 -0.0093352 0*** -0.0036884 0.212 -0.0092868 0*** 
_cons 0.0455627 0*** 0.0676016 0*** 0.0479624 0*** 
R-squared (within) 0.0691 0.0631 0.0634 
F-Statistic 2.91 9.97 45.64 
Prob > F 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
* Significant at the 10 % level. ** Significant at the 5 % level. *** Significant at the 1 % level. 
As we can see from the table, the R-squared (within) is substantially lower when defining the 
interest rate as loan rate – deposit rate. However, there seems to be a similar pattern as to 
which variables explain the interest rate spread defined as loan rate – deposit rate compared 
to which variables explain the interest rate spread under the original definition of the spread. 
Except for acc_bank, which is not significant in either high- or low concentration regions, all 
the significant explanatory variables remain the same in both high- and low concentration 
regions. In high concentration regions, hhi still has a positive effect on the interest rate spread, 
while loansize_reg, marketshare and loansize_bank affect the interest rate spread negatively. 
In the low concentration regions, the interest rate spread increases with bankssize_reg. If we 
accept a 10 % significant level this is also the case for the variable cust_reg. loansize_reg, 
acc_reg and marketshare have negative impacts in the interest rate spread. The results are 
close to the ones found under the original definition of the interest rate spread and indicate 
that while the explanatory variables explain less of the interest rate spread when defining the 
spread as loan rate – deposit rate, the results are robust in terms of which determinants explain 
the variation in the spread and in which direction the spread changes as a result of the changes 
in these determinants. It should be noted however, that the number of banks included in the 
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panel when running the regression with loan rate – deposit rate as the dependent variable is 
smaller than under the original assumptions, 16,563 compared to 21,095 in total. This is 
largely because the number of banks with deposits is smaller than the number of banks with 
loans. 
In order to check whether the distinction of local markets into high- and low concentration 
commuter regions was robust, we redefined the grouping criteria. Instead of grouping the 
regions by a threshold of 0.20, we looked ran an FE regressions on the regions with the 25 % 
highest HHI ratios and compared the results with the results of an FE regression run on the 
regions with 25 % lowest HHI ratios. The results of these regressions, along with an FE 
regression run on the remaining 50 % of the regions are displayed in Table 5.15. The interest 
rate spread was defined as in our original model as loan rate – NIBOR. 
Table 5.15 Determinants of the Interest Rate Spread (alternative grouping criteria) 
Regions: Top 25 % Regions Bottom 25 % Regions Mid 50 % Regions 
Variable Coefficient P > t Coefficient P > t Coefficient P > t 
hhi 0.0031331 0.124 0.0109904 0.414 0.0049741 0.168 
loansize_reg 2.23E-11 0.915 -1.78E-09 0.002*** -4.65E-10 0.008*** 
banksize_reg -3.92E-12 0.544 1.03E-11 0.002*** 2.10E-12 0.543 
cust_reg 0.0000322 0.079* 1.80E-06 0.207 -4.65E-06 0.409 
acc_reg -0.0000224 0.06* -2.17E-06 0.047** 3.61E-06 0.36 
banks_reg -0.0001677 0.244 0.0000973 0.138 -4.79E-06 0.95 
marketshare -0.0072509 0*** -0.0275837 0.001*** -0.0212103 0*** 
cust_bank -0.0000357 0.582 -8.05E-06 0.552 -0.0000315 0.204 
acc_bank 0.000046 0.208 0.0000123 0.165 0.0000327 0.052* 
loansize_bank -1.89E-12 0.066* -2.50E-13 0.034** -4.94E-13 0.261 
year_dummy1 (omitted)  (omitted)  (omitted)  
year_dummy1999 0.0038648 0*** 0.0025645 0.03** 0.0029266 0*** 
year_dummy2000 -0.0074832 0*** -0.01204 0*** -0.0087148 0*** 
year_dummy2001 -0.0079691 0*** -0.0081735 0*** -0.0076896 0*** 
year_dummy2002 -0.0067706 0*** -0.0062558 0*** -0.0067908 0*** 
year_dummy2003 0.0098633 0*** 0.0091016 0*** 0.0099038 0*** 
year_dummy2004 0.0099346 0*** 0.0080752 0*** 0.0093605 0*** 
year_dummy2005 0.0038979 0*** 0.0056569 0*** 0.004468 0*** 
year_dummy2006 -0.0014316 0.182 -0.0008545 0.508 -0.0012422 0.121 
year_dummy2007 -0.0058829 0*** -0.0040963 0.003 -0.004842 0*** 
year_dummy2008 -0.0019913 0.082 -0.0015158 0.355 -0.0016072 0.073* 
_cons 0.0226123 0*** 0.0212769 0*** 0.0194641 0*** 
R-squared (within) 0.2658 0.2496 0.2472 
F-Statistic 61.23 71.70 120.84 
Prob > F 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
* Significant at the 10 % level. ** Significant at the 5 % level. *** Significant at the 1 % level. 
We observe that at 1% and 5 % significance levels, only marketshare and most of the year 
dummies are significant in the top 25 % regions. As with the original grouping criteria, the 
impact that market share has on the interest rate spread differs greatly between the regions in 
the top and bottom 25 %. While a 0.10 increase in market share will result in a 27.58 bp 
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decrease in the spread in the bottom 25 % group, an increase in market share of the same 
magnitude makes the spread decrease with only 7.25 bp in the top 25 % group. If we expand 
the significant level at which we accept the variables as explanators of the interest rate spread 
to 10 %, cust_reg and acc_reg are also significant in top 25 % group. The results in the top 25 
% group differ substantially from those of the regression run on the high concentration 
regions (HHI  0.20). This is not necessarily very surprising; as we can see from Table 5.10 
the number of observations were 15,986 in the regions with HHI levels higher than 0.20, 
while the number of observations in the top 25 % group is slightly less than one third of this 
(4,903). What still appears evident is that HHI is a determinant of the interest rate spread in 
high concentration regions, but the strength of this relationship is only significant up to a 
certain degree of market concentration. The same cannot be said for regions with low market 
concentration, where HHI does not have a significant effect on the interest rate spread at all. 
In the bottom 25 % regions, the results are almost identical to the results for the regions with 
HHI  0.20. This should not come as a surprise either, since the number of observations in 
the panel is 5860 in bottom 25 %, which is just a little bit more than in the regression run on 
the regions with HHI  0.20 (these regions make up close to 25 % of the entire panel). The 
only difference of note is that cust_reg and acc_reg are no longer significant and that 
loansize_bank becomes significant at the 5 % level. 
Finally, even if the determinants of the interest rate spread in the top 25 % group differ from 
the rest of the high concentration markets, the important thing is that we still observe that 
there is a difference in what determines the interest rate spread high and low concentration 
markets. The result of the robustness tests indicate that our main findings are, at least to a 
certain extent, robust to alternative definitions of the interest rate spread and alternative ways 
of grouping the regions. Table 5.16 below sums up the HHI-coefficients for all the regressions 
we have run in the analysis. 
Table 5.16 Summary: HHI-Coefficients 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable Coefficient P > t 
hhi  national (all regions) 0.003846 0.002** 
hhi  > 0.20 0.0036409 0.005** 
hhi ≤ 0.20 -0.0100521 0.561 
hhi top 25 % regions 0.0031331 0.124 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan 
Rate –Nibor) 
hhi bottom 25 % regions 0.0109904 0.414 
hhi  national (all regions) 0.005733 0.002*** 
hhi > 0.20 0.0061254 0.002*** 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan 
Rate –Deposit Rate) 
 hhi ≤ 0.20 -0.0323598 0.235 
* Significant at the 10 % level. ** Significant at the 5 % level. *** Significant at the 1 % level. 
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6.	  Conclusions	  and	  Discussion	  
6.1	  Introduction	  
In this chapter we will discuss the results in relation to our research question and draw 
conclusions from our findings. The chapter follows the same structure as the Results chapter, 
but we will for the most part focus on the main findings from the regression analyses. We end 
the chapter with a brief discussion of the implications this study may have for future research. 
6.2	  Concluding	  Remarks	  
The positive correlation between HHI and the interest rate spread in many of the regions 
serves first and foremost as an indication that a significant relationship between the two exists 
in some of the regions but not in others, and we use it mainly to legitimize further studies and 
testing. However, the relationship does to some extent fortify the underlying assumptions of 
the SCP hypothesis, which states that higher concentration in the bank market leads to softer 
competition between the banks and enables them to capture more profits (Degryse, 2009), but 
only in the regions where a positive correlation exists. Although the correlation alone in no 
way confirms the cause and effect of this relationship, it serves as an argument not to reject 
this assumption without further investigating the adherent coherence between the interest rate 
spread and the HHI. 
In the years between 1998 and 2008 the t-tests show significant differences between banks in 
regions with high (HHI  0.20) and low (HHI  0.20) market concentration across most of 
the variables tested for. The first and most obvious indication that there are significant 
differences between these two groups is that the interest rate spread (loan rate – NIBOR) is 
larger in the high concentration regions than in the low concentration regions in every year 
included in the t-tests. Because the NIBOR remains the same for both groups, the difference 
between the regions is a result of higher loan rates charged by banks in the high concentration 
regions. These results lead us to conclude that banks in high concentration regions on average 
have higher margins than banks in low concentration regions. This is consistent with the 
findings of Kim et al. (2005) and Sapienza (2002) who argue that higher levels of market 
concentration in bank markets are associated with higher loan rates. (Not that this should not 
come as any surprise; higher levels of concentration are usually associated with softer 
competition (Besanko et al., 2007) and makes price coordination easier.) The consistently 
higher margins found in high concentration regions correspond well with the consolidation 
trend in the Norwegian banking industry over the period of analysis. Again, no inference 
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about causal relationships can be made from this, but it does give credibility to the assumption 
that   bank markets have different characteristics depending on the in-market level of 
concentration. The differences between high- and low concentration markets become even 
more apparent when looking at the structural differences between the regions in the two 
groups. The t-tests also reveal that there are significant structural differences between these 
two groups. The fact that the mean loan size in the high concentration regions is smaller than 
in the low concentration regions over the span of the years in the analysis (significant in every 
year except for 2004) tells us that the high concentration regions are smaller than the low 
concentration regions when measured by the size of loans. At the same time, the average size 
of the banks measured by their loan sizes, the average number of banks in a region, and 
number of loan customers and loan accounts on both regional and bank levels are smaller in 
high concentration regions. This suggests that the banks and the regions in which they operate 
are generally larger in magnitude when concentration is low. While the results from the t-tests 
do not allow us to infer about causal relationships between the variables, they do suggest that 
there are important differences between the two groups in respect to the variables selected and 
that these difference may help explain differences in the interest rate spread. To conclude, the 
results of the t-tests tell us that there are consistently higher interest rate spreads in high 
concentration regions than in low concentration regions. At the same time, the regions differ 
significantly in their structure depending on their level of concentration. 
The results of the FE regressions gives us reason to conclude that there are significant 
differences as to what determines the interest rate spread in highly concentrated and less 
concentrated regions. While a 0.10 increase in HHI increases the interest rate spread by 3.64 
basis points (bp) in regions where concentration is high (HHI 
€ 
> 0.20), which is similar to the 
findings of Kim et al. (2005), a similar increase in HHI has no effect on the interest rate 
spread in low concentration regions (HHI 
€ 
≤ 0.20). However, the interest rate spread increase 
that banks in concentrated markets enjoy as a result of a 0.10 HHI increase is, at 3.64 bp, 
fairly small. Considering the trend of HHI and the interest rate spread in the years of our 
analysis, it is evident that HHI changes do not have a very large impact on the banks’ interest 
rate spreads. A plausible, yet only suggestive, explanation for this is that banks in the 
Norwegian banking indutstry do not have very much market power vis-à-vis their customers 
in regions with low concentration, and only marginally so when regions become more 
concentrated. In any case, it is evident that there appears to be a threshold where HHI 
increases begins to have a positive impact on the interest rate spread, but once this threshold 
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is exceeded a further increase in market concentration does not necessarily lead to additional 
increases in the spread. This view is supported by the findings from the robustness tests, 
which show that market concentration does not have a larger impact on the spread in the top 
25 percent regions than in all regions with HHI-levels above 0.20. In fact, the impact of HHI 
on the interest rate spread may even diminish at a certain point. The HHI-coefficient in the 
top 25 percent group is actually slightly smaller than in the group consisting of regions with 
HHI-levels above 0.20. However, the HHI-coefficient in the top 25 percent group is not 
significant, so this is only suggestive. What ultimately matter is that market concentration, as 
measured by HHI, is only a significant determinant of the interest rate spread in the regions 
that have HHI-levels above 0.20. At some level of market concentration this impact ceases to 
be significant. From this we can conclude that market concentration only impacts the interest 
rate spread in highly concentrated markets, and only moderately so. These findings give some 
support to the SCP hypothesis, which states that banks perform better as market concentration 
increases. However, it appears that this is only the case in markets with a certain level of 
concentration to begin with. As we have stated, the interest rate spread in low concentration 
regions appears to be unaffected by changes in HHI-levels. Since many of the larger markets, 
such as the regions Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger and Trondheim maintain fairly low concentration 
levels over the years, it gives us reason to question the validity of the SCP hypothesis. The 
validity of the SCP hypothesis is especially questionable when interest rate spreads are being 
used as a performance measure.  
A somewhat at first glance surprising finding is that a banks’ market share has a negative 
impact on the interest rate spread. Market share has a particularly strong negative effect in the 
interest rate spread in low concentration markets. This is an interesting observation because it 
contradicts with the intuitive assumption, and central argument in the efficiency hypothesis, 
that increased market share goes hand in hand with greater market power and thus the 
possibility to raise prices above competitive levels. There are several plausible reasons to why 
we observe the reverse being the case in local Norwegian bank markets. First, it may very 
well be that other factors are present that limit a bank’s ability to increase loan rates when its 
market share increases, thereby preventing the bank to gain market power when its market 
share rises. One such factor, which may be especially prevalent for banks in regions with very 
high concentration, is that the threat of new banks entering the market, or banks in other 
regions branching out into the region, can inhibit a bank already in the market to increase its 
loan rates even though it has gained market shares. In fact, lowering the loan rate on purpose 
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may be an effective entry barrier enabling a bank with increased market share to sustain these 
shares. Another factor is that competition can be so tough that an increase in loan rates above 
competitive levels simply would not be possible, especially in the low concentration regions 
where there are many banks to begin with. Second, it is not unlikely that a bank that increases 
its market share attracts different types of customers that have lower risk profiles and less 
probability of defaulting on their loans. Customers with less default risk will typically be 
offered lower loan rates. A switch in loan policy that aims at customers with lower risk 
profiles may in the end lead to higher cumulative profitability since the default risk 
diminishes, essentially leaving the bank better off. A third possibility as to why market share 
has a negative impact on the interest rate spread is that the coherence is simply a result of 
reverse causation between the two variables. Lowering the loan rates, and thereby also the 
spread, can result in an increase in market shares. Indeed, when running a regression with 
market share as the dependent variable and interest rate spread as an explanatory variable, the 
interest rate spread is a significant determinant both in high and low concentration markets. 
We also have to keep in mind that interest rate spreads only measure the relative performance 
of banks and being percentages do not reflect total profits in any way. As such, an interest rate 
decrease does not necessarily have to be associated with a decrease in earnings. 
We will refrain from further attempts to explain the negative impact of market share on 
interest rate spreads here as any further elaboration would be mere guesswork, but we note 
that this relationship may be a topic worth exploring more thoroughly in future research. 
However, the fact that market share appears to be a strong determinant of the interest rate 
spread may help to explain the relatively small impact market concentration has on the 
interest rate spread. This relationship is consistent with the findings of Berger et al. (2004) 
who argue that the impact of market concentration on bank performance seems to diminish 
when a market share measure is included in the analysis. The negative impact market share 
has on the interest rate spread is much stronger in the low concentration regions (10.28 bp) 
than in the high concentration regions (45.12 bp). Although significant at all levels in both 
groups, this leads us to infer that market share is a relatively more important determinant of 
the interest rate spread in low concentration regions than in high concentration regions. 
By comparing the regression results in the low concentration regions with the results in the 
high concentration regions we see that region specific variables, with the exception of market 
concentration and the average loan size in a region, seem to play a more prevalent role in 
determining the interest rate spread for banks in regions with low concentration than they do 
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for banks high concentration regions. The opposite is the case for bank specific variables. 
Common for both of the regions is that as the average size of loans in a region grows, 
indicating that the market for loans grows larger, the interest rate spread decreases. These 
findings indicate than not only does the interest rate spread decrease as individual banks grow 
larger at the expense of other banks, it also diminishes as the entire market expands its loans. 
This effect is much stronger in the low concentration regions than in the high concentration 
regions, meaning that, ceteris paribus, banks in low concentration regions are willing to grant 
credit at better terms for borrowers as loan size increases compared to banks in high 
concentration regions. The fact that the remaining region specific variables are significant in 
the low concentration regions but not in the high concentration regions, leads us to conlcude 
that banks’ interest rate spreads in low concentration markets are more sensitive to structural 
changes that are specific to their local markets than are banks in high concentration markets. 
In regions with high concentration the interest rate spread seems much less sensitive to such 
changes. The exception to this is the effect HHI has on the interest rate spreads in the 
respective type of regions. What we can infer from this is that banks in low concentration 
regions are to a lesser extent able to determine the loan rates they offer to customers, owing to 
the competitive forces that are present in these regions but absent in high concentration 
regions. This can be a possible motivation behind the increasing consolidation observed in 
Norwegian bank markets over the years in this study. Finally, we observe that events specific 
to each of the years, such as business cycle variations and sudden shocks, play a substantial 
role in determining the interest rate spread in both high- and low concentration regions, but 
more so for banks in high concentration regions than for banks in low concentration regions, 
and we infer that banks’ interest rate spreads in regions where concentration is high are more 
sensitive to conjectural variations and other factors that occur within specific years. 
6.2	  Limitations	  of	  the	  Study	  and	  Implications	  for	  Future	  Research	  
A possible limitation in our study is that our data sets does not adequately address all the firm 
specific variables that affect the interest rate banks charge on their loans. One such factor is 
the risk profile of the banks’ customers. When determining the loan rates charged to 
customers, banks assess the customers’ default or bankruptcy risks. Consequently, customers 
with high credit risk usually must pay higher loan rates.  The composition of a bank’s 
customers is among other things the result of the bank’s business objectives and managers’ 
willingness to take risk. The implication of this is that banks’ average interest rate spreads 
may be affected by the risk profile of their pool of borrowers. The risk profile of banks’ 
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customers could then serve as an explanatory variable in our analysis.  However, we have not 
included this in our analysis due to limitations in the data we have used when conducting this 
study. Future research may find it feasible to conduct studies with explanatory variables that 
exploit the attributes of banks’ customers, as well as the attributes of the banks themselves. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that increasing market share have a negative impact in the 
interest rate spread. It may be interesting to elaborate further on the effect increasing market 
shares have on the interest rate spread in Norwegian bank markets. More research needs to be 
conducted to unveil the properties of this relationship and the robustness of this assessment. 
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8.	  Appendices	  
Appendix	  A	  –	  Winsorization	  of	  Loan	  and	  Deposits	  Rates	  
Figure A.1 Loan Rates before Winsorizing for Year 2008 
 
 
Figure A.1 shows distribution of loan rates after exclusion of loans with more than 100 percent loan rates. The summary statistics reveal that 
the mean loan rate was 7.581 percent, which is a plausible rate. However, there were still loans in the sample that had loan rates of 94.444 
percent, which is likely to be incorrectly recorded loan rates. We therefore found it necessary to winsorize the loan rates for all years in our 
sample in order to smooth the outliers. 
 
 
 
Figure A.2 Loan Rates after Winsorizing for Year 2008 
 
 
 
Figure A.2 shows distribution of loan rates winsorized with a fraction of 0.05 on each end. The outliers were smoothed and max loan rates 
decreased to 9.694 percent while minimum loan rates were 6.364. Note that the range of loan rates was narrowed to a more appropriate 
range.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Percentiles Smallest   
1 % 4.011578 0   
5 % 6.363584 0   
10 % 6.363584 0 Obs 679783 
25 % 6.817157 0 Sum of Wgt. 679783 
  
 
  
50 % 7.362967 
 
Mean 7.580733 
  Largest Std. Dev. 1.700694 
75 % 7.98303 55.59427   
90 % 8.775671 94.44444        Variance 2.892359 
95 % 9.694343 94.44444        Skewness 5.635944 
99 % 14.30638 94.44444        Kurtosis 116.2232 
Percentiles Smallest   
1 % 6.363584 6.363584   
5 % 6.363584 6.363584   
10 % 6.363584 6.363584 Obs 679783 
25 % 6.817157 6.363584 Sum of Wgt. 679783 
  
 
  
50 % 7.362967 
 
Mean 7.500906 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.8880409 
75 % 7.98303 9.694343   
90 % 8.775671 9.694343 Variance 0.7886167 
95 % 9.694343 9.694343 Skewness 0.8451122 
99 % 9.694343 9.694343 Kurtosis 3.068853 
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Figure A.3 Deposit Rates before Winsorizing for Year 2008 
 
 
Figure A.3 shows distribution of deposit rates after exclusion of deposits with more than 100 percent deposit rates. As with loan rates, we 
found it purposeful to winsorize the deposit rates in order to smooth the outliers. 
 
 
 
Figure A.4 Deposit Rates after Winsorizing for Year 2008 
 
 
Figure A.4 shows distribution of deposit rates winsorized with a fraction of 0.05 on each end. Note that the smoothing of outliers led to a 
more appropriate range in deposit rates.  
 
 
Percentiles Smallest   
1 % 1.702617 0   
5 % 3.340697 0   
10 % 3.882268 0 Obs 666177 
25 % 4.329919 0 Sum of Wgt. 666177 
  
 
  
50 % 4.638833 
 
Mean 4.884898 
  Largest Std. Dev. 1.535797 
75 % 5.245714 98.23736   
90 % 6.068585 98.23736 Variance 2.358674 
95 % 6.804098 98.23736 Skewness 11.38843 
99 % 10.58099 98.23736 Kurtosis 405.0643 
Percentiles Smallest   
1 % 3.340697 3.340697   
5 % 3.340697 3.340697   
10 % 3.882268 3.340697 Obs 666177 
25 % 4.329919 3.340697 Sum of Wgt. 666177 
  
 
  
50 % 4.638833 
 
Mean 4.831105 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.8273997 
75 % 5.245714 6.804098   
90 % 6.068585 6.804098 Variance 0.6845903 
95 % 6.804098 6.804098 Skewness 0.6052752 
99 % 6.804098 6.804098 Kurtosis 3.240568 
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Appendix	  B	  –	  Norwegian	  Concentration	  Measures	  
The table below shows various concentration measures for the Norwegian commercial bank market. The values are calculated based on the 
data sample that we used in our analysis. Further, the concentration measures are calculated based on lending banks. Note that the HTI 
values appear low. A possible explanation may be that the largest banks in Norway have unusually high market shares as opposed to their 
smaller peers. Another interesting observation is that all measures show that the market has become more concentrated from 1998 to 2008. 
Table B.1 Concentration Measures for the Norwegian Commercial Loan Market 
Index type Range Typical features 1998 2008 
3-bank ratio 0.468 0.626 
4-bank ratio 0.530 0.705 
5-bank ratio 
1/n < HHI < 1 Takes only large banks into account, arbitrary cut off. 
0.582 0.741 
HHI 1/n < HHI < 1 Considers all banks; sensitive to entrance of new banks. 0.105 0.163 
HTI 0 < HTI < 1 Emphasis on absolute number of banks. 0.057 0.084 
Rosenbluth 0 < RI < 1 Sensitive to changes in the size distribution of small banks. 0.056 0.080 
CCI 0 < CCI < 1 
Addresses relative dispersion and absolute magnitude; 
suitable for cartel markets. 0.331 0.432 
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Appendix	  C	  –	  Regions	  Ranked	  by	  Descending	  HHI	  
Figure C.1 
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Figure C.1, Continued 
Figure 1 lists the complete set of the 161 regions (commuter belts) in Norway. The regions are sorted by descending HHI-level. In general, as 
expected, the most concentrated regions consist of smaller cities and rural areas of Norway. Figure 2 lists the commuter belts and HHI in 
1998 to capture the change of HHI in the commuter belts. 
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Figure C.2 
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Figure C.2, Continued 
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Appendix	  D	  –	  Overview	  Regions,	  Country	  Parts,	  and	  Provinces	  
The below table shows regions (commuter belts) along with the geographical country part and province(s) they belong to. Norway has 7 
geographical country parts as defined by Statistics Norway (Statistisk sentralbyrå). Some regions encompass several provinces and therefore 
appear more than once in the list. 
Region Country Part Province Region Country Part Province 
Alstahaug Nord-Norge Nordland Hemne/Snillfjord/Aure Trøndelag Møre og Romsdal 
Alta Nord-Norge Finnmark Hemne/Snillfjord/Aure Trøndelag Sør-Trøndelag 
Andøy Nord-Norge Nordland Hitra Trøndelag Sør-Trøndelag 
Arendal Sørlandet Aust-Agder Hjelmeland Vestlandet Rogaland 
Askim/Eidsberg Østviken Østfold Holmestrand Vest-Viken Vestfold 
Aurland Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane Høyanger Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane 
Austevoll Vestlandet Hordaland Ibestad Nord-Norge Troms 
Balsfjord/Storfjord Nord-Norge Troms Indre Vest-Agder Sørlandet Vest-Agder 
Beiarn Nord-Norge Nordland Jondal/Kvam Vestlandet Hordaland 
Bergen Vestlandet Hordaland Kárášjohka - Karasjok Nord-Norge Finnmark 
Berlevåg Nord-Norge Finnmark Kongsberg Vest-Viken Buskerud 
Bindal Nord-Norge Nordland Kongsvinger Innlandet Hedmark 
Bjarkøy Nord-Norge Troms Kristiansand Sørlandet Aust-Agder 
Bodø Nord-Norge Nordland Kristiansand Sørlandet Vest-Agder 
Brønnøy Nord-Norge Nordland Kristiansund Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
Båtsfjord Nord-Norge Finnmark Kristiansund Vestlandet  
Deatnu – Tana Nord-Norge Finnmark Kvinnherad Vestlandet Hordaland 
Dovre Innlandet Oppland Kvænangen Nord-Norge Troms 
Drammen Vest-Viken Buskerud Larvik/Sandefjord Vest-Viken Vestfold 
Drammen Vest-Viken Vestfold Lebesby Nord-Norge Finnmark 
Eid/Gloppen Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane Leka Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag 
Eigersund Vestlandet Rogaland Lenvik Nord-Norge Troms 
Elverum Innlandet Hedmark Levanger/Verdal Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag 
Evje/Bygland Sørlandet Aust-Agder Lierne Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag 
Fagernes Innlandet Oppland Lillehammer Innlandet Oppland 
Farsund Sørlandet Vest-Agder Loppa Nord-Norge Finnmark 
Fauske Nord-Norge Nordland Lurøy Nord-Norge Nordland 
Fedje Vestlandet Hordaland Lyngen Nord-Norge Troms 
Fjaler Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane Lærdal/Årdal Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane 
Flakstad/Vestvågøy Nord-Norge Nordland Lødingen Nord-Norge Nordland 
Flatanger Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag Mandal Sørlandet Vest-Agder 
Flekkefjord Sørlandet Rogaland Masfjorden/Gulen Vestlandet Hordaland 
Flekkefjord Sørlandet Vest-Agder Masfjorden/Gulen Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane 
Flora Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane Meløy Nord-Norge Nordland 
Fredrikstad/Sarpsborg Østviken Østfold Meråker Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag 
Fron Innlandet Oppland Modalen Vestlandet Hordaland 
Frøya Trøndelag Sør-Trøndelag Molde Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
Førde Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane Moskenes Nord-Norge Nordland 
Gáivuotna – Kåfjord Nord-Norge Troms Moss Østviken Østfold 
Gamvik Nord-Norge Finnmark Målselv Nord-Norge Troms 
Gjøvik Innlandet Oppland Måsøy Nord-Norge Finnmark 
Grenland Vest-Viken Telemark Namsos Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag 
Grong/Høylandet Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag Namsskogan Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag 
Guovdageaidnu – 
Kautokeino 
Nord-Norge Finnmark Narvik Nord-Norge Nordland 
H lden Østviken Østfold Narvik Nord-Norge Troms 
Hallingdal Vest-Viken Buskerud Nesna Nord-Norge Nordland 
Hamar Innlandet Hedmark Nissedal/Fyresdal Vest-Viken Telemark 
Hamarøy Nord-Norge Nordland Norddal/Stranda Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
Hammerfest Nord-Norge Finnmark Nordkapp Nord-Norge Finnmark 
Harstad Nord-Norge Nordland Nore og Uvdal Vest-Viken Buskerud 
Harstad Nord-Norge Troms Notodden Vest-Viken Telemark 
Hasvik Nord-Norge Finnmark Odda Vestlandet Hordaland 
Hattfjelldal Nord-Norge Nordland Oppdal/Rennebu Trøndelag Sør-Trøndelag 
Haugesund Vestlandet Hordaland Orkdal Trøndelag Sør-Trøndelag 
Haugesund Vestlandet Rogaland Osen Trøndelag Sør-Trøndelag 
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Region Country Part Province 
Oslo Østviken Akershus 
Oslo Østviken Buskerud 
Oslo Østviken Oppland 
Oslo Østviken Oslo 
Oslo Østviken Østfold 
Porsanger Nord-Norge Finnmark 
Rana Nord-Norge Nordland 
Rauma Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
Ringerike Vest-Viken Buskerud 
Ringerike Vest-Viken Oppland 
Risør Sørlandet Aust-Agder 
Rødøy Nord-Norge Nordland 
Røros Trøndelag Hedmark 
Røros Trøndelag Sør-Trøndelag 
Røst Nord-Norge Nordland 
Røyrvik Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag 
Salangen Nord-Norge Troms 
Sandøy Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
Sauda Vestlandet Rogaland 
Sel Innlandet Oppland 
Seljord/Kviteseid Vest-Viken Telemark 
Sirdal Sørlandet Vest-Agder 
Skjervøy/Nordreisa Nord-Norge Troms 
Skjåk/Lom Innlandet Oppland 
Smøla Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
Sogndal Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane 
Solund Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane 
Sortland Nord-Norge Nordland 
Stavanger/Sandnes Vestlandet Rogaland 
Steigen Nord-Norge Nordland 
Steinkjer Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag 
Stord Vestlandet Hordaland 
Stor-
Elvdal/Rendalen 
Innlandet Hedmark 
Stryn Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane 
Suldal Vestlandet Rogaland 
Sunndal Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
Surnadal Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
Sør-Varanger Nord-Norge Finnmark 
Tinn Vest-Viken Telemark 
Torsken/Berg Nord-Norge Troms 
Tromsø Nord-Norge Troms 
Trondheim Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag 
Trondheim Trøndelag Sør-Trøndelag 
Trysil/Engerdal Innlandet Hedmark 
Træna Nord-Norge Nordland 
Tydal Trøndelag Sør-Trøndelag 
Tynset Innlandet Hedmark 
Tysfjord Nord-Norge Nordland 
Tønsberg Vest-Viken Vestfold 
Ulstein Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
Utsira Vestlandet Rogaland 
Vadsø Nord-Norge Finnmark 
Valle/Bykle Sørlandet Aust-Agder 
Vanylven Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
Vardø Nord-Norge Finnmark 
Vefsn Nord-Norge Nordland 
Vik Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane 
Vikna/Nærøy Trøndelag Nord-Trøndelag 
Vinje/Tokke Vest-Viken Telemark 
Voss Vestlandet Hordaland 
Værøy Nord-Norge Nordland 
Vågan Nord-Norge Nordland 
Vågsøy Vestlandet Sogn og Fjordane 
Ørland Trøndelag Sør-Trøndelag 
Ørsta/Volda Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
Åfjord/Roan Trøndelag Sør-Trøndelag 
Ålesund Vestlandet Møre og Romsdal 
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Appendix	  E	  –	  Country	  Parts	  
This appendix displays diagrams with various statistics for the country parts. 
 
 
The figures Distribution of Loans and Deposits show that Østviken (which includes Oslo) clearly have largest volumes in terms of loans and 
deposits. Vestlandet (includes Stavanger/Sandnes region) is the second largest country part. 
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Appendix	  F	  –	  Correlation	  Matrix	  
Figure F.1 
Figure F.1 shows scatter plots of the correlations between all the variables used in the analysis. Observe the scatter plot of HHI lending banks 
and market share of the lending banks. This scatter plot shows that high market share of banks are only present when HHI-levels are high, 
while low market shares can be observed regardless of the level of HHI. 
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Appendix	  G	  –	  T-­‐tests	  	  
The tables above show the complete T-test results for the variables that we used in our analysis. There are two sets of tables, one for the main 
grouping of regions (High HHI Regions with HHI levels above 0.20, Low HHI Regions with levels equal to or less than 0.20) and one for the 
alternative grouping of the regions, top/bottom 25 percent by HHI-level. 	  
Table G.1 T-tests High/Low HHI Period 1998-2008 
Year Test variable Mean High HHI Regions 
Mean Low HHI 
Regions 
Results (Pr(|T| 
> |t|) ) 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.0211049 0.0187486 0.0010 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0456089 0.0402202 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 1,767,233 2,963,352 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 7.12e+07 3.85e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 303.4865 3,992.765 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 541.7153 6,744.103 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 12.086 46.97202 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.1205906 0.0335731 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 20.03774 62.96882 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 36.15669 106.6427 0.0000 * 
1998 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 4.2e+07 2.38e+08 0.0000 * 
     
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0244112 .0241897 0.8738 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) .0419802 .0408018 0.5761 
Mean Loan Size Regional 2,214,018 2,438,208   0.0099 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 1.68e+08 2.45e+08 0.0001 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 1,254.909 1,760.863 0.0191* 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 2,038.658 3,012.536 0.0046 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 18.13778 31.37308 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) .1299246 .0392157 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 32.77536 51.20915 0.1172  
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 55.96899 88.06536 0.0890  
1999 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 9.02e+07 1.60e+08 0.1847 
     
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .012283 .008063 0.0000 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) .0372247 .0291588 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 2,312,183 3,632,016 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 9.17e+07 4.10e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 387.9533 4,269.235 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 675.9903 6,922.217 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 14.86602 55.32815 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) .1009749 .0282187 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 20.37883 55.3157 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 35.99513 91.04938 0.0000* 
2000 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 6.11e+07 3.02e+08 0.0000 * 
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Table G.1 T-tests High/Low HHI Period 1998-2008, Continued 
Year Test variable Mean High HHI Regions 
Mean Low HHI 
Regions 
Results (Pr(|T| 
> |t|) ) 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0124759 .0107925 0.0242 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) .0378661 .0339443 0.0043 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 2,636,888 3,772,106 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 1.09e+08 4.18e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 423.5968 4,038.79 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 723.3138 6,495.576 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 15.51622 52.81719 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) .0999301 .0300501 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 21.11041 53.01336 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 36.75332 87.21035 0.0000 * 
2001 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 7.10e+07 3.03e+08 0.0000 * 
     
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0128142 .0123952 0.5302 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) .0349557 .0328451 0.0427 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 2,633,441 3,732,278 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 9.73e+07 3.75e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 369.5604 3605.321 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 627.581 5674.36 0.0046 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 14.75909 48.70485 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) .10162 .0322129 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 19.84757 49.76751 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 34.17378 80.12325         0.0000 * 
2002 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 6.24e+07 2.60e+08 0.0000* 
     
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0294207 .0290928 0.6259 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) .037899 .0342986 0.0003 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 2,652,986 3,668,900 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 9.81e+07 4.25e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 318.8107 4,157.882 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 528.8957 6398.56 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 13.51867 52.81206 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) .1050671 .026041 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 19.83979 55.38021 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 33.3994 87.04297 0.0000 * 
2003 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 5.99e+07 2.89e+08 0.0000 * 
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Table G.1 T-tests High/Low HHI Period 1998-2008, Continued 
Year Test variable Mean High HHI Regions 
Mean Low HHI 
Regions 
Results (Pr(|T| 
> |t|) ) 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0288108 .0267732 0.0074 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) .0377432 .0350486 0.0036 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 3,120,852 3,282,730 0.1642 
Mean Loan Bank size region 2.26e+08 2.30e+08 0.8452  
Number of Loan Customers By Region 1,667.83 1,519.732 0.4420 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 2,572.25 2,396.833 0.5452 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 24.50019 32.00874 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) .0886999 .0410959 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 32.25213 39.98904 0.4239 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 51.71567 63.49863 0.4249 
2004 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 1.43e+08 1.47e+08 0.9603 
     
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .024057 .0237438 0.6234 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) .0350704 .0329706 0.0097 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 3,455,135 5,149,043 0.0000* 
Mean Loan Bank size region 2.02e+08 8.25e+08 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 728.3971 5,608.892 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 1145.878 8470.504 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 16.51141 46.96172 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) .1064748 .0350404 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 30.46978 72.45553 0.0001 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 48.55827 111.7197 0.0001* 
2005 
 
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 1.04e+08 4.90e+08 0.0000* 
     
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0182238 .0177184 0.3546 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) .0320097 .0300363 0.0098 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 3,358,424 6,010,356 0.0000* 
Mean Loan Bank size region 1.68e+08 9.80e+08 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 650.4177 6,348.66 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 1,015.124 9,658.795 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 16.66793 54.41971 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) .0960922 .028133 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 28.04741 78.79795 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 44.17425 121.3836 0.0000* 
2006 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 9.12e+07 6.10e+08 0.0000* 
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Table G.1 T-tests High/Low HHI Period 1998-2008, Continued 
Year Test variable Mean High HHI Regions 
Mean Low 
HHI Regions 
Results (Pr(|T| 
> |t|) ) 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0144222 .0141667 0.6578 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) .0318694 .0311251 0.4427 
Mean Loan Size Regional 2,213,970 2,438,208 0.0098 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 1.68e+08 2.45e+08 0.0001* 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 1,254.909 1,760.863 0.0191* 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 2,038.658 3,012.536 0.0046* 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 18.13778 31.37308 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) .1299246 .0392157 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 32.77536 51.20915 0.1172  
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 55.96899 88.06536 0.0890  
2007 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 9.02e+07 1.60e+08 0.1847 
     
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) .0180415 .0163215 0.0137 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) .035121 .0334066 0.1292 
Mean Loan Size Regional 4,901,986 5,329,828 0.0173 * 
Mean Loan Bank Size Region 4.14e+08 4.92e+08 0.0518 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 1,832.501 2,075.068 0.2638 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 2,858.905 3,236.549 0.2636 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 22.80029 35.73883 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.0835227 0.0367454 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region  35.25682 48.99213 0.1331 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 55.5983 76.67454 0.1364 
2008 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 2.14e+08 2.62e+08 0.6666 
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Table G.2 T-tests Top/Bottom 25 percent. Period 1998 - 2008 
 
Year Test variable Mean Top 25 Percent Regions 
Mean Bottom 
25 Percent 
Regions 
Results (Pr(|T| 
> |t|) ) 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.0226815 0.018577 0.0010  * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0486243 0.0403318 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 1,426,477 2,893,451 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 3.73e+07 3.72e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 103.4375 3,852.975 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 195.9036 6,506.977 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 12.086 46.97202 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.2005208 0.0345622 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 12.55469 61.47926 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 23.52604 104.0461 0.0000 * 
1998 
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 2.13e+07 2.29e+08 0.0001 * 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.026841 0.02364 0.0082* 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0463268 0.0398485 0.0005 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 1,645,267 3,104,880 0.0000* 
Mean Loan Bank size region 5.45e+07 3.82e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 118.2704 3,663.75 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 218.2704 5,927.605 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 5.865506 44.04928 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.2410423 0.04 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 16.32899 60.645 0.0009 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 30.11075 100.04 0.001 * 
1999 
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 2.85e+07 2.28e+08 0.001 * 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.0140369 0.008063 0.0000 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0419772 0.0291588 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 1,870,996 3,632,016 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 5.09e+07 4.10e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 147.6444 4,269.235 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 270.6616 6,922.217 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 8.404696 55.32815 0.0000* 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.1594828 0.0282187 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 14.09267 55.3157 0.0001 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 25.72629 91.04938 0.0001* 
2000 
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 3.26e+07 3.02e+08 0.0003 * 
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Table G.2 T-tests Top/Bottom 25 percent. Period 1998 – 2008, Continued 
Year Test variable Mean Top 25 Percent Regions 
Mean Bottom 
25 Percent 
Regions 
Results (Pr(|T| 
> |t|) ) 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.0127854 0.0108057 0.0428* 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0382512 0.0339851 0.0171 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 2,502,895 3,963,477 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 8.33e+07 4.49e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 152.9707 4,362.837 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 277.9184 7,012.279 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 15.51622 52.81719 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 14.43724 0.0272232 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 8.450535 55.96552 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 26.2113 91.84936 0.0000 * 
2001 
 
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 5.32e+07 3.25e+08 0.0006 * 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.0128844 0.0125127 0.6826 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0353992 0.0329159 0.0784 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 2,652,879 3,956,853 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 7.24e+07 4.38e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 160.914 4,425.159 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 287.0734 6,949.733 0.0046 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 8.75651 56.30653 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.1551363 0.0268817 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 14.37736 56.33513 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 25.60797 90.23118             0.0000 
* 
2002 
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 4.50e+07 3.07e+08 0.0004* 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.0294207 0.0290928 0.0327 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0385755 0.0346514 0.0042* 
Mean Loan Size Regional 2,082,477 3,115,718 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 6,.6e+07 2.60e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 194.6998 2,048.188 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 339.2495 3,281.506 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 9.133574 40.68927 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.1521298 0.0296684 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 17.30426 45.34206 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 30.21501 73.06632 .0001 * 
2003 
 
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 3.89e+07 1.68e+08 0.0000 * 
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Table G.2 T-tests Top/Bottom 25 percent. Period 1998 – 2008, Continued 
Year Test variable Mean Top 25 Percent Regions 
Mean Bottom 
25 Percent 
Regions 
Results (Pr(|T| 
> |t|) ) 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.0295192 0.0269521 0.0022 * 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0396952 0.035604 0.0000* 
Mean Loan Size Regional 2,807,200 3,1736,11 0 0.0007 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 1.28e+08 2.18e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 356.9979 1,424.749 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 583.355 2,268.48 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 12.74395 32.15567 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.144958 0.0411765 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 21.21849 38.03922 0.0041 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 35.59034 61.20196 0.0069 * 
2004 
	  
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 7.74e+07 1.39e+08 0.0508 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.0247119 0.0235683 0.1134 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0370992 0.0329865 0.0000* 
Mean Loan Size Regional 3,104,688 4,681,969 0.0000* 
Mean Loan Bank size region 1.37e+08 6.66e+08 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 330.1513 4,475.425 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 523.4137 6,773.266 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 16.51141 46.96172 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.1654846 0.0386179 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 22.91489 62.20325 0.0085 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 37.34515 96.27439 0.0083* 
2005 
 
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 7.03e+07 3.88e+08 0.0084* 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.0187928 0.0177021 0.0776 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0334383 0.0303299 0.0004 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 2,936,318 5,169,526 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 8.68e+07 7.73e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 178.758 4,994.313 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 293.0107 7,597.853 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 8.184422 47.21413 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.1627409 0.0316574 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 17.18201 68.40596 0.0001* 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 27.97859 105.2998 0.0001* 
2006 
 
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 4.72e+07 4.59e+08 0.0019 * 
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Table G.2 T-tests Top/Bottom 25 percent. Period 1998 – 2008, Continued 
Year Test variable Mean Top 25 Percent Regions 
Mean Bottom 
25 Percent 
Regions 
Results (Pr(|T| 
> |t|) ) 
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.0143891 0.0143937 0.9941 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0335049 0.0310871 0.0183 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 4,064,345 5,695,833 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank size region 1.16e+08 8.80e+08 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 163.5561 5,371.251 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 267.6453 8,207.021 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 8.072961 47.35033 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.1647597 0.0313531 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 17.09611 74.7805 0.0000* 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 27.83753 115.4241 0.0000 * 
2007 
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 5.54e+07 5.04e+08 0.0015 * 
	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Interest Rate Spread (Loan rate - NIBOR) 0.0184183 0.0171248 0.0819 
Interest Rate Spread (Loans-deposits) 0.0366843 0.0338213 0.0151 * 
Mean Loan Size Regional 5,001,883 6,451,639 0.0000 * 
Mean Loan Bank Size Region 1.17e+08 1.01e+09 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Region 167.0644 5,065.854 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts By Region 270.7706 7,892.851 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Banks By Region 9.132425 46.88614 0.0000 * 
Marketshare (Loan banks) 0.1488934 0.0316456 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Customers By Banks in Region 15.10463 69.96994 0.0000 * 
Number of Loan Accounts by Banks in Region 24.31187 109.318 0.0000 * 
2008 
 
Loan Size By Banks in Region 5.74e+07 5.63e+08 0.0016 * 
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Appendix	  H	  –	  Correlation	  Coefficients	  
Table 1 shows the complete list of correlation coefficients of the variable HHI and Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate – NIBOR). A star behind 
the coefficient denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
Table H.1 Correlation Coefficients of HHI and Interest Rate Spread (Loan Rate –NIBOR)  
 
Region Correlataion Coefficient P	   Region Correlataion Coefficient P	  
Alstahaug 0.1812 0.0757 Ibestad 0.1687 0.2140 
Alta -0.1844 0.0736 Indre Vest-Agder 0.2548* 0.0209 
Andøy -0.2223 0.1132 Jondal/Kvam -0.0473 0.5930 
Arendal -0.0921 0.1175 Kongsberg 0.2027* 0.0102 
Askim/Eidsberg 0.0109 0.8613 Kongsvinger 0.1348 0.0659 
Aurland -0.0014 -0.0014 Kristiansund 0.0958 0.1350 
Austevoll -0.0750 0.4448 Kvinnherad -0.0307 0.7081 
Balsfjord/Storfjord 0.0544 0.6642 Kvænangen 0.1253 0.4801 
Beiarn 0.2476 0.1718 Kárášjohka - 
Karasjok 
-0.1916 0.3018 
Bergen 0.1506* 0.0006 L rvik/Sandefjord 0.2501* 0.0000 
Berlevåg 0.1892 0.2487 Lebesby 0.3766* 0.0091 
Bindal 0.4608* 0.0269 Leka -0.0154 0.9241 
Bjarkøy 0.1678 0.3507 Lenvik 0.3404* 0.0000 
Bodø -0.1400* 0.0403 Levanger/Verdal 0.0552 0.5124 
Brønnøy -0.4333* 0.0000 Lierne 0.0330 0.8440 
Båtsfjord 0.1067 0.4702 Lillehammer 0.1489* 0.0455 
Deatnu – Tana 0.2858 0.0600 Loppa -0.2646 0.1502 
Dovre 0.0945 0.3401 Lurøy 0.1658 0.2822 
Drammen 0.1306* 0.0033 Lyngen 0.3280* 0.0099 
Eid/Gloppen -0.1669 0.0857 Lærdal/Årdal 0.3844* 0.0000 
Eigersund -0.0022 0.9785 Lødingen 0.0484 0.6698 
Elverum 0.2378* 0.0020 Mandal 0.1415 0.0842 
Evje/Bygland -0.2269* 0.0239 Masfjorden/Gulen 0.3345* 0.0020 
Fagernes 0.0375 0.6419 Meløy 0.3291* 0.0070 
Farsund 0.0379 0.6421 Meråker 0.1644 0.2394 
Fauske 0.1064 0.3153 Modalen -0.0134 0.9506 
Fedje -0.1384 0.4501 Molde 0.0595 0.3344 
Fjaler -0.0701 0.4926 Moskenes -0.2835* 0.0359 
Flakstad/Vestvågøy -0.1320 0.2048 Moss 0.0952 0.1056 
Flatanger 0.0220 0.8927 Målselv 0.1973 0.0834 
Flekkefjord -0.0001 0.9988 Måsøy -0.0483 0.7071 
Flora 0.3633* 0.0000 Namsos 0.1651 0.0704 
Fredrikstad/Sarpsborg 0.1937* 0.0001 Namsskogan 0.0343 0.8169 
Fron -0.0046 0.9620 Narvik 0.3188* 0.0001 
Frøya -0.0475 0.7256 Nesna -0.0337 0.8407 
Førde -0.0428 0.5666 Nissedal/Fyresdal 0.0905 0.3730 
Gamvik 0.1638 0.2880 Norddal/Stranda -0.0268 0.8218 
Gjøvik 0.1690* 0.0119 Nordkapp -0.0245 0.8153 
Grenland -0.0855 0.0913 Nore og Uvdal 0.1488 0.3291 
Grong/Høylandet 0.1752 0.2051 Notodden 0.2113* 0.0018 
Guovdageaidnu – 
Kautokeino 
0.3221 0.0591 Odda 0.2232* 0.0156 
Gáivuotna – Kåfjord -0.2795 0.0892 Oppdal/Rennebu -0.0923 0.2779 
Halden 0.1506* 0.0441 Orkdal 0.1244 0.1584 
Hallingdal 0.1304 0.0745 Osen 0.4268* 0.0010 
Hamar 0.1246* 0.0339 Oslo 0.2719* 0.0000 
Hamarøy -0.3215* 0.0228 Porsanger -0.3761* 0.0141 
Hammerfest 0.1382 0.1480 Rana 0.0756 0.3764 
Harstad -0.0318 0.6863 Rauma -0.2581* 0.0031 
Hasvik 00.2226 0.2207 Ringerike 0.2214* 0.0007 
Hattfjelldal 0.2160   0.2603 Risør 0.1703 0.0587 
Haugesund 0.2850* 0.0000 Rødøy 0.4401* 0.0012 
Hemne/Snillfjord/Aure -0.0025 0.9816 Røros -0.0023 0.9784 
Hitra 0.1749 0.1418 Røst 0.1273 0.4401 
Hjelmeland -0.1255 0.3437 Røyrvik 0.5659* 0.0002 
Holmestrand -0.1838* 0.0225 Salangen -0.0396 0.7764 
Høyanger -0.0470 0.7080 Sandøy 0.1270 0.3379 
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Region Correlataion Coefficient P	  
Sauda -0.2110 0.1456 
Sel 0.1180 0.3166 
Seljord/Kviteseid 0.0961 0.2942 
Sirdal 0.2581* 0.0120 
Skjervøy/Nordreisa 0.1393 0.1982 
Skjåk/Lom -0.0253 0.8632 
Smøla -0.1544 0.2268 
Sogndal -0.1409 0.0920 
Solund 0.1731 0.3517 
Sortland 0.1929* 0.0234 
Stavanger/Sandnes 0.0731 0.1232 
Steigen -0.0122   0.9305 
Steinkjer -0.0115 0.8676 
Stor-Elvdal/Rendalen 0.0687 0.5804 
Stord 0.0752 0.2922 
Stryn 0.1825 0.0870 
Sulda 0.0328 0.7831 
Sunndal 0.3263* 0.0000 
Surnadal -0.0445 0.5988 
Sør-Varanger 0.0239 0.8407 
Tinn 0.2170 0.0652 
Torsken/Berg 0.0737 0.5356 
Tromsø 0.3391* 0.0000 
Trondheim 0.1408* 0.0004 
Trysil/Engerdal 0.1477 0.1827 
Træna -0.0234 0.8987 
Tydal -0.2788 0.0815 
Tynset 0.0860 0.5135 
Tysfjord 0.0653   0.6555 
Tønsberg 0.1736* 0.0005 
Ulstein 0.0142 0.8513 
Utsira 0.3062   0.2166 
Vadsø -0.0086 0.9436 
Valle/Bykle 0.1191 0.2990 
Vanylven -0.0214 0.8496 
Vardø -0.2230 0.0676 
Vefsn 0.2561* 0.0097 
Vik 0.2486 0.0576 
Vikna/Nærøy 0.2452* 0.0284 
Vinje/Tokke 0.4239* 0.0000 
Voss 0.1480* 0.0461 
Vågan 0.2226* 0.0301 
Vågsøy 0.0135 0.8847 
Værøy 0.0740 0.6373 
Ørland 0.1810* 0.0386 
Ørsta/Volda -0.0955 0.2448 
Åfjord/Roan -0.1016 0.3491 
 Ålesund -0.1317* 0.0270
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Appendix	  I	  –	  Summary	  Statistics	  of	  the	  Panel	  Data	  
The tables presented in this appendix present summary statistics of the panel data that were used in the regressions. The standard deviations 
are decomposed into component of overall, between and within. 
Table I.1 Years 1998 - 2008  
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.0361171 0.0193205 -0.0439944 0.0863708 N =   16,563 
 between  0.0155797 -0.0439944 0.0863708 n =    3,054 
 within  0.0145865 -0.0401494 0.100075 T-bar = 5.42338 
       
iratespread(loans-nibor) overall 0.0191034 0.0147472 -0.0099608 0.0472835 N =   21,095 
 between  0.010976 -0.0099608 0.0472835 n =    4061 
 within  0.0120597 -0.0219113 0.0584596 T-bar = 5.19453 
       
hhi overall 0.3210468 0.1560644 0.122954 1 N =   35792 
 between  0.1494844 0.127712 1 n =    6713 
 within  0.0714773 -0.0828383 0.9098529 T-bar = 5.33174 
       
loansize_reg overall 3,363,550 2,967,746 161,619.4 4.20E+07 N =   35,792 
 between  2,800,861 183,949 3.33E+07 n =    6,713 
 within  1,563,107 -1.02E+07 3.66E+07 T-bar = 5.33174 
       
banksize_reg overall 2.59E+08 4.30E+08 492,858 3.00E+09 N =   21,095 
 between  3.37E+08 65,6546.9 3.00E+09 n =    4,061 
 within  1.91E+08 -7.33E+08 1.85E+09 T-bar = 5.19453 
       
cust_reg overall 1,410.789 2,910.392 1 16,887 N =   35,792 
 between  2,311.587 1 16,754 n =    6,713 
 within  5.12E+02 -2,919.211 5.18E+03 T-bar = 5.33174 
       
acc_reg overall 2,234.437 4.49E+03 2.00E+00 2.59E+04 N =   35,792 
 between  3,588.548 2 25,874 n =    6,713 
 within  702.2751 -3,875.786 7,573.437 T-bar = 5.33174 
       
banks_reg overall 24.19714 25.82592 1 135 N =   35,792 
 between  21.31119 1 134 n =    6,713 
 within  3.527815 5.397139 41.53047 T-bar = 5.33174 
       
marketshare overall 0.0839535 0.1665599 2.54E-11 1 N =   21,095 
 between  0.1244456 2.54E-11 0.9515683 n =    4,061 
 within  0.0675457 -0.6035411 0.7802306 T-bar = 5.19453 
       
cust_bank overall 34.33615 148.7971 1 5710 N =   21,095 
 between  107.6428 1 3,825.273 n =    4,061 
 within  45.39647 -2.08E+03 1,919.063 T-bar = 5.19453 
       
acc_bank overall 55.83792 230.2614 0 8479 N =   21095 
 between  172.227 0.8571429 5691.818 n =    4061 
 within  67.56627 -3086.162 2843.02 T-bar = 5.19453 
       
loansize_bank overall 1.54E+08 1.70E+09 0 1.29E+11 N =   35792 
 between  1.04E+09 0 5.95E+10 n =    6713 
 within  9.05E+08 -3.84E+10 6.94E+10 T-bar = 5.33174 
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Table I.2 - Year 1998 
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.0441326 0.0179954 0.0039341 0.0763559 N =    1,325 
 between  0.0179954 0.0039341 0.0763559 n =    1,325 
 within  0 0.0441326 0.0441326 T =       1 
       
iratespread(loans-nibor) overall 0.0205043 0.0126337 0.0010855 0.0357468 N =    1,636 
 between  0.0126337 0.0010855 0.0357468 n =    1,636 
 within  0 0.0205043 0.0205043 T =       1 
       
hhi overall 0.3307779 0.1829264 0.1427994 1 N =    2,772 
 between  0.1829264 0.1427994 1 n =    2,772 
 within  0 0.3307779 0.3307779 T =       1 
       
loansize_reg overall 2,060,211 1,203,829 183,949 5,996,901 N =    2,772 
 between  1,203,829 183,949 5,996,901 n =    2,772 
 within  0 2,060,211 2,060,211 T =       1 
       
banksize_reg overall 1.51E+08 2.18E+08 589,825 8.35E+08 N =    1,636 
 between  2.18E+08 589,825 8.35E+08 n =    1,636 
 within  0 1.51E+08 1.51E+08 T =       1 
       
cust_reg overall 1,133.347 2.34E+03 1 1.03E+04 N =    2,772 
 between  2340.052 1.00E+00 1.03E+04 n =    2,772 
 within  0 1,133.347 1133.347 T =       1 
       
acc_reg overall 1,935.519 3,947.416 2 17,487 N =    2,772 
 between  3,947.416 2 17,487 n =    2,772 
 within  0 1,935.519 1,935.519 T =       1 
       
banks_reg overall 20.63131 23.4498 1 109 N =    2,772 
 between  23.4498 1 109 n =    2,772 
 within  0 20.63131 20.63131 T =       1 
       
marketshare overall 0.0984108 0.182831 5.98E-10 1 N =    1,636 
 between  0.182831 5.98E-10 1 n =    1,636 
 within  0 0.0984108 0.0984108 T =       1 
       
cust_bank overall 30.98044 120.9629 1.00E+00 2,617 N =    1,636 
 between  120.9629 1 2,617 n =    1,636 
 within  0 30.98044 30.98044 T =       1 
       
acc_bank overall 54.12347 200.8354 1 3,946 N =    1,636 
 between  200.8354 1 3,946 n =    1,636 
 within  0 54.12347 54.12347 T =       1 
       
loansize_bank overall 9.01E+07 7.08E+08 0 2.19E+10 N =    2,772 
 between  7.08E+08 0 2.19E+10 n =    2,772 
 within  0 9.01E+07 9.01E+07 T =       1 
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Table I.3 – Year 1999 
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.0441909 0.0208227 0.0026679 0.0781361 N =    1,170 
 between  0.0208227 0.0026679 0.0781361 n =    1,170 
 within  0 0.0441909 0.0441909 T =       1 
       
iratespread(loan rates-nibor) overall 0.024386 0.0162334 0.0017885 0.0465331 N =    1,346 
 between  0.0162334 0.0017885 0.0465331 n =    1,346 
 within  0 0.024386 0.024386 T =       1 
       
hhi overall 0.3759929 0.1948375 0.1662146 1 N =    2,568 
 between  0.1948375 0.1662146 1 n =    2,568 
 within  0 0.3759929 0.3759929 T =       1 
       
loansize_reg overall 2,236,694 1,328,515 168,605.6 8,288,619 N =    2,568 
 between  1,328,515 168,605.6 8,288,619 n =    2,568 
 within  0 2,236,694 2,236,694 T =       1 
       
banksize_reg overall 1.77E+08 2.24E+08 650549.5 7.83E+08 N =    1,346 
 between  2.24E+08 6.51E+05 7.83E+08 n =    1,346 
 within  0 1.77E+08 1.77E+08 T =       1 
       
cust_reg overall 1,106.558 2,190.309 3 9,413 N =    2,568 
 between  2,190.309 3 9,413 n =    2,568 
 within  0 1,106.558 1,106.558 T =       1 
       
acc_reg overall 1,823.248 3,490.587 5 14,979 N =    2,568 
 between  3,490.587 5 14,979 n =    2568 
 within  0 1,823.248 1,823.248 T =       1 
       
banks_reg overall 19.4778 24.07892 1 107 N =    2,568 
 between  24.07892 1 107 n =    2,568 
 within  0 19.4778 19.4778 T =       1 
       
marketshare overall 0.1196137 0.21095 4.66E-10 1 N =    1,346 
 between  0.21095 4.66E-10 1 n =    1,346 
 within  0 0.1196137 0.1196137 T =       1 
       
cust_bank overall 34.87073 136.9944 1 2,780 N =    1,346 
 between  136.9944 1 2,780 n =    1,346 
 within  0 34.87073 34.87073 T =       1 
       
acc_bank overall 59.61664 219.7551 1 4,145 N =    1,346 
 between  219.7551 1 4,145 n =    1,346 
 within  0 59.61664 59.61664 T =       1 
       
loansize_bank overall 9.73E+07 8.10E+08 0 2.70E+10 N =    2,568 
 between  8.10E+08 0.00E+00 2.70E+10 n =    2,568 
 within  0 9.73E+07 9.73E+07 T =       1 
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Table I.4 – Year 2000 
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.0347327 0.027731 -0.0439944 0.0823123 N =    1,395 
 between  0.027731 -0.0439944 0.0823123 n =    1,395 
 within  0 0.0347327 0.0347327 T =       1 
       
iratespread(loan rates-nibor) overall 0.0110884 0.0153959 -0.00895 0.0321043 N =    2,003 
 between  0.0153959 -0.00895 0.0321043 n =    2,003 
 within  0 0.0110884 0.0110884 T =       1 
       
hhi overall 0.2958795 0.1528451 0.1444712 1.00E+00 N =    2,928 
 between  0.1528451 0.1444712 1 n =    2,928 
 within  0 0.2958795 0.2958795 T =       1 
       
loansize_reg overall 2,659,653 1.71E+06 212,211.1 1.37E+07 N =    2,928 
 between  1,708,934 2.12E+05 1.37E+07 n =    2,928 
 within  0 2,659,653 2,659,653 T =       1 
       
banksize_reg overall 1.82E+08 2.46E+08 1,456,177 9.45E+08 N =    2,003 
 between  2.46E+08 1,456,177 9.45E+08 n =    2,003 
 within  0 1.82E+08 1.82E+08 T =       1 
       
cust_reg overall 1,313.908 2,660.007 3 12,015 N =    2,928 
 between  2,660.007 3 12,015 n =    2,928 
 within  0 1,313.908 1,313.908 T =       1 
       
acc_reg overall 2,169.434 4,250.937 6 19,163 N =    2,928 
 between  4,250.937 6 19,163 n =    2,928 
 within  0 2,169.434 2,169.434 T =       1 
       
 banks_reg overall 25.52049 28.37983 1.00E+00 134 N =    2,928 
 between  28.37983 1 134 n =    2,928 
 within  0 25.52049 25.52049 T =       1 
       
marketshare overall 0.0803794 0.1582103 1.93E-10 1 N =    2,003 
 between  0.1582103 1.93E-10 1 n =    2,003 
 within  0 0.0803794 0.0803794 T =       1 
       
cust_bank overall 30.2686 125.5437 1 2,703 N =    2,003 
 between  125.5437 1 2,703 n =    2,003 
 within  0 30.2686 30.2686 T =       1 
       
acc_bank overall 51.58213 2.01E+02 1 4.02E+03 N =    2,003 
 between  200.7635 1.00E+00 4.02E+03 n =    2,003 
 within  0 51.58213 51.58213 T =       1 
       
loansize_bank overall 1.24E+08 1.04E+09 0 3.26E+10 N =    2,928 
 between  1.04E+09 0 3.26E+10 n =    2,928 
 within  0 1.24E+08 1.24E+08 T =       1 
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Table I.5 - Year 2001 
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.0366759 0.0251547 -0.0107949 0.0863708 N =    1,585 
 between  0.0251547 -0.0107949 0.0863708 n =    1,585 
 within  0 0.0366759 0.0366759 T =       1 
       
iratespread(loan rates-nibor) overall 0.0119792 0.0153554 -0.0099608 3.08E-02 N =    2,030 
 between  0.0153554 -0.0099608 0.0308328 n =    2,030 
 within  0 0.0119792 0.0119792 T =       1 
       
hhi overall 0.3004264 1.53E-01 0.1362995 9.25E-01 N =    3,015 
 between  0.1534881 1.36E-01 9.25E-01 n =    3,015 
 within  0 0.3004264 0.3004264 T =       1 
       
loansize_reg overall 2,947,913 2,080,879 161,619.4 1.43E+07 N =    3,015 
 between  2,080,879 161,619.4 1.43E+07 n =    3,015 
 within  0 2,947,913 2,947,913 T =       1 
       
banksize_reg overall 2.00E+08 2.69E+08 9,69,716.3 1.02E+09 N =    2,030 
 between  2.69E+08 9,69,716.3 1.02E+09 n =    2,030 
 within  0 2.00E+08 2.00E+08 T =       1 
       
cust_reg overall 1,340.01 2,685.581 3 12,232 N =    3,015 
 between  2,685.581 3 12,232 n =    3,015 
 within  0 1,340.01 1,340.01 T =       1 
       
acc_reg overall 2,192.194 4,235.424 4.00E+00 19,198 N =    3,015 
 between  4,235.424 4 19,198 n =    3,015 
 within  0 2,192.194 2,192.194 T =       1 
       
banks_reg overall 25.73532 27.82403 2 132 N =    3,015 
 between  27.82403 2 132 n =    3,015 
 within  0 25.73532 25.73532 T =       1 
       
marketshare overall 0.0793103 0.1558145 4.18E-10 0.9615608 N =    2,030 
 between  0.1558145 4.18E-10 0.9615608 n =    2,030 
 within  0 0.0793103 0.0793103 T =       1 
       
cust_bank overall 30.52414 1.25E+02 1 2.76E+03 N =    2,030 
 between  125.2783 1.00E+00 2.76E+03 n =    2,030 
 within  0 30.52414 30.52414 T =       1 
       
acc_bank overall 51.64138 199.826 1 4,090 N =    2,030 
 between  199.826 1 4,090 n =    2,030 
 within  0 51.64138 51.64138 T =       1 
       
loansize_bank overall 1.35E+08 1.12E+09 0 3.31E+10 N =    3,015 
 between  1.12E+09 0 3.31E+10 n =    3,015 
 within  0 1.35E+08 1.35E+08 T =       1 
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Table I.6  - Year 2002 
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.0342231 0.0199569 -0.0084086 6.46E-02 N =    1,619 
 between  0.0199569 -0.0084086 0.0646097 n =    1,619 
 within  0 0.0342231 0.0342231 T =       1 
       
iratespread(loan rates-nibor) overall 0.0126698 1.44E-02 -0.0087701 2.95E-02 N =    2,072 
 between  0.0144371 -8.77E-03 2.95E-02 n =    2,072 
 within  0 0.0126698 0.0126698 T =       1 
       
hhi overall 0.2903574 0.1455015 0.127712 1 N =    3,147 
 between  0.1455015 0.127712 1 n =    3,147 
 within  0 0.2903574 0.2903574 T =       1 
       
loansize_reg overall 2,993,048 1,968,967 196,390 1.57E+07 N =    3,147 
 between  1,968,967 196,390 1.57E+07 n =    3,147 
 within  0 2,993,048 2993048 T =       1 
       
banksize_reg overall 1.93E+08 2.53E+08 960,590.7 9.88E+08 N =    2,072 
 between  2.53E+08 960,590.7 9.88E+08 n =    2,072 
 within  0 1.93E+08 1.93E+08 T =       1 
       
cust_reg overall 1,318.027 2,635.9 3.00E+00 12,173 N =    3,147 
 between  2,635.9 3 12,173 n =    3,147 
 within  0 1,318.027 1,318.027 T =       1 
       
acc_reg overall 2,112.657 4,070.076 6 18,714 N =    3,147 
 between  4,070.076 6 18,714 n =    3,147 
 within  0 2,112.657 2,112.657 T =       1 
       
banks_reg overall 25.8694 27.93957 1 134 N =    3,147 
 between  27.93957 1 134 n =    3,147 
 within  0 25.8694 25.8694 T =       1 
       
marketshare overall 0.0777027 1.53E-01 2.07E-10 1.00E+00 N =    2,072 
 between  0.1533047 2.07E-10 1.00E+00 n =    2,072 
 within  0 0.0777027 0.0777027 T =       1 
       
cust_bank overall 30.15782 121.9428 1 2,586 N =    2,072 
 between  121.9428 1 2,586 n =    2,072 
 within  0 30.15782 30.15782 T =       1 
       
acc_bank overall 50.00772 191.675 1 3,807 N =    2,072 
 between  191.675 1 3,807 n =    2,072 
 within  0 50.00772 50.00772 T =       1 
       
loansize_bank overall 1.27E+08 1.05E+09 0 3.53E+10 N =    3,147 
 between  1.05E+09 0 3.53E+10 n =    3,147 
 within  0 1.27E+08 1.27E+08 T =       1 
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Table I.7 – Year 2003 
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.0365563 1.93E-02 -0.0107414 6.61E-02 N =    1,617 
 between  0.0193377 -1.07E-02 6.61E-02 n =    1,617 
 within  0 0.0365563 0.0365563 T =       1 
       
iratespread(loan rates-nibor) overall 0.0293014 0.0148625 0.0068553 0.0472835 N =    2,110 
 between  0.0148625 0.0068553 0.0472835 n =    2,110 
 within  0 0.0293014 0.0293014 T =       1 
       
hhi overall 0.2991742 0.1498129 0.122954 1 N =    3,324 
 between  0.1498129 0.122954 1 n =    3,324 
 within  0 0.2991742 0.2991742 T =       1 
       
loansize_reg overall 2,997,736 2,273,799 231,883.5 1.90E+07 N =    3,324 
 between  2,273,799 231,883.5 1.90E+07 n =    3,324 
 within  0 2,997,736 2997736 T =       1 
       
banksize_reg overall 2.17E+08 3.17E+08 6.04E+05 1.26E+09 N =    2,110 
 between  3.17E+08 603582.7 1.26E+09 n =    2,110 
 within  0 2.17E+08 2.17E+08 T =       1 
       
cust_reg overall 1,479.714 3,048.374 5 14,415 N =    3,324 
 between  3,048.374 5 14,415 n =    3,324 
 within  0 1,479.714 1,479.714 T =       1 
       
acc_reg overall 2,313.836 4,592.932 6 21,611 N =    3,324 
 between  4,592.932 6 21,611 n =    3,324 
 within  0 2,313.836 2,313.836 T =       1 
       
banks_reg overall 26.85289 2.82E+01 1 1.35E+02 N =    3,324 
 between  28.21652 1.00E+00 1.35E+02 n =    3,324 
 within  0 26.85289 26.85289 T =       1 
       
marketshare overall 0.0763033 0.1551849 1.36E-10 1 N =    2,110 
 between  0.1551849 1.36E-10 1 n =    2,110 
 within  0 0.0763033 0.0763033 T =       1 
       
cust_bank overall 32.77583 141.0108 1 3,296 N =    2,110 
 between  141.0108 1 3,296 n =    2,110 
 within  0 32.77583 32.77583 T =       1 
       
acc_bank overall 52.92464 217.0364 1 5,075 N =    2110 
 between  217.0364 1 5,075 n =    2110 
 within  0 52.92464 52.92464 T =       1 
       
loansize_bank overall 1.38E+08 1.39E+09 0 5.79E+10 N =    3,324 
 between  1.39E+09 0 5.79E+10 n =    3,324 
 within  0 1.38E+08 1.38E+08 T =       1 
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Table I.8 - Year 2004 
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.0372566 0.0141281 0.0052146 0.0565282 N =    1,567 
 between  0.0141281 0.0052146 0.0565282 n =    1,567 
 within  0 0.0372566 0.0372566 T =       1 
       
iratespread(loan rates-nibor) overall 0.028441 0.0131463 0.0082187 0.0430466 N =    2,011 
 between  0.0131463 0.0082187 0.0430466 n =    2,011 
 within  0 0.028441 0.028441 T =       1 
       
hhi overall 0.3243501 0.144513 0.1427265 0.9948181 N =    3,169 
 between  0.144513 0.1427265 0.9948181 n =    3,169 
 within  0 0.3243501 0.3243501 T =       1 
       
loansize_reg overall 3,150,087 2,519,533 226272.7 1.86E+07 N =    3,169 
 between  2,519,533 226272.7 1.86E+07 n =    3,169 
 within  0 3,150,087 3,150,087 T =       1 
       
banksize_reg overall 2.27E+08 3.30E+08 654,084 1.26E+09 N =    2,011 
 between  3.30E+08 654,084 1.26E+09 n =    2,011 
 within  0 2.27E+08 2.27E+08 T =       1 
       
cust_reg overall 1,473.186 2,928.72 5 13,665 N =    3,169 
 between  2,928.72 5 13,665 n =    3,169 
 within  0 1,473.186 1,473.186 T =       1 
       
acc_reg overall 2,293.463 4,419.979 6 2,0516 N =    3,169 
 between  4,419.979 6 2,0516 n =    3,169 
 within  0 2,293.463 2,293.463 T =       1 
       
banks_reg overall 25.85547 26.8482 2 129 N =    3,169 
 between  26.8482 2 129 n =    3,169 
 within  0 25.85547 25.85547 T =       1 
       
marketshare overall 0.0800597 0.1615952 2.58E-10 0.9974023 N =    2,011 
 between  0.1615952 2.58E-10 0.9974023 n =    2,011 
 within  0 0.0800597 0.0800597 T =       1 
       
cust_bank overall 33.65639 167.1839 1 5,710 N =    2,011 
 between  167.1839 1 5,710 n =    2,011 
 within  0 33.65639 33.65639 T =       1 
       
acc_bank overall 53.8538 255.1607 1 8,479 N =    2011 
 between  255.1607 1 8,479 n =    2011 
 within  0 53.8538 53.8538 T =       1 
       
loansize_bank overall 1.44E+08 1.46E+09 0 6.27E+10 N =    3,169 
 between  1.46E+09 0 6.27E+10 n =    3,169 
 within  0 1.44E+08 1.44E+08 T =       1 
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Table I.9 - Year 2005 
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.034616 0.0127886 0.0037272 0.0525087 N =    1,460 
 between  0.0127886 0.0037272 0.0525087 n =    1,460 
 within  0 0.034616 0.034616 T =       1 
       
iratespread(loan rates-nibor) overall 0.0239911 0.0109124 0.0060636 0.0366301 N =    1,761 
 between  0.0109124 0.0060636 0.0366301 n =    1,761 
 within  0 0.0239911 0.0239911 T =       1 
       
hhi overall 0.342676 0.1517904 0.1391347 1 N =    3,345 
 between  0.1517904 0.1391347 1 n =    3,345 
 within  0 0.342676 0.342676 T =       1 
       
loansize_reg overall 3,772,673 3,855,410 226,612.7 4.20E+07 N =    3,345 
 between  3,855,410 226,612.7 4.20E+07 n =    3,345 
 within  0 3,772,673 3772673 T =       1 
       
banksize_reg overall 3.33E+08 5.07E+08 492,858 1.89E+09 N =    1,761 
 between  5.07E+08 492,858 1.89E+09 n =    1,761 
 within  0 3.33E+08 3.33E+08 T =       1 
       
cust_reg overall 1,462.425 3,011.526 4 14,377 N =    3,345 
 between  3,011.526 4 14,377 n =    3,345 
 within  0 1,462.425 1,462.425 T =       1 
       
acc_reg overall 2,252.1 4,522.863 5 21,491 N =    3,345 
 between  4,522.863 5 21,491 n =    3,345 
 within  0 2,252.1 2,252.1 T =       1 
       
banks_reg overall 22.21913 24.28082 1 120 N =    3,345 
 between  24.28082 1 120 n =    3,345 
 within  0 22.21913 22.21913 T =       1 
       
marketshare overall 0.0914253 0.1767707 3.49E-11 1 N =    1,761 
 between  0.1767707 3.49E-11 1 n =    1,761 
 within  0 0.0914253 0.0914253 T =       1 
       
cust_bank overall 39.31516 179.4471 1 5,554 N =    1,761 
 between  179.4471 1 5,554 n =    1,761 
 within  0 39.31516 39.31516 T =       1 
       
acc_bank overall 61.86428 271.0811 0 8,227 N =    1,761 
 between  271.0811 0 8,227 n =    1,761 
 within  0 61.86428 61.86428 T =       1 
       
loansize_bank overall 1.77E+08 1.89E+09 0 7.05E+10 N =    3,345 
 between  1.89E+09 0 7.05E+10 n =    3,345 
 within  0 1.77E+08 1.77E+08 T =       1 
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Table I.10 - Year 2006 
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.0315847 0.0123654 0.0027669 0.0486579 N =    1,546 
 between  0.0123654 0.0027669 0.0486579 n =    1,546 
 within  0 0.0315847 0.0315847 T =       1 
       
iratespread(loan rates-nibor) overall 0.0181226 0.0096524 0.0026363 0.0292453 N =    1,952 
 between  0.0096524 0.0026363 0.0292453 n =    1,952 
 within  0 0.0181226 0.0181226 T =       1 
       
hhi overall 0.3229391 0.1396047 0.1567824 0.9829303 N =    3,538 
 between  0.1396047 0.1567824 0.9829303 n =    3,538 
 within  0 0.3229391 0.3229391 T =       1 
       
loansize_reg overall 3829980 3,083,203 318,308.3 2.24E+07 N =    3,538 
 between  3,083,203 318,308.3 2.24E+07 n =    3,538 
 within  0 3,829,980 3,829,980 T =       1 
       
banksize_reg overall 3.31E+08 5.35E+08 875,663 2.17E+09 N =    1,952 
 between  5.35E+08 875,663 2.17E+09 n =    1,952 
 within  0 3.31E+08 3.31E+08 T =       1 
       
cust_reg overall 1,533.862 3,202.634 3 15,632 N =    3,538 
 between  3,202.634 3 15,632 n =    3,538 
 within  0 1,533.862 1,533.862 T =       1 
       
acc_reg overall 2,359.94 4,843.704 5 23,563 N =    3,538 
 between  4,843.704 5 23,563 n =    3,538 
 within  0 2,359.94 2,359.94 T =       1 
       
banks_reg overall 23.37959 24.10169 2 122 N =    3,538 
 between  24.10169 2 122 n =    3,538 
 within  0 23.37959 23.37959 T =       1 
       
marketshare overall 0.0824795 0.1648653 7.23E-11 0.991402 N =    1,952 
 between  0.1648653 7.23E-11 0.991402 n =    1,952 
 within  0 0.0824795 0.0824795 T =       1 
       
cust_bank overall 38.21311 166.7513 1 4,993 N =    1,952 
 between  166.7513 1 4,993 n =    1,952 
 within  0 38.21311 38.21311 T =       1 
       
acc_bank overall 59.63883 250.9966 1 7364 N =    1,952 
 between  250.9966 1 7364 n =    1,952 
 within  0 59.63883 59.63883 T =       1 
       
loansize_bank overall 1.83E+08 2.04E+09 0 8.48E+10 N =    3538 
 between  2.04E+09 0 8.48E+10 n =    3538 
 within  0 1.83E+08 1.83E+08 T =       1 
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Table I.11 - Year 2007 
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.0317287 0.0152443 -0.0014121 0.0538908 N =    1,614 
 between  0.0152443 -0.0014121 0.0538908 n =    1,614 
 within  0 0.0317287 0.0317287 T =       1 
       
iratespread(loan rates-nibor) overall 0.014374 0.010164 -0.0001968 0.0267245 N =    2,033 
 between  0.010164 -0.0001968 0.0267245 n =    2,033 
 within  0 0.014374 0.014374 T =       1 
       
hhi overall 0.3224919 0.1411149 0.1575334 1 N =    3,835 
 between  0.1411149 0.1575334 1 n =    3,835 
 within  0 0.3224919 0.3224919 T =       1 
       
loansize_reg overall 4,189,031 3,500,483 372,635.9 2.87E+07 N =    3,835 
 between  3,500,483 372,635.9 2.87E+07 n =    3,835 
 within  0 4,189,031 4,189,031 T =       1 
       
banksize_reg overall 3.67E+08 5.78E+08 1,376,988 2.34E+09 N =    2,033 
 between  5.78E+08 1,376,988 2.34E+09 n =    2,033 
 within  0 3.67E+08 3.67E+08 T =       1 
       
cust_reg overall 1,602.523 3,360.882 4 16,887 N =    3,835 
 between  3,360.882 4 16,887 n =    3,835 
 within  0 1,602.523 1,602.523 T =       1 
       
acc_reg overall 2,463.64 5,102.111 7 25,568 N =    3,835 
 between  5,102.111 7 25,568 n =    3,835 
 within  0 2,463.64 2,463.64 T =       1 
       
banks_reg overall 24.24641 24.37143 1 125 N =    3,835 
 between  24.37143 1 125 n =    3,835 
 within  0 24.24641 24.24641 T =       1 
       
marketshare overall 0.0791933 0.161528 4.71E-10 1 N =    2,033 
 between  0.161528 4.71E-10 1 n =    2,033 
 within  0 0.0791933 0.0791933 T =       1 
       
cust_bank overall 39.46778 169.402 1 4,893 N =    2,033 
 between  169.402 1 4,893 n =    2,033 
 within  0 39.46778 39.46778 T =       1 
       
acc_bank overall 61.46188 255.5365 0 7,187 N =    2,033 
 between  255.5365 0 7,187 n =    2,033 
 within  0 61.46188 61.46188 T =       1 
       
loansize_bank overall 1.96E+08 2.28E+09 0 1.08E+11 N =    3,835 
 between  2.28E+09 0 1.08E+11 n =    3,835 
 within  0 1.96E+08 1.96E+08 T =       1 
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Table I.12 – Year 2008 
Variable Components of Std.Dev Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
iratespread(loans-deposits) overall 0.0348141 0.0176727 -0.0044051 0.0635365 N =    1,665 
 between  0.0176727 -0.0044051 0.0635365 n =    1,665 
 within  0 0.0348141 0.0348141 T =       1 
       
iratespread(loan rates-nibor) overall 0.0177354 0.0123523 0.0013358 0.0346434 N =    2,141 
 between  0.0123523 0.0013358 0.0346434 n =    2,141 
 within  0 0.0177354 0.0177354 T =       1 
       
hhi overall 0.331168 0.1510989 0.1489888 1 N =    4,151 
 between  0.1510989 0.1489888 1 n =    4,151 
 within  0 0.331168 0.331168 T =       1 
       
loansize_reg overall 4,976,342 4,379,193 468,861.7 3.33E+07 N =    4,151 
 between  4,379,193 468,861.7 3.33E+07 n =    4,151 
 within  0 4,976,342 4,976,342 T =       1 
       
banksize_reg overall 4.28E+08 7.07E+08 1,210,953 3.00E+09 N =    2,141 
 between  7.07E+08 1,210,953 3.00E+09 n =    2,141 
 within  0 4.28E+08 4.28E+08 T =       1 
       
cust_reg overall 1,547.873 3,202.862 5 16,621 N =    4151 
 between  3,202.862 5 16,621 n =    4151 
 within  0 1,547.873 1,547.873 T =       1 
       
acc_reg overall 2,415.689 4,983.47 7 25,874 N =    4,151 
 between  4,983.47 7 25,874 n =    4,151 
 within  0 2,415.689 2,415.689 T =       1 
       
banks_reg overall 25.03204 23.6258 1 120 N =    4,151 
 between  23.6258 1 120 n =    4,151 
 within  0 25.03204 25.03204 T =       1 
       
marketshare overall 0.0751985 0.1612633 2.54E-11 1 N =    2,141 
 between  0.1612633 2.54E-11 1 n =    2,141 
 within  0 0.0751985 0.0751985 T =       1 
       
cust_bank overall 37.70107 161.8337 1 4,724 N =    2,141 
 between  161.8337 1 4,724 n =    2,141 
 within  0 37.70107 37.70107 T =       1 
       
acc_bank overall 59.3475 250.4156 0 7,028 N =    2,141 
 between  250.4156 0 7,028 n =    2,141 
 within  0 59.3475 59.3475 T =       1 
       
loansize_bank overall 2.22E+08 2.71E+09 0 1.29E+11 N =    4,151 
 between  2.71E+09 0 1.29E+11 n =    4,151 
 within  0 2.22E+08 2.22E+08 T =       1 
 
 
 
 
